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It has become the tactics and strategy of necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan. While elite forces are most familiar with it, it must again become the natural instinct of every soldier from general to private. They must learn to plug into networks of potential fighters as force multipliers that will enhance the numbers and performance of American forces and then allow them to hand the fight over to the locals. The trick comes in institutionalizing the ability to work with local forces in the training and doctrine of the U.S. military the way it was before the end of the wars at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Unlike then, we must not forget the lessons of irregular warfare on our way home once the job is done....
The tactics of the elite forces must become the tactics of the whole military. They will only take the fight to the enemy when they have turned to the enemy's neighbors who know his address, phone number and how to reach his front door. We will need their help in kicking and keeping down permanently before he comes to ours.
Works Cited
Birtle, Andrew James. U.S. army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine 1860-1941. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998.)
Fulton, Robert a. The legend of the colt 45 pistol caliber semi-automatic pistol and the moros. Retrieved from http://www.morolandhistory.com/Related%20Articles/Legend%20of%20Colt%2045.pdf
Works Cited
Birtle, Andrew James. U.S. army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine 1860-1941. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998.)
Fulton, Robert a. The legend of the colt 45 pistol caliber semi-automatic pistol and the moros. Retrieved from http://www.morolandhistory.com/Related%20Articles/Legend%20of%20Colt%2045.pdf
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