Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine in Postwar Greece

Background: Greece Before and During World War II

It is impossible to discuss the Marshall Plan in Greece without first gaining an understanding of the situation that warranted international intervention. The situation began prior to World War II when Greece became a conservative dictatorship under General Ioannis Metaxas in 1936. King George II, who had been living in exile for twelve years in England, initially appointed Metaxas as leader. The period was generally marked by unrest due to labor issues and poor economic conditions. Metaxas used this unrest to his advantage and was able to suspend important parts of the constitution in the summer of 1936.[2]

Metaxas' regime, known as the "Regime of the Fourth of August 1936," was not viewed positively by most and has been labeled "an authoritarian, backward-looking and paternalistic dictatorship, overlaid with a patina of quasi-fascist rhetoric and style."[3] It was a fascist regime but lacked the power of other such regimes that were gaining strength across Europe at the time. Metaxas' government was aware of the growing problems in Europe and attempted to align itself with Great Britain, which had been a supporter for many years. Without offering a formal treaty of alliance, Britain and France offered to help protect Greece's territory from invasion as long as Greece would also resist any external aggression. Since Italy had just entered and occupied Greece's neighbor Albania, Greece gratefully accepted the offer from Britain and France in 1939, believing it would be safe.[4]

Although it was Metaxas' hope not to get involved in the war, it soon became obvious that he would have no choice. Mussolini of Italy, anxious to show off to his ally Germany, decided that Greece would be an easy target. On October 28, 1940, Italy demanded that Greece surrender. Greece immediately refused and found itself under attack shortly thereafter. Germany, seeing a complete occupation of Greece as a strategic necessity, brought in extra troops, and a bloody battle began in the spring of 1941. Greek soldiers and citizens fought valiantly against the well-supplied and highly aggressive enemy, but in the end Greece was unable to stop them and was occupied by a joint force from Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.[5]

Greece was divided into three regions based on the occupying forces. Greece did maintain a type of government based in Athens under General Tsolakoglou. However, this government was not very effective against its occupiers and mostly existed as a figurehead. As a result of the occupation and the weaknesses of Tsolakoglou's government, food was not distributed adequately, and many starved during the first winter of occupation.[6] The situation did not improve for many years as the country continued to be occupied.

As happened in other occupied nations, such as France, small pockets of resistance did exist. At first these were small groups of former military troops, but they were unable to put a substantial dent in the occupying forces. Other, more powerful resistance groups began to emerge that would set the stage for the civil war to follow World War II. An urban group known as the EA, or National Solidarity, was able to find and distribute food and control the black market. The EA was tied to the EAM, or National Liberation Front, which was more directly involved in actual military resistance. Behind both of these groups was the KKE, or Greek Communist Party. The Communist Party continued to dominate the resistance movement with the creation of the ELAS, or Greek People's Liberation Army. In order to advance its own agenda, the KKE actually fought and eliminated other resistance groups so that it would be the most powerful force to emerge from the chaos of occupation.[7]

The EAM and ELAS were effective forms of resistance, so Greece's ally Britain felt compelled to support these communist-led groups. However, the British also wanted to see the Greek monarchy restored and created the EDES, or National Republican Greek League, with that aim in mind. The EDES did not have the power of the EAM and ELAS and was soon driven from power despite British support.[8] Consequently, in the fall of 1944, when Germany withdrew from Greece, the EAM/ELAS was able to seize power — though not securely. Britain remained involved in the conflict with military advisors and troops. Furthermore, unknown to Greek authorities at the time, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had already negotiated with Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union to keep Greece within the British sphere of influence in exchange for Soviet influence in the Eastern European countries of Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland.[9] Greece was unaware of this negotiation, and consequently many were genuinely concerned about possible Soviet support for the communist faction in Greece.

As a result of the occupation and intense political instability, Greece's condition at the close of World War II was nothing short of appalling. James Warren, a member of the American contingent who went to Greece as part of the Marshall Plan at the age of 23, summarized the condition of Greece following the joint occupation in a 1996 interview:

"Greece, of course, emerged from the war in a terrible state. Probably 2,000 of the nation's villages had been razed and burnt to the ground by the reprisal raids of the Nazis. There was not a harbour in Greece that was usable. There was hardly any road that could distribute supplies to starving people; the railroad was a total wreck; the Corinth Canal, of course, was filled with railroad cars dumped there by the Nazis. The industrial structure of the country was in fair shape, but the basic sinews of the economy were wrecked. A million goats killed, a million sheep killed, most livestock destroyed. Hardly a bridge left standing anywhere in the country. That was the result, if you will, of World War II."[10]

Years of occupation, resistance, and retaliation had huge repercussions for Greece. Unfortunately, the pain and suffering were not yet concluded — a terrible civil war was still to be fought on the same soil by the various factions who wished to ultimately control the nation.

The Greek Civil War and the Truman Doctrine

In what has been called "Europe's bloodiest conflict between 1945 and the breakup of Yugoslavia," Greece went to war with itself from 1946 to 1949.[11] Right after the end of World War II, Britain was able to focus its attention on Greece and supply enough support to restore a monarchy-friendly government.[12] A wave of retributions occurred against communist-associated forces and leaders, causing purges and executions on a large scale.[13] As a result of the purges and killings, a guerrilla movement began to grow and rapidly gained strength. Soon it consisted of "17,000 fighters, 50,000 active supporters, and perhaps 250,000 sympathizers, in a country of 7 million."[14] This rebellion was becoming too much for the British to manage.

Consequently, United States President Harry S. Truman addressed the U.S. Congress on March 12, 1947. Truman laid out a plan — the Truman Doctrine — that would support the governments of Greece and Turkey. The United States' intention was to prevent the spread of communism into this region for several reasons. In the speech, Truman insisted that without the foreign aid that Great Britain was no longer financially able to supply, Greece would certainly fall to the pressure of the Soviet Union and become communist.[15] The United States saw that this must be prevented at all costs due to Greece's connection to the economies of Western Europe and the United States. Furthermore, with Greece's strategic position in the Mediterranean region and proximity to the Middle East, it and Turkey could be vital allies in the future of global politics.[16]

Greece, Turkey, and Iran were part of the so-called Northern Tier, a buffer zone designed to stop the USSR from gaining access to Middle Eastern oil reserves and the Persian Gulf. Some have suggested that these nations were used as pawns in a much larger political game. Since those nations needed assistance, they were given it — but with certain expectations about their future allegiances. This was certainly what the Truman Doctrine was designed to bring about in this region of the world.[17]

The aid package that Truman proposed, and that was approved by the U.S. Congress on May 22, 1947, was valued at $400 million. Some sources state that Greece was to receive $350 million and Turkey the remaining $50 million.[18] Others suggest the split was somewhat more even, with Greece receiving $300 million overall. As Truman intended it, Greece and Turkey were each to receive an equal amount in relief and military supplies, with $150 million going to each category for Greece; Turkey was to receive $100 million in arms and military advice.[19] The ability and willingness of the United States to give this kind and amount of aid, coupled with the strategic purpose behind the package, solidly positioned the United States as a world superpower. Truman saw the necessity of winning Greece from communism, and the fact that he put so much on the line to do it demonstrates his and the United States' willingness to act in a world leadership role. The isolationist policies of the past would no longer work in the growing environment of the Cold War and the escalating concern about spheres of influence in Europe.[20]

Truman's timing could not have been better, as the situation for the Greek government was bleak in the spring of 1947. The Greek National Army (GNA) began advancing toward areas where the communist guerrillas were known to operate in April of that year. The drive through central Greece heading north was expected to be successful — it was assumed the guerrillas would yield, and they were even offered amnesty if they surrendered. However, the army bogged down and became the victim of ambushes and guerrilla attacks. Frequently the GNA could not distinguish the enemy from innocent civilians in the villages; villagers often secretly worked for the guerrillas, making life even more difficult for the legitimate army and eroding soldiers' morale. The civil war mostly affected the countryside and isolated villages, while the cities remained relatively safely held by the Greek government. Despite this, the economy of the nation came to a standstill, as it was largely agricultural.[21]

The communist-backed guerrillas were able to operate in the mountainous areas in small groups of 70 to 100 men, crippling the central government by cutting off access to supplies and roads. The guerrilla forces were receiving assistance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria — all pro-Soviet, communist countries at the time — which helped train and supply them.[22] It was clearly not a fair fight. The Truman Doctrine served to shift the balance in favor of the legitimate government. The Greek government was also beginning to gain more general support following the death of King George II. His brother, Paul I, came to the throne and was a more active and politically engaged person. Paul was also more widely liked in his country and more respected as a political figure by the United States.[23]

The Marshall Plan: Origins and European Context

As all of that was occurring, the post-war conditions in Greece continued to decline. With the backdrop of the civil war, the U.S. was recognizing the need for other forms of intervention in Greece and throughout Western Europe. To help relieve the economic and social conditions of the time, a plan was being formulated. On July 12, 1947, at a meeting of the European states, a recovery plan was being developed. The plan, known as the European Recovery Plan or the Marshall Plan, was first introduced by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall at a graduation address at Harvard University in June of 1947. Marshall was one of the most respected leaders of his day — a "former wartime chief of staff, the first career soldier to become secretary of state. Marshall was a man of enormous personal integrity whose selfless devotion to duty and hard-boiled honesty made him one of the most respected global leaders of the day."[30] Marshall's role in World War II and his involvement in current affairs, including the civil war in Greece, made him the ideal figure to announce and implement this plan.

The plan was a massive investment by the U.S. government in economic recovery in both Western Europe and the forming Eastern Bloc states. The plan would actually be so expensive that Truman's administration was reluctant to reveal it to the U.S. public and did not invite the American press to the commencement speech at Harvard. The British press had been tipped off to the text of the speech, and soon the word spread throughout the world.[31] The program would equal between 5 and 10 percent of the U.S. federal budget, or 2 percent of the U.S. gross national product, over the four years of the program.[32] Even though the program would be crushingly expensive to American taxpayers — equaling about $13 billion (roughly $130 billion in today's terms) — the need was obvious.[33] Across Europe the conditions were nearly the same:

"Food shortages and inflation discouraged maximum efforts by a demoralized workforce; shortages of coal, steel, and other basic resources further restrained production; and the severe winter of 1946–47, the worst in modern memory, nearly wiped out earlier economic gains. In 1947, Western Europe's agricultural production averaged only 83 percent of its prewar volume, industrial production only 88 percent, and exports a bare 59 percent. Translated into human terms, these figures added up to widespread fatigue and a pervasive sense of pessimism about the future."[34]

Europe was not able to fix these problems on its own due to a lack of money. Gold and dollar reserves were dwindling, and consequently the nations were unable to purchase needed equipment and supplies.[35] Businesses did not have the capital to invest and therefore could not advance.

The U.S., France, and Great Britain agreed that the Soviet Union and countries within its sphere would be given the opportunity to benefit from the Marshall Plan. The offer was made, but — to no one's surprise — the Soviets refused because they did not wish to have their financial situation evaluated, which was considered a necessary part of the plan. Furthermore, the Soviets prevented their sphere-of-influence countries from accepting the plan, fearing those countries would become part of the Western European economy and the U.S. sphere of influence. Stalin and other leaders could not accept these conditions and feared the consequences. The United States' generous offer was refused, eliminating these nations from any foreign assistance, which led to their isolation and dependence on the Soviet Union.[36]

Works Cited

Bernaris, Anthony. "Oral History Interview with Anthony Bernaris." By Philip C. Brooks. Truman Presidential Museum and Library. 30 April 1964. Accessed 19 January 2007.

Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

"Corinth Canal." 2003. Accessed 19 January 2007.

Hogan, Michael J. "Blueprint for Recovery." The Marshall Plan: Investment in Peace. Accessed 18 January 2007. http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/marshall/pam-blu.htm

Jones, Howard. "A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Kofas, Jon V. Under the Eagle's Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.-Greek Relations. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Kousoulas, Dimitrios G. The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939–1953. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953.

Mazower, Mark, ed. After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State of Greece, 1943–1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

O'Ballance, Edgar. The Greek Civil War 1944–1949. New York: Praeger, 1966.

"The Marshall Plan in Greece." GoGreece.com. 1996–2004. Accessed 19 January 2007.

Warren, James. "Interview with James Warren." Marshall Plan Episode. 17 February 1996. Accessed 19 January 2007. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-3/warnen1.html

Wittner, Lawrence C. American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Zinn, Howard. "A People's War." A People's History of the United States. 2002. Accessed 18 January 2007. http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/zinn-chap16.html