S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. In a 2006 Washington D.C. speech, Kilcullen stated that "insurgency, including terrorism," will be America's enemies' "weapon of choice" against the "unprecedented superiority" of U.S. military firepower (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 1). Citing Bill Murray's iconic film Groundhog Day, Kilcullen notes that until the U.S. masters a form of counterinsurgency that truly is effective, "we are going to live this day over, and over, and over again -- until we get it right." Granted, Kilcullen offered his remarks nearly 5 years ago, but his context is fully up-to-date when one reviews the current lack of effectiveness of the United States' counterinsurgency strategy. For one thing, trying to institute "democratic processes" in Afghanistan without the "foundation of a robust civil society" tends to create "instability and perpetuate conflict," Kilcullen points out on page 3. Indeed, "control" in the counterinsurgency context does not mean "imposing order through unquestioned dominance" -- and moreover just killing the Taliban is certainly not the "sole objective," he continues. The "true aim" in this kind of warfare is to marginalize and "out-compete" the enemy, within the socio-political context of the battleground, according to Kilcullen.

So, the three pillars that Kilcullen uses to define his terms vis-a-vis counterinsurgency are: a) security (keeping the population safe from attack or intimidation by insurgents; military security, community policing; human security and building "a framework for human rights"; and public safety like fire, ambulance and sanitation services); b) political (focusing on mobilizing "stakeholders" to support their local and national government); and c) economic stability (this entails "humanitarian" and "development assistance" and the building of resources that can sustain families within the community) (p. 4). Kilcullen (p. 5) asserts that unless these three pillars are developed "in parallel, the campaign become unbalanced."

How is the U.S. doing with the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan?

According to Spencer Ackerman, it's not going well at all. In fact Ackerman calls his article "Counterproductive Counterinsurgency" because the methodology being employed "is not...

2). On paper the U.S. approach looks all right, Ackerman, but in reality the flow of information from various coalition units is slow and ineffective. In fact, coalition units "are still apprehensive" when it comes to distributing information to those not wearing "the same uniform." Because it takes too much time for information to flow down to the troops from higher-ups -- a strategy Ackerman calls "stove-piped information sharing" -- that extra time gives the Taliban an opportunity to "seek out coalition vulnerabilities and exploit them" (p. 2).
"Lumbering bureaucracy inhibits the rapid application of services and economic aid" once coalition military forces clear a given area, Ackerman writes on page 1 of his report in the Washington Independent Newspaper. Moreover, there is "little attention" given to making sure the local population understands the "transition of combat troops occupying their home one month" and the following month "smiling faces knocking on their doors" -- e.g., Taliban insurgents move in right after the U.S.-led coalition forces move on.

Conclusion: If Ackerman is correct, and recent news reports from Afghanistan seem to corroborate his assertions, Obama's strategy for counterinsurgency success if failing. Frankly, it doesn't require a military specialist to see that the Taliban cannot be stopped from coming across the Pakistan border into Afghanistan. With a restless electorate back in the U.S. that is already weary of this war, and a strategy that doesn't appear to be effective, this effort may well become another Vietnam and another albatross around the neck of America's global reputation.

Works Cited

Ackerman, Spencer. (2010). From Kandahar, a View of a 'Counterproductive

Counterinsurgency'. The Washington Independent Newspaper. Retrieved March 6, 2011,

from http://washingtonindependent.com.

Jones, Seth G. (2008). The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency. International Security, 32(4),

7-40.

Kilcullen, David J. (2006). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved March 6, 2011, from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/.../3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf.