League of Arab States and Non-Aligned Movement Critiqued

Introduction to the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States was created in 1945 with six founding members: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Yemen joined shortly thereafter, and today there are 22 members of the League, excluding Syria, which was suspended in 2011 following accusations that Assad was using chemical weapons against his own population. The objective of the League was to "draw closer the relations between member states and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries" (Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945). The League gave particular focus to: (a) economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry; (b) communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, and posts and telegraphs; (c) cultural matters; (d) matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition; (e) social welfare matters; and (f) health matters (Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945). Notably absent from the League is Iran.

The role of the League is to coordinate policy, strengthen ties, and promote common interests of the member states (Rai, 2019). This is an important role in the Middle East, since World War II left the world in need of a new order of relations. The League helped bring the Arab world into a framework of social, political, and economic unity — at least, that was the main idea. While it is true that the League does help to settle disputes and bring resolutions to conflicts among member states, it has not effectively achieved any of its goals related to its role in the Middle East. Instead, individual states like the UAE have taken it upon themselves to show leadership and set a new path forward for other states to follow. The best example of this is the signing of the Abraham Accords. The UAE led the way forward and other states, like Bahrain, followed its example — but this was not a resolution or treaty put forward by the League of Arab States. On the contrary, the League's relevance in the face of the UAE's actions has been questioned more and more (Rai, 2019).

The League of Arab States is incredibly rich in oil and gas, and many of the member states are pushing forward with modern telecommunications systems to support economic and social growth. Some of the region is fertile — southern Sudan, for example, is often considered the food basket of the Arab world. However, there is also considerable instability in these regions due to the threat of terrorism and radical groups that seek to overthrow established governments, as has been the case with Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2019). Nonetheless, tourism is viewed as a very important industry in some of these regions, and this has especially been an area of interest for the UAE in the wake of the Abraham Accords signed with Israel and other Arab states (Scheindlin, 2022).

Failures and Declining Relevance of the Arab League

The Abraham Accords represent a new turning point for the Arab League — especially given that in 1967 the League signed the "Three No's," indicating that Arab countries would never have peace with Israel, would never negotiate with Israel, and would never recognize Israel (Smith, 2021). Seeing as how the Arab League was formed for the purpose of collaborating and coordinating policy, the apparent break with the Arab world by the UAE in signing the Abraham Accords represents a potential conflict brewing within the League.

As Rai (2019) notes, "the Arab League today represents little more than a fake talking shop where Arab leaders engage in brief meetings whilst exchanging empty pleasantries, before going back and pursuing their vested interests." The main problem with the Arab League today is that the "common interests" the League is supposed to pursue are not so common anymore. Rai (2019) further points out that the League has not effectively achieved any of its stated objectives in its decades of existence: it has not strengthened ties among member states, it has not coordinated significant policy, and it has not promoted a common ideal or interest that benefits all member states. Part of the problem is that the member states are very diverse in terms of population, demographics, belief systems, politics, and economy. Not all are as oil-rich as the UAE, nor are all as politically powerful as Saudi Arabia. There is a great deal of difference between Jordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, just as there is between Egypt and Somalia.

The Abraham Accords and Arab-Israeli Relations

The Arab population had chafed at UN Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine into two states. The Israeli population likewise expressed dissatisfaction with it, as the border plan denied Israel access to important cultural sites deemed central to Israeli national identity. Yet if the Israelis had grounds for complaint, so too did the Arab world, which saw its own freedoms restricted. The Arab states refused to recognize the validity of Israeli statehood. Egypt had closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping in 1950, which led Israel to invade the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 with the goal of regaining access to shipping lanes. Israel eventually withdrew its military forces following Egypt's promise of reopening access, but when President Nasser refused to reopen the Straits in the months leading up to 1967, the risk of military conflict increased dramatically.

For this reason — and ever since — the Arab states have been reluctant to make peace with Israel or to enter into formal relations with it, although Jordan and Egypt did make cold peace with Israel in the past. The UAE's warm peace with Israel is something different, as it represents a pivotal shake-up of Arab-Israeli relations. It therefore remains to be seen how this shift will affect the Arab League in general. The realist framework of international relations provides needed context.

The Arab League now faces a new change of direction in geopolitical policy, with a Saudi-aligned bloc consisting of Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and a handful of other Arab states aligning themselves more closely with the geopolitical priorities of the United States and Israel, and withdrawing some support from Palestine. Meanwhile, Turkey and Iran remain the main supporters of Palestine, which has long counted on the solidarity of the Arab world in its conflict with Israel. Israel stands to gain from this realignment by forming alliances with regional power brokers, but the Arab world — once united in the Arab League on the matter of Palestine — is now coming apart. The Arab Spring and the uprisings of 2011 are evidence that deep conflicts within the Arab states have emerged. The war in Yemen is further evidence of this, and it now appears that the Arab League may not be as strong as it once was, particularly with Iran growing in strength and the possibility of a new nuclear agreement with the United States on the horizon.

Essentially, the Abraham Accords have altered the framework that once defined the Arab world. The relevance of the Arab League in the face of this new geopolitical development — a warm peace between Israel and the UAE — indicates that policy is shifting tremendously in the Middle East.

Origins and Purpose of the Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) consists of 120 developing world states that have no formal alliance with or against any major power bloc. Outside the United Nations, NAM is the largest body of organized member states in the world. Its member states are entirely part of the Global South, ranging from Central America to Africa, the Middle East, and into Asia. NAM developed in the 1950s as a way of staying out of the Cold War politics dividing the world between the Soviet East and the American-led West. The founding member states were India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia, though the NAM designation did not really emerge until the 1970s. Castro (1979) gave a sense of the movement's purpose in a speech at the close of the 1970s, stating that "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" face a "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics." This speech gave NAM a posture of defiance toward the world's superpowers — even though many NAM member states maintained close working relationships with the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, NAM has moved in a new direction: promoting closer ties and collaboration across the Global South.

NATO countries viewed NAM countries as Third World nations, yet NAM members like Yugoslavia played an important role in the Cold War. Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact there was a need for bridging, and Yugoslavia served as a mediator between the two spheres. This was crucial for Europe, since any increase in division would have been catastrophic (Eerola, 2012). What helped in this situation was the fact that a NAM country was able to maintain its independence throughout the mediation process. In doing so, such states created social, economic, and political buffers between the NATO bloc and the Soviet bloc — and it is exactly this kind of buffer that is needed today, as the world witnesses what appears to be a return of the Cold War as Russia moves against Ukraine and the West acts to bar Russia from the global economy (O'Neill, 2022).

Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, NAM countries had to redefine their mission. They embraced, to some degree, the notion of liberal internationalism and the belief that "the current global system is capable of engendering a peaceful world order" (Norwich University, 2017). The Global South sought to cooperate with other powers and integrate into the global economy through foreign direct investment and new formal diplomatic relations. Examples of this can be seen across Africa and Asia, where states work closely with the EU and other Western nations, and where Russia and China have both made significant advances in developing their trade networks. Russia has worked closely with Iran, Syria, India, and Venezuela, while China has been expanding its Belt and Road Initiative throughout Asia and into the Middle East (World Bank, 2018).

Conclusion: Realism and the Future of Both Organizations

The role of NAM today is to understand where it can fit in between the two or three global powers vying to reshape or maintain world order. The West, China, and Russia all have vested interests in defining the future global order — yet there is a conflict of interest among them, even between Russia and China. The NAM countries have a role to play in preventing the outbreak of a global war, as they did during the Cold War. The challenge, however, is that NAM states may now see themselves as more naturally allied to one of the major powers, or so economically and politically close to one of them that breaking away to declare neutrality would threaten their own security and prosperity. The West, Russia, and China have entrenched themselves in the global order and have deep roots throughout the Global South. The Global South will increasingly be asked to choose sides as realism in international relations once more asserts itself.

Both the League of Arab States and the Non-Aligned Movement thus face existential questions about their continued relevance. The Arab League is fractured by sectarian divisions, structural redundancy, and the diplomatic realignments catalyzed by the Abraham Accords, while NAM is caught between the gravitational pull of great-power competition and its founding principle of independence. Without meaningful reform and a clearer sense of collective purpose, both organizations risk becoming historical footnotes in a world that has largely moved on from the frameworks that once gave them meaning.

References

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Center for International Security and Cooperation. (2019). Al Shabaab. Retrieved from https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab

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O'Neill, J. (2022). Russian banks blocked from SWIFT international payment network. New York Post.

Pact of the League of Arab States. (1945). Accessed at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp

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Scheindlin, D. (2022). How to salvage progressive policies from the Abraham Accords. The Century Foundation.

Smith, C. (2021). Abraham Accords show that Israel victory enhances Arab lives. Middle East Forum.

World Bank. (2018). Belt and Road Initiative. Accessed at https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative