In this regard, the author rightfully targets circumscription of the authority of the major agencies that are responsible for rating private credit which allowed banks to approve many mortgage situations with citizens that were tenuous, at best. The most efficacious way of doing so, particularly when one considers that most banks simply pay these agencies, which are primarily Fitch Ratings, Standards & Poor's, and Moody's Investor Services, Roubini asserts is to issue a removal of the agencies' certification by the Securities and Exchange Commission as "nationally recognized statistical rating organizations." This publicly blessed oligopoly, intended to maintain high standards, has only inhibited competition that would bring down the price of security-rating services (Barrett, 2010). The commission was widely vilified for not playing a more active role in limiting the unscrupulous behavior of banks that lured investors into poor mortgage situations (no author, 2012)

Ultimately, Roudini proposes increasingly strident measures of accountability that financial institutions should hold themselves to. The author argues vigorously against a repeat of any sort of measures in which the federal government, using taxpayers hard earned money, has to accept the financial responsibility for a banks debts. And true to form, the author comes up with some fairly creative, if not unconventional solutions, for keeping banks more honest about their loans and the risks associated with them. In fact, one of the key points Roudini makes regarding banks is that there should be requirements in place that mandate that banks have some form of capital that is approximately commensurate with the amount of risk they incur with in terms of loans. The ramifications of fairly revolutionary measure would substantially reduce the amount of profit that financial institutions would gain from the loaning of their assets, and even require some of the larger financial conglomerates to disband and ultimately take accountability for any sort of risks associated...

The general idea is that once such institutions had to incur a greater amount of responsibility and accountability for their own actions, they would not act as haphazardly as they did during the banking meltdown of 2008.
As alluded to earlier in this book review, the general strength of Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance lies in the author's creative solutions that represent a substantial departure form measures previously implemented and even from many of those that are in place today. At the same time, this strength actually has the potential to become the book's biggest weakness. It is not because many of Roudini's ideas are inconceivable, but it is because many of them are too far to the left for the financial practices that routinely take place in the U.S. today. Perhaps if the global depression narrowly averted by the federal government's intervention in the domestic banking crisis had taken place, America's financial systems would be willing to accept many of the solutions proffered by the author. But since the crisis has yet to reach epic proportions, too many of Roudini's ideas are still too radical to be pragmatic, and essentially do not apply to the contemporary economic climate. But in another 10 years, who is to say the same?