He disapproved of it because it went against what he termed "conventional wisdom." He was reacting to the views expressed in an article published in Asia Times about the failed expectation of U.S. trade policy. The intended benefits on the U.S. side in trading with China were in two groups. These were the multinational companies, which were set up in China, and the financial institutions, which funded their investments, trade flows and deficits (McCormack). When Cassidy was the lead negotiator for the U.S.-China 1999 Market Access Agreement and entry into the WTO, he assumed that China would be subjected to the governing laws of international trade (McCormack, 2008). There were encouraging predictions at that time that such entry would increase U.S. exports and American jobs. It would improve trade deficit with China and the "421" safeguard mechanism, focusing on industry, would be enforced by the succeeding president. The safeguards were to hold the Chinese government answerable for unfair advantages and subsidies for Chinese producers. He did not imagine or foresee that China would manipulate its currency to control its trade with the U.S. Neither did he foresee that the previous administration would fail to enforce the 421 safeguard mechanism. China's unfair trade practices and the U.S. multinational corporations' support of these practices wrought severe havoc on the American economy. The trade deficit increased twice every five years. The result was unexpected and alarming (McCormack).

This situation reveals a deeper problem in the lack of a coherent and workable economic strategy on the part of the U.S. government (McCormack, 2008). Cassidy thought that the U.S. trade representative proved more than just as an adjunct for the State department in negotiating with other countries for political reasons. In addition, the U.S. policy on currency exchange is the exclusive charge of the Treasury Department. This is the situation even when exchange rates affect the U.S. economy. An ultra-strong monetary policy and an international...

In the past, there were too many imbalances. He urged the present administration to get back to the basic principle of a national economic council uncontrolled by the Treasury. It should, instead, be an integration of the economic agencies but keep the State Department out of it (McCormack).
He suggested a new trade agenda that would be based on market principles beyond tariffs (McCormack, 2008). These should include currency, rebated value-added taxes and non-tariff barriers affecting international trade and distribution. It should be one that would incorporate differences in environmental and labor standards. He would also stop the implementation of all free trade agreements until the International Monetary Fund or the WTO established a workable mechanism to deter the manipulation of exchange rates by any one trading country. If no such standards were established and enforced, trade agreement for specific industrial sectors should be terminated. He noted that the U.S. had been removing regulations and restrictions since the time of President Reagan. But other countries had maintained theirs as barriers against the U.S., he said (McCormack).#

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Business Wire (2008). HST Global, Inc. announces negotiations with Chinese government. Vol. 15 #19. Business Wire: Gale, Cengage Learning. Retrieved on April 9, 2009 on http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/is_2008_August_27/ai_n28032470/?tag=content;col1

McCormack, R. (2008). China's entry into WTO is questioned by former chief trade negotiator. Manufacturing & Technology News: Publishers and Producers, Inc.

Retrieved on April 9, 2009 from http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/08/1031/ChinaWTO.html