Had the emergency been declared at this time and the descent started, the plane could have landed about 3 to 5 minutes earlier than it had landed at Cincinnati. Although it is not possible to determine whether the shortened flight time would have delayed or prevented the flash-fire, the decreased exposure time of the passengers to the toxic environment in the cabin would have enhanced their ability to escape after the cabin doors and over-wing exit windows were opened. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the delayed decision to descend contributed to the severity of the accident. The first officer turned off the air conditioning and pressurization packs in the belief that the airflow was feeding the fire. The resulting loss of circulation accelerated the accumulation of smoke, heat, and toxic gases in the cabin and decreased the time available for evacuation.

Considering the fact that the captain had to make the emergency descent and landing in extremely adverse condition, i.e., several of his flight instruments had become inoperative due to loss of AC power, and he had difficulty in seeing the instruments in the smoke-filled cockpit, he displayed outstanding airmanship in landing the plane safely.

The flight attendants' efforts during the emergency descent, landing and the evacuation also contributed significantly to the survivability factor. For example, they had successfully moved the passengers forward of row 12 as far away from the source of the smoke and heat as possible. Their selection and briefing of able-bodied male passengers to open the four overwing exit windows were similarly successful. Most of all, the flight attendants' initiative to distribute wet towels to the passengers and instructions to breathe through the towels or other items of clothing (although this was not provided in the SOP of the airline) is believed to have aided in the survival of some of the passengers.

NTSB Recommendations

Installation of smoke detectors or promulgation of operating procedures for the frequent inspections of lavatories by cabin attendants must be made compulsory on all turbine-powered, transport-category aircraft for early detection of lavatory fires.

Emergency oxygen bottles along with full-face smoke masks for each cabin attendant must be provided on turbine-powered transport aircraft in order to permit the attendants to effectively...

The fire-fighting SOP must also incorporate hands-on training in the donning of breathing equipment, the use of fire axe to gain access to the source of the fire without risk to essential aircraft components, and training for effective use of appropriate hand fire extinguishers on an actual fire (pp. 76-77)
The interior cabin panels of transport category airplanes, including panels of the lavatories and galleys, which can be safely penetrated with a fire axe, be clearly identified and the knowledge may be imparted to the flight attendants and the flight crew.

Automatic-discharge fire extinguishers should be installed in lavatory waste paper containers on all transport aircraft since fires activated by a carelessly thrown cigarette butt or a burning match in waste paper containers are quite common (Noland, 2007).

Recommendation for floor lighting and clear, illuminated markings to lead passengers to exits in dense smoke. (Ibid.)

Use of less inflammatory and flame-resistant material may be used in the interior of transport planes, e.g., seat covers and cushions. (Ibid.)