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Essay Undergraduate 1,267 words

Three Mile Island and Challenger Disaster Memos Compared

~7 min read 6 sections History · 21St Century
Abstract

This paper examines two sets of internal memos related to two of the most significant technological disasters in American history: the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown and the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion. Through analysis of the "Filthy Five" memos from Three Mile Island and two key Challenger memos, the paper argues that both disasters resulted from preventable failures in institutional communication and decision-making. At Three Mile Island, operators dismissed the reactor builders' warnings about incorrect bypass procedures. In the Challenger program, managers prioritized budget concerns over unresolved safety questions about O-ring seal failures. Together, these cases illustrate how organizational arrogance and financial pressures can override technical expertise with catastrophic consequences.

Key Takeaways
  • Introduction to Two Preventable Disasters: Overview of both disasters and memo sources
  • The Three Mile Island Memos: Ignored Warnings: TMI memo chain and rejected safety recommendations
  • Operator Arrogance and the TMI Meltdown: Operators override builders, causing core meltdown
  • The Challenger Memos: Safety Versus Budget: Budget pressures overshadow O-ring safety concerns
  • O-Ring Uncertainty and Institutional Doubt: Davids expresses doubts about putty as root cause
  • Conclusion: Organizational Failure as Root Cause: Both disasters traced to institutional priority failures
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What makes this paper effective

  • The paper draws a clear structural parallel between two distinct disasters, using internal memos as primary sources to build a coherent comparative argument.
  • Direct quotations from the memos are used selectively and effectively to support claims, lending authenticity and specificity to each point.
  • The analysis moves beyond description to draw evaluative conclusions — identifying arrogance and budget prioritization as the real causes — rather than simply summarizing the documents.

Key academic technique demonstrated

The paper demonstrates primary source analysis: it reads a series of institutional memos not just for their surface content but for what they reveal about organizational culture, power dynamics, and decision-making priorities. By tracing the chain of memos in sequence, the author reconstructs how warnings were raised, deflected, and ultimately ignored in both cases.

Structure breakdown

The paper is organized into two parallel case studies. The first half addresses Three Mile Island, walking through five memos chronologically to show how operators rejected the reactor builder's safety recommendations. The second half turns to the Challenger, analyzing two memos to show how budget and scheduling concerns displaced unresolved safety questions. A brief conclusion synthesizes the common thread: in both disasters, institutional priorities overrode expert technical warnings.

Essay 1,267 words

Introduction to Two Preventable Disasters

The series of memos entitled "The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster" details how a conflict over the operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Facility — between the Babcock & Wilcox Company and the facility's operators — led to the greatest nuclear power disaster in United States history. While the builders of the reactor warned the operators that their operating procedures were incorrect, the operators refused to accept those findings and continued to run the facility improperly, ultimately producing a catastrophic nuclear accident.

The Three Mile Island Memos: Ignored Warnings

The initial memo, "Memo 1," describes two incidents in which operators did not follow procedures as recommended by the Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) company (Kelly). In response, "Memo 2" — written by a facility manager — stated that the other operators "responded in the correct manner considering how they have been trained" (Walters). This wording suggests that operators may have been trained in incorrect procedures, but the memo was framed in a way that deflected responsibility away from those directly involved in the two initial incidents.

Babcock & Wilcox were extremely emphatic in "Memo 3" that the procedures used by the operators — primarily bypassing the high pressure injection (HPI) system after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) — were incorrect and could lead to "core uncovery and possible fuel damage" (Dunn 3). Even after B&W followed up with "Memo 4," specifically instructing the operators when to bypass the HPI system and when not to, the operating managers refused to accept the builders' recommendations (Dunn 4).

Instead, the operators produced the final memo, "Memo 5," stating their belief that following the procedures outlined by B&W could cause the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to solidify. On those grounds, they declined to follow the recommended procedures. As a result, the Three Mile Island facility suffered a catastrophic meltdown: the core became uncovered, the fuel rods heated to damaging levels, and the facility and surrounding area sustained severe harm.

4 Sections Hidden · 660 words
Operator Arrogance and the TMI Meltdown150 words
Had the operators followed the procedures recommended by the reactor's builders, the disaster could have been prevented. The operators believed they understood the reactor's behavior better than those…
The Challenger Memos: Safety Versus Budget220 words
The next set of memos concerns the Space Shuttle Challenger and the disaster that befell it. These memos involve a problem that engineers discovered with the booster…
O-Ring Uncertainty and Institutional Doubt180 words
The second Challenger memo responds to the first by documenting 12 instances of in-flight O-ring erosion and identifying the "prime suspect" as the new type of putty used to seal the O-ring. The memo also attributes the unavailability of proper putty to EPA…
Conclusion: Organizational Failure as Root Cause110 words
Whether the Challenger disaster was caused by the failure of the O-ring or the putty that was supposed to seal it, the shuttle should never have been launched until a definitive answer was found. Irv Davids admitted in "Memo 2" that he had reservations about…

Works Cited

Cook, R. Memo 1 (Cook). 23 July 1985. The Challenger Disaster.

Davids, Irv. Memo 2 (Davids). 17 July 1985. The Challenger Disaster.

Dunn, Bert. Memo 3 (Dunn). 9 February 1978. The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster.

Dunn, Bert. Memo 4 (Dunn). 16 February 1978. The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster.

Hallman, D.F. Memo 5 (Hallman). 3 August 1978. The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster.

Kelly, J.J. Memo 1 (Kelly). 1 November 1977. The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster.

Walters, J.F. Memo 2 (Walters). 10 November 1977. The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster.

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Key Concepts in This Paper
Three Mile Island Challenger Disaster O-Ring Failure Institutional Communication Loss of Coolant Safety Warnings Organizational Arrogance Budget Prioritization High Pressure Injection Primary Source Memos
Cite This Paper
PaperDue. (2026). Three Mile Island and Challenger Disaster Memos Compared. PaperDue. https://www.paperdue.com/study-guide/three-mile-island-challenger-disaster-memos-118240

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