Women's Rights Cases: Gender, Law, and Equal Protection

Introduction: Rights of Women Tried

"Woman, as a human being, has rights — the inevitable conclusion of the then new philosophical theory."
— Mary Wollstonecraft (Wollstonecraft & Pennell, 1891, p. viii)

In 1891, more than one hundred years ago, after Mary Wollstonecraft published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Horace Walpole — like many others of his era — denounced her as a social outcast. Walpole "politely called" Wollstonecraft a "hyena in petticoats" and a "philosophising serpent" (Wollstonecraft & Pennell, 1891, p. vii). Wollstonecraft (1891) asserted that woman, as a human being, has rights. This research paper examines a number of women's rights and how women achieved some of their current legal protections through the United States justice system. As this study considers numerous contemporary legal constraints that women have previously encountered, the researcher also reflects on five cases linked to legal rights for women. In conclusion, the researcher presents observations on women's legal rights that have yet to be achieved and asserts that these rights need to be considered, secured, and implemented in future policies.

During the course of this study, the researcher explores and notes the significance of the following cases:

1. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971): Contrary to the Idaho Probate Code's specification that "males must be preferred to females" in the appointment of administrators of estates, the Court in Reed v. Reed ruled that the dissimilar treatment of men and women under the law was unconstitutional (The Oyez Project, 1971).

2. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976): Curtis Craig, a male between the ages of 18 and 21, challenged an Oklahoma law prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The Court found that "generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice" (The Oyez Project, 1976, p. 1). The Court also determined that in this particular case, the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause.

3. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968): The Court determined that sex-based disparate sentencing did, in fact, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution — a conclusion that had been uniformly rejected by the courts prior to the late 1960s (Popiel, 1980).

4. Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Supp. 9, 246 A.2d 106 (S. Ct. 1968): A Connecticut superior court ruled that no "legitimate basis" existed for that state's sex-differential sentencing statute (Babcock, 1975).

5. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976): This case addressed medical care in the prison setting. The Supreme Court established that prison authorities must not exhibit "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's serious illness or injury (Morrison, 1996, pp. 100–101).

The Bill of Rights and Women's Legal Protections

In Fundamentals of American Law, Alan B. Morrison (1996) recounts that in the twentieth century, the Bill of Rights' protections were expanded when the Nineteenth Amendment (1919) assured women of the right to vote. In 1787, primarily because the United States accepted the moral failings of slavery and the subordination of women, the original Bill of Rights did not address equality concerns (Morrison, p. 111).

The protections the contemporary Bill of Rights offers are broad, Morrison notes, but they have boundaries. Standing alone, the Bill of Rights does not protect individuals from the misuse of private power. Morrison observes that the Bill of Rights does not "guarantee economic or social movements. The document concentrates, instead, on preserving the personal and political rights needed for the proper functioning of the tolerant political democracy" (Morrison, p. 83).

Bill of Rights Components

Morrison explains that the original Bill of Rights — the first ten amendments — codifies 31 specific protections, which include the following:

1. No establishment of religion (1st); 2. Free exercise of religion (1st); 3. Free speech (1st); 4. Free press (1st); 5. Free assembly (1st); 6. Petition for redress of grievances (1st); 7. Right to keep and bear arms (2nd); 8. No quartering of troops (3rd); 9. No unreasonable searches (4th); 10. No unreasonable seizures (4th); 11. Necessity of warrant on probable cause (4th); 12. Specificity of warrant (4th); 13. Grand jury indictment in serious cases (5th); 14. No double jeopardy (5th); 15. No compulsory self-incrimination (5th); 16. No deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (5th); 17. No taking of property for private use (5th); 18. No taking of private property for public use without just compensation (5th); 19. Impartial criminal jury trial (6th); 20. Speedy and public trial (6th); 21. Criminal venue — vicinage (6th); 22. Notice of criminal charges (6th); 23. Right of confrontation (6th); 24. Compulsory process for criminal defendants (6th); 25. Counsel in criminal cases (6th); 26. Civil jury trial (7th); 27. No excessive bail (8th); 28. No excessive fines (8th); 29. No cruel and unusual punishments (8th); 30. Enumerated rights do not preclude other rights (9th); 31. Powers not delegated to the national government are reserved to the states and the people (10th) (Morrison, 1996, p. 85).

After the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, it endeavored to prevent racial minorities from being excluded from jury service. More recently, the Supreme Court invalidated state rules that kept women from serving on juries (Morrison, 1996, p. 110).

Due to the increasing presence of women and minorities, the composition of the legal profession has changed considerably over time. In 1963, only 3.7% of the approximately 47,000 law students enrolled in the 135 American Bar Association–accredited law schools were women. By 1994, when 129,000 students attended 177 accredited law schools, women made up approximately 43.7% of the student body (Morrison, 1996, p. 151).

The Code of Judicial Conduct

Morrison (1996) explains that a judge is instructed to refrain from any semblance of impropriety in his or her activities. One important point: the 1990 (but not the 1972) Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from joining organizations — including clubs — that practice "invidious" discrimination based on a person's race, sex, religion, or national origin. An organization discriminates invidiously, Morrison points out, if it specifically and arbitrarily excludes minorities, women, or others (Morrison, 1996). U.S. law expressly relates to the enforcement of equal treatment in the courtroom, as the 1990 Code instructs judges to "require lawyers and proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others" (Morrison, p. 174).