This paper examines Aaron Wildavsky's 1966 "Two Presidencies" thesis, which argues that the American president exercises substantially greater authority in foreign policy than in domestic affairs. Drawing on Wildavsky's analysis, the paper traces how this divide played out from the Johnson administration through Reagan and beyond, with particular attention to budgetary politics, the Vietnam War's domestic impact, and the ongoing struggle between executive and legislative branches over spending authority. Key legislation—including the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, and the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act—is examined as evidence of Congress's repeated efforts to reclaim domestic policy influence from an executive whose foreign policy imperatives tend to dominate the entire governing agenda.
When Aaron Wildavsky refers to the Two Presidencies, his argument concerns the precarious balance that every chief executive must establish in navigating the space between responsibilities to the domestic population and an interest in stewarding America's role on the world stage. The domestic and international priorities that both fall under the purview of the president are often of distinctly different character and will demand distinctly different approaches. Sometimes, weighing in on this balance will carry a direct political cost or a direct policy cost. It is the job of the president to serve as the face of the American government on both sides of this divide.
It is within that framework that Aaron Wildavsky composed his 1966 analysis, which touches upon the varying issues of war, taxation, and especially budgetary discretion in identifying the two sides of the presidency.
As Wildavsky contends, "the President's normal problem with domestic policy is to get congressional support for the programs he prefers. In foreign affairs, in contrast, he can almost always get support for policies that he believes will protect the nation — but his problem is to find a viable policy." (23)
Regarding the budgetary roles of the presidency, the 1960s were marked by a wave of social changes stimulated by the coalescence of heightening domestic tensions, a controversial foreign policy, and general political upheaval. Amidst all of these pressures, the federal budget came to reflect the tumult of the time, with conflicts over the appropriate expenditure of federal resources underscoring the sheer difficulty of the president's position.
Specifically, the administration of Lyndon Johnson saw America enter a period of paradox, with spending policies reflecting a set of essentially conflicting priorities. Entangled in the costly Vietnam War, dispatching domestic security forces to quell a rising Civil Rights Movement, and engaging in his own ambitious social-programs initiative known as the Great Society, President Johnson created so many spending requirements that he considerably diminished the role of Congress in shaping his budget. The result was the perception of a president who had reached too far in his ambition to balance the two sets of priorities that direct the responsibilities of a sitting executive.
According to Wildavsky, however, this is an aspect of the structure of American government which tends to favor the president's foreign policy interests as the dominant force in all affairs. The controlling impact that Vietnam bore on all aspects of its time and place is telling in this regard. Wildavsky shows that "when refugees and immigration — which Congress considers primarily a domestic concern — are removed from the general foreign policy area, it is clear that Presidents prevail about 70% of the time in defense and foreign policy, compared with 40% in the domestic sphere." (24)
For Johnson, a high success rate on both fronts was tied to the imperative of the Vietnam War and the force of necessity that this levied over his authority to commit budgetary funds and shape domestic social policies to fit the needs of the war. Ultimately, though, Wildavsky's point suggests that there is a genuine divide in the extent of the president's power. Almost ironically, that power is far more limited on American soil than it is in America's dealings beyond its own borders.
In times not just of military but also of economic turmoil, the challenges facing the divided executive are equally clear. When weakness or vulnerability is apparent in the chief executive, domestic opponents find easier opportunities to undermine his influence. With the transition from Johnson's administration to Nixon/Ford and then to Carter, continued spending increases were overshadowed by stagnant economic growth and rising inflation, even as these administrations experienced a widening of the national deficit.
For a president such as Jimmy Carter, Wildavsky's text proved prescient, anticipating that a president's attempts to expand his authority within the governmental hierarchy could result in consistent legislative defeat and the self-fulfilling prophecy of diminished credibility.
"Wildavsky's incrementalism theory and its political complications"
"Key spending laws limiting executive budgetary authority"
"Circular logic of foreign policy driving domestic executive dominance"
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