Planning and Preparing to Achieve Information Superiority will be of paramount importance, using as much of friendly forces' technological superiority as possible to jam or impede the C3I of the enemy if it comes to a fight ("FM 3-0 Operations" 11-2-11-23). This will allow the town to be taken with a minimum of casualties, hopefully at night when the population is asleep and when superior U.S. night vision equipment and technology will give us the advantage, minimizing casualties. This will hopefully convince loyalists that U.S. forces were doing all in their power to minimize casualties and damage to property.

Since FM 3-90 provides specific guidance as to offensive encircling, FM 5-0 will be used because of its reference to a river crossing and crowd control procedures as part of an offensive operation. In the hours leading up to the movement to contact, it would be necessary for units unfamiliar with crowd control and small boat operations to practice in order to be ready when it is time to pull out from FOB Viking. Also, "Leaders can also

allocate time for maintaining proficiency on individual Soldier skills (such as zeroing individual weapons, combat lifesaving tasks, language familiarization, and cultural awareness) during preparation ("FM 5-0 the Operations Process" 4-1)."

Prior to taking the town, friendly forces would...

Priorities across the river would of course be to take the class 90 bridge intact (hopefully at night) in order to secure the water treatment immediately adjacent to it as well as the southern fording site (ibid. 4-1-4-2).
Conclusion

To sum up, the higher echelon's directives are not a strait jacket but can be worked out with a judicious use of force assembled and ongoing but not too lengthy negotiations with the enemy. It is important to take New Olaf, but not to alienate loyalists. It is necessary to take the town with minimum casualties and preservation of property. The railroad and water plant need to be taken intact to insure an adequate food and water supply to the capital so that the government can not be starved out by the mutineers.

References

United States. Department of the Army. FM 3-0 Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001. Print.

United States. Department of the Army. FM 5-0 the Operations Process. Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Army, 2001. Print.

United States. Department of the Army. FM 3-90 Tactics. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,

2001. Print.