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"Each day our military campaign takes a toll on Serbia's machinery of repression (Clinton warns Congress not to double Kosovo appropriations request http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/28/kosovo/
April 28, 1999 Web posted at: 6:24 P.M. EDT (2224 GMT))."
He believed that ground forces were not needed and that continued air strikes would bring about the desired result of having Serbian forces leave Kosovo.
Clinton assured all involved if he believed ground troops were needed he would seek advice from Congress, to which the House of Representatives decided to require its authorization if ground troops were requested.
As the conflict continued members of Congress began to assert that Clinton was actually committing acts of war, without the approval of Congress, by calling it something other than war (Albright to Congress: "We cannot fail' in Kosovo (http://www.counterpunch.org/serbia.html).According to Clinton the U.S. was simply "strengthening and maintaining its military strength" while Congress argued that he was permitting and ordering acts of war against Yugoslavia without going through the mandated federal steps to do so.
The response by Congress was swift. A lawsuit was filed on behalf of 13 congressional members against Bill Clinton (Albright to Congress: "We cannot fail' in Kosovo (http://www.counterpunch.org/serbia.html).
The suit accused Clinton of going to war without permission as well as demanded he remove U.S. troops within 60 days of the filing unless Congress voted to declare war within that time frame (Albright to Congress: "We cannot fail' in Kosovo (http://www.counterpunch.org/serbia.html).
The suit brought to light the fact that a President using the War Powers Resolution has an obligation to report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing hostile actions to the mix...
They disagreed whether or not the president was in compliance with the acts of war that he was obligated to follow. Clinton said he was following the war by reporting his decisions to Congress. Congress believed that he was dragging out the actions of the military, and presenting a smokescreen through funding requests to hide the fact that he was committing war without the approval of Congress (Albright to Congress: "We cannot fail' in Kosovo (http://www.counterpunch.org/serbia.html).
Clinton was ordered to either withdraw the troops or submit to the rules of Congress with regard to letting Congress decide whether or not to declare war.
References
Clinton warns Congress not to double Kosovo appropriations request http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/28/kosovo/
April 28, 1999
Albright to Congress: "We cannot fail' in Kosovo
http://www5.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/21/kosovo.congress/
http://www.counterpunch.org/serbia.html
The international community, while supporting greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovar Albanians' demand for independence" (History file: Yugoslavia and the Balkans, 2003, BBC News). Yet Milosevic reacted with disproportionate levels of aggression. Structural realism makes no allowance for the level of violence with which Serbia carried out its expansionist program, engaging in efforts of ethnic cleansing. Serbia's efforts make even less rationalistic sense, given the international community's previous hostile reaction to
strategy executed by the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met the criterions for a just war as defined below. Both the U.S. And NATO did not fight this war in order to overthrow the Yugoslavian government nor to give the Kosovo Albanians a country of their own. Rather, the war was fought to stop the needless ethnic violence against the Albanians living in Kosovo
S. was faced with a: "critical test..." (1999) when the Serbs began their assault on the Kosovar Albanians in March 1999" and in fact Starr believes this test was of more consequence than the one posed by Iraq in 1991 because in the Gulf War the United States "faced a clear act of international aggression that threatened to put vast wealth in the hands of a murderous and hostile regime."
Through policies of systematic discrimination and persecution of national minorities, Serb nationalists indirectly strengthened the radical wing of Albanian nationalist movements. The wing was represented by KSA (Kosovo Liberation Army). Most of the KSA leadership, Hedges writes, has formerly been imprisoned for separatist activities, and many were imprisoned by the Tito's communist government. The KSA's ideological base, Hedges writes, comes from a bizarre mixture of fascist and communist factions.
Hence, his plan here was not even based upon the assumption of ethnic plurality, but simply upon his own hunger for territorial power. Franjo Tudjman, equally power hungry, was the elected president of Croatia in 1990. His focus was not ethnic plurality. Rather, his aim was to establish a Croatian state for Croatians, without providing any minority rights to other citizens. For this reason, his focus on Bosnia was also
States like Bangladesh, Egypt, and Indonesia have severe challenges due to the risks of flooding, drought, and deforestation. Recently Bangladesh was hit by a powerful Typhoon (same as a hurricane), which caused thousands of deaths and was so severe it was beyond the capability of its weak government to deal with the disaster. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has been working for many years to try and help with