U.S.–India Security Ties After 9/11: Progress and Tensions

Executive Summary

This paper examines security ties between the US and India in the years after the 9/11 attacks on America. To provide context for those security ties and their development, it first looks at the relationship between India and the US in the years following World War II, when the Cold War caused significant tension between the two states. It shows how rifts were caused by various political maneuvers on the part of both the US and India.

Following the establishment of historical context, the paper turns to an examination of the ways in which US-India security ties improved after 9/11. Several instances are given showing that these ties developed and strengthened, particularly during the Bush and Obama administrations. This section supports the central thesis: that since 9/11, security ties between the US and India have improved and grown stronger.

The next section provides an antithesis to this argument, suggesting that beneath cordial relations, tensions and suspicion remain that undermine any steps toward the true creation of strong security ties. The reasons for this are geopolitical and cultural. Finally, the paper concludes with a synthesis of the two positions. The conclusion demonstrates how both perspectives hold merit and how the ultimate view of US-India security ties must account for each. Yet, with the help of sound diplomatic efforts, it is posited that strong security ties can be maintained between the two countries.

Historical Background: U.S.–India Relations Before 9/11

The central argument of this paper is that 9/11 changed the working dynamic in security operations and policy in the relationship between the US and India. Prior to 9/11, security ties between the two nations were relatively weak, largely due to tensions surrounding the Cold War. After 9/11 and the October attack in Kashmir, security ties became stronger (Ahmad). However, in recent years tensions have flared once more, as India also maintains relationships with Iran and Russia that the US has sought to discourage. In spite of recent security disagreements, it remains the thesis of this paper that since 9/11, US-India security ties have been strong and beneficial to both states.

The improvement in US-India security ties followed the 9/11 attacks of 2001. A concerted global effort to counter terrorism got underway, and the improvement in US-India security relations was a prime aspect of those developments. Part of this improvement was rooted in the absence of strong security ties between the two states in the past; another part stemmed from the fact that India had itself been attacked in Kashmir just one month after 9/11. Considering that India and Pakistan had a long-standing feud, and that Osama bin Laden—the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks—was said to be hiding somewhere in Pakistan, it made sense for the US and India to renew their relationship and strengthen their security ties (Javaid, Rashid).

To understand this development fully, it is helpful to first examine the security relationship between the US and India prior to 9/11. Beginning in 1947, as the Cold War was getting underway, the US viewed India's nuclear program with deep distrust (Council on Foreign Relations). India's independence in 1947 established a partition between the Muslim-majority region of Pakistan and the Hindu-majority state of India, and tensions between these regions would continue to flare. With tensions also rising between the US and the Soviet Union, India sought to pursue a policy of neutrality, spearheading the Non-Aligned Movement into the 1950s (Council on Foreign Relations).

In spite of India's non-alignment policy, ties between the US and India began to develop through education and research programs. The Indian Institutes of Technology were established, and the Kanpur Indo-American Program flourished as American academics collaborated with India to provide higher education in technology (Council on Foreign Relations). This collaboration helped bring India and the US closer on scientific matters, even as India remained diplomatically committed to non-alignment.

Tensions between China and India flared in 1962 over border disputes, and the US sided with India. However, that friendship would deteriorate in 1971 with the India-Pakistan conflict. In that war, the US sided with Pakistan because the Nixon Administration was seeking rapprochement with China via Pakistan (Council on Foreign Relations). India viewed this as a betrayal and moved toward the Soviet Union, signing a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets—thereby ending its policy of non-alignment (Council on Foreign Relations). The relationship between the US and India would remain estranged from that point, particularly after India detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1974. President Carter did engage India and secured the state's signature on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which allowed for inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Council on Foreign Relations).

In 1984, the Bhopal tragedy—in which a gas leak from an American firm killed thousands in an Indian village—increased the strain in US-India relations, as the US resisted pressure to extradite the firm's executives to India (Morehouse, Subramaniam). In 1998, India conducted underground nuclear tests, inviting sanctions from the US as a result (Council on Foreign Relations). It is clear, therefore, that prior to 9/11, the US and India were not on common footing when it came to building security ties.

Strengthening Security Ties After 9/11

On September 22, 2001, the G. W. Bush Administration lifted Clinton-era sanctions on India. It was the first step in a renewed show of solidarity between the two nations and a gesture of friendship from the US toward India. The US recognized that it would need India's assistance if it was going to partner with allies around the globe to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism through money laundering and other means (Pellon).

Still, the US and India had to find a way to work together toward common security aims while simultaneously pursuing their own national self-interests. For example, in 2005 the US wanted to sell fighter jets to Pakistan, and India wanted to cooperate with Iran in the field of energy. Because the US maintains a special relationship with Israel—and Israel views Iran as an enemy—the US routinely sanctions Iran and nations that engage in business relationships with it. Because Pakistan and India remain at odds with one another, the sale of military hardware to Pakistan by the US is viewed unfavorably by India. Thus, both states had reason to be hesitant about security cooperation (Vijayalakshmi).

However, it was still seen as being in both states' best interest to work together on security matters, given that the world had become increasingly globalized and the threat of terrorism could not be addressed adequately without strong security ties. India had suffered from terror attacks, as had the US, since 9/11. The terror attack on the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Mumbai in 2008 was a tragedy in which hundreds of Indians and six Americans died. This incident further heightened the need for enhanced security ties between the two nations. Indeed, Nobhojit Roy questioned whether the attacks on the Palace Hotel were not the beginning of a proxy war against the US.

Steps had in fact already been taken between 2005 and 2008 to strengthen security ties, and these developments irritated some of both states' enemies (Roy). In June 2005, India and the US signed a new defense framework—the US-India Defense Relationship agreement—which established parameters for maritime security cooperation and coordination. Months after that agreement, the two states conducted the largest joint naval exercise in their shared history (Council on Foreign Relations).

This demonstration of security cooperation was followed by the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, also signed in 2005. The Initiative ended the moratorium on nuclear energy trade with India. India agreed to divide its civil nuclear energy facilities from its military nuclear energy facilities and to submit to all International Atomic Energy Agency safety protocols (Council on Foreign Relations). By 2008, India was permitted to engage in nuclear energy trade with permission from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thanks in no small part to the Bush Administration's lobbying on India's behalf. That same year, the US-India Space Cooperation Agreement was renewed as India conducted a moon landing using NASA-designed instruments (Council on Foreign Relations).

Under the Obama Administration, friendly overtures continued. In 2010, the first US-India Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington. Months later, President Obama supported India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Council on Foreign Relations). The following year, the US and India signed a memorandum of understanding on cybersecurity cooperation, fulfilling one of the promises made during that Strategic Dialogue (Council on Foreign Relations). As part of a "pivot to Asia" strategy, President Obama sent Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to India to further develop military and security ties (Pitlo III). Finally, in 2020, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement Act, which allows for the sharing of intelligence between the two states—particularly geospatial data intended to help India obtain better accuracy in cruise missile firings and drone warfare (Council on Foreign Relations).

The character of these developments since 9/11 indicates that the US and India have strengthened their security ties and improved their overall relationship. Prior to 9/11, a Cold War mentality largely frustrated security understanding between the two states. Post-9/11, with both states having suffered terror attacks, a renewed commitment to strengthening global security developed, and the two nations have since fostered a relationship that promotes heightened security efforts.