To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.

Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority

Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors.

To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.

COA 2

This course of analysis this seeks to provide a foundation for clear thinking about the potential use of force against Iran in protecting Azerbaijan.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

23

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions operated in COA process:

The behavior of the Iranian regime postures as grave a set of challenges to the global community as any problem being faced currently. Iran's nuclear determinations against Azerbaijan; its support for terrorism;

The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iran, including lethal backing for groups attacking Azerbaijan troops, are all deeply troubling the nation

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

24

Operational CoGs

Friendly Forces

Friendly Intel action

Threat reaction to friendly actions

Friendly counteraction to threat reaction

Critical Capabilities

Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver

Mission Command.

To occupy a support-by-fire position to support an attack

Critical Requirements

Access to APOD/SPOD

LOCs

Host Nation Support

CAISR

Mobility

Missile Defense

Air Superiority

Critical Vulnerabilities

LOCs

C4ISR

Air Platforms

To attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction

Enhance international legitimacy

Gain multinational cooperation

Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations

Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

25

Operational CoG

Preserve sureness in ultimate victory or success

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Alliance forces

Small naval fleet from allies

Critical Capabilities

State security forces

Unconventional forces,

Terrorists

Sea power

Airpower

Operate with allies

Critical Requirements

Good weather chemical gear fuel and ammo re-supply precise intelligence

Critical Vulnerabilities

IF Allies break ENIGMA code system

IF new merchant ships have faster speeds

IF Allies develop more effective radar capabilities

Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

26

Operational CoG

Clan support or sharing of power

Ambushes and raids.

Insurgents

Underground militia

Critical Capabilities

Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services

Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media

Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas

Critical Requirements

Command and Control Structure

Finances

Liaisons

Leadership

Training

IO

fight more effectively at night move faster operationally to intercept reported convoy

Critical Vulnerabilities

Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan

IF they employ counter FW 200 operations

IF they change code settings frequently or adopt an unbreakable code system

IF new merchant ships have faster speeds

IF they come up with more effective radar

Capabilities

Electronic and technological advances may out pace Iranian developments.

Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

27

Operational CoG

Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Coalition forces

Critical Capabilities

Worldwide Linkages

State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism

Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors

Critical Requirements

Intelligence regarding production facilities in Iran

Effective and sustained bombing of production facilities

Critical Vulnerabilities

Communication Links

Globalization

Increased autonomy of network

Financial Basis

Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

28

CoG

Ideology

freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens clandestine agents the civilian population,

Critical Capabilities

Fundamentalist Sheik

Belief in Cause

Shared Intelligence

Premeditated, politically motivated violence

Critical Requirements

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Time

Critical Vulnerabilities

Lack of credible HUMINT

Technological competence

Maintaining Focus

INSURGENTS

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

29

JOA

Continuous operations including normal and routine military activity "performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."

Goals include shaping perceptions, developing capacity for coalition operations, improving information and intelligence exchange, and providing peacetime and contingency access.

Also important that shaping activities could be "executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another."

Logical Lines of Operations

International borders reestablished in the region.

Red military defeated.

Red offensive capability neutralized.

Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.

Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.

Gain air & maritime superiority.

Support DOS and OGA.

Conduct stability operations.

Support Yellow leadership.

Mass combat power and sustainment.

Strategic end state

Retrograde coalition forces.

Attack strategic-level targets.

Security/Information Military

Governance

Economic

Diplomacy

Security

Information

Maintain sovereign state.

Secure Yellow borders.

Control population centers.

Isolate leadership

Establish legitimate coalition.

1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.

FFIR- LCC RSOI.

FFIR- amphibious operations success.

3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.

IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.

4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.

PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.

5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.

5

Branch

Regime change

Legend

Psychological

operations

SPOD security

Maritime superiority

Maritime security

Amphib assault

Maritime security

Spt LCC

Maritime superiority

Spt ACC

Defeat Red Off. navy

Handover/

scale down

Maritime security

Train Yellow navy

COA 1

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

32

JTF

JFACC

JFLCC

JFSOCC

JFMCC

Yellow MOD

Coordination

TACON

OPCON

COCOM

XX

ESG

CSG

SAG

MPS

PATRON

SAG

Amphib

X

SF

NSWTG

PSYOPS

JSOAC

AETF

AEF

ASOG

Yellow

Patrol

Boats

COA 1

Task Force

Command Level

Major Subordinate Element

(MSE) Level

MSE Subordinate

Units Level

Depict Command Relationships

X

XX

Yellow

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

33

Phase I-- Deter

Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-

governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.

Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.

Phase II -- Seizure Initiative

A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.

SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.

Forces will secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.

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Phase III-Dominate

In addition to making lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- will need to be besieged by accuracy strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.

They will continue to perform the same functions as the previous have. However, DOD military force will be used more aggressively to isolate the enemy force from outside support. OGAs and IOs will continue to influence allies or neighboring states in support of operational objectives.

S/CRS will then start preparing for the transition to stability and reconstruction operations during this phase. Unity of effort is critical to forcing rapid culmination of major combat operations

Phase 5 -- Enable Civil Authority

Short-term lasting from 2 weeks to 6 months.

Making sure the populations live in a fair economy close operations might aim to Make sure that enemy force is destroyed, then seize a piece of terrain, disrupt an insurgent cell, or secure a local population.

Make sure that proper security is set in place.

Making sure that there are no more guerilla forces.

Phase IV -- Stabilize

The operational risk in Iran will be reduced for the reason that there is a high degree of commonality between organizations in their emphasis of effort. S/CRS has responsibility to lead and coordinate all government agencies in this phase. DOD, USAID, UNDP, WB, and IMF have the capacity to provide foreign aid during the stability period.

It will be critical that aid money for Iran will clearly have to support long-term economic development goals

COMPARISON & DECISION MATRIX

WEIGHTING FACTORS

Evaluation

Comparison

Good Fair Poor

5 3 1

Weight Evaluation Criteria

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The Commander has now assigned weighting factors to his criteria. Unlike our previous comparison where all criteria were treated equally, the Commander has now stated that certain criteria are more important to him. Note how the application of weighting has now changed the results. Even though we are using the same criteria for our comparison, the use of weighting illustrates how they factor into our comparison results.

Talk to the slide...

It isn't difficult to see that weighting has changed the results of our comparison: now COA 3 is the winner.

Criteria must be tailored to the COAs and situation.

Be able to justify why the criteria…