The United States, though it has been involved in much unconventional fighting over the last 50 years, has positioned itself to fight more or less conventional wars. Al Qaeda represents an adaptable, flexible, and potent enemy that has no headquarters and does not fight on any battlefield so to speak. Each of these entities views and fights war completely differently. The Al Qaeda model is based in the historic warfare model of the crusades, whereby small religious groups brought the battle to each other's doorstep. The United State's relatively inflexible, unadaptive forces are having a hard time fighting successfully against such a small, moving target. The battle lines and compartments of this war between these two entities are ever shifting and ever-increasing in complexity.
As war becomes more compartmentalized, that is to say as low-intensity conflict spreads, the face of warfare will shift forever as a result. Author van Creveld (216) states, "As states start to collapse, leaders and war-making organizations will merge into each other." His assertion is more poignant when combined with the fact that as the future of warfare shifts from a state vs. state model to a less defined warfare, the goals and demands of the groups' leaders will come into play. This idea that war will become more about the smaller groups of individuals rather than individuals bound together by statehood is important because it shows a re-stratification of the groups and...
It is as if modern warfare is coming back to the model of warfare that existed hundreds or thousands of years ago, before official states were typically involved in battles.
The modified full-circle nature of warfare is intriguing, and shows that humanity's mechanisms for dealing with problems and solving them through warfare have not changed since the beginning of history. Only the technology of warfare has truly and progressively changed. This vision of future warfare also does not fit a progressive view of history vs. The future. No longer does just war theory prevail where states have reasons to go to war with other states. A much more pragmatic, almost schizophrenic nature of warfare is emerging. One that Machiavelli himself would be very proud of. Modern warfare is more about the ends justifying the means, rather than holding fast to the idea that warfare is regulated and there are rules on the battlefield. More often now the battlefields are in the hearts and minds of people, and do not require state sponsorship. Complex relationships and interdependencies among small groups gives rise to more low-intensity conflicts fought between these entities.
References
Keohane, Robert O. And Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. New York:
Longman, 2000.
Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
