Kosovo: history, politics, and regional significance

INTERVENTION in KOSOVO: U.S. & NATO INVOLVEMENT

The objective of this work is to discuss the sources of the conflict in Kosovo and the efforts taken by the international community, specifically the United States and NATO in efforts to stem the violence. Finally, this work will address changes that could have been undertaken or what might have been done differently and what steps could be taken in the present or in the future to improve the country and its stability.

Kosovo is a province of Serbia and is the central area of the old Yugoslavia in which 90% of those in the region are Albanian in their origin with the remainder being Serbs. Under the former government, that of the old Yugoslavia this region was characterized by a great deal of autonomy. However, this autonomy was taken away by President Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 who was seeking what he called a 'Greater Serbia' seeking to secure it through a nationalist campaign. The Kosovo region was the site of a historic and emotionally charged defeat by the Ottoman Empire in 1389 and therefore has great significance to Serbian nationalists residing in the Kosovo region. Upon this region, losing its autonomy at the hands of Milosevic a conflict ensued due to the ethnic-Albanian people striving to have their cultural rights restored. The Kosovo Liberation Army, also known as the KLA drove the conflict toward the radical edge through entering violent conflicts with arms and their demand of full independence while simultaneously the Serbs were fiercely determined to keep the province. The United States and NATO entered the situation when hundreds of thousands of ethnic-Albanians were forced from their homes in what was destined to be a humanitarian disaster resulting in refugees strewn across an entire continent. Furthermore, this conflict was believed to likely have involved neighboring countries of Albania and Macedonia as well as Russia, all of whom have ties of ethnicity and religion to the Serbs and inclusive was the possible involvement of Iran due to the Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. NATO has been opposed to independence for Kosovo based on the possibility of this setting a precedent for succession of regions elsewhere in the world but has acknowledged that a resolution for this situation in Kosovo is unlikely. The United States and NATO have both intervened and attempted to bring the two sides of this conflict to some type of agreement that would result in peace. From the onset, it was acknowledged that Milosevic was unlikely to be moved unless military forces of NATO were involved, at least this was the track-record of Milosevic and added to this was Milosevic's determination to form a 'Greater Serbia'. Furthermore, the KLA became a dominant force in Kosovo although at the onset the KLA was not highly organized or unified but the KLA was highly determined and had gained some ground by the time the U.S. And NATO entered into the conflict. U.S. European allies desired the United States to take the stance of a peacekeeping force in the Kosovo region however, the Clinton administration struggled and won congressional approval for military intervention even though the military commanders were unsettled about risking soldier's lives in this situation where neither side desired the presence of the United States and NATO in the region.

I. REPORT of SECRETARY of STATE ALBRIGHT (1999)

Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright in a Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee- U.S. Department of State on April 20, 1999, and documented in the work entitled: "U.S. And NATO Policy Toward the Crisis in Kosovo" states that the "potential dangers of the situation in Kosovo" have been acknowledged throughout the decade of the 1990s and states that Slobodan Milosevic: "...first vaulted to prominence by exploiting the fears of ethnic Serbs in this province" and that in the latter part of the 1980's that Milosevic "...catered to those fears by robbing Kosovo Albanians of their cherished autonomy." The Kosovo Albanians are stated to have sought a peaceable means to recover their rights however, by 1992, fighting had broken out "elsewhere in the Balkans" with the former President Bush, Sr. having "issued a warning against Serb military repression in Kosovo." (Albright, 1999) at this time, a warning was issued against military repression by the Serbs in Kosovo by former President Bush, Sr. Simultaneously, President Milosevic had instigated three wars by attacking Slovenia, Croatia and managed to trigger an ongoing and devastating conflict in Bosnia. Early in 1998, Milosevic is stated to have "initiated a more extensive and violent campaign of repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo: resulting in a humanitarian crisis in which "tens of thousands of people fled their homes." (Albright, 1999) Secondly, the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) had strengthened and had provoked further unrest. The United States along with its allies, partners and Russia "sought to end this cycle of violence by diplomatic means." (Albright, 1999) While Milosevic agreed to a ceasefire as well as withdrawal of his security forces in 1989 as well as agreeing to "the entry of a verification mission from the OSCE...It soon became clear that Milosevic never had any intention of living up to this agreement. Instead of withdrawing, his security forces positioned themselves for a new offensive..." (Albright, 1999) Early in 1990, Milosevic's security forces massacred the village of Racak. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright states that at the same time that Milosevic was blocking diplomatic efforts he was also in the midst of making preparations of a "barbaric plan for expelling or forcing the total submission of the Kosovo Albanian community." (Albright, 1999) Milosevic's security forces not only threatened but then "forced the withdrawal of the OSCE mission. Then a new rampage of terror began." (Albright, 1999) Albright states that all have "seen the resulting images of families uprooted and put on trains, children crying for parents they cannot find, refugees recounting how loved ones were separated and led away, and ominous aerial photos of freshly-upturned earth. Behind these images is a reality of people no different in their fundamental rights or humanity" than any other individual and these children are the same as those in the United States except these children were "cut off from their homes, deprived of their families, robbed of their dreams." (Albright, 1999) President Clinton "repeatedly urged" consultation of the location of Kosovo in that it is a region "with a large historical importance and a vital role to play in Europe's future." (Albright, 1999) the reason for this is that the Kosovo region "is a crossroads where the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity and the Islamic world meet. It is where World War I began, major battles of World War II were fought, and the worst fighting in Europe since Hitler's surrender occurred..." (Albright, 1999) the stability of Kosovo has a direct affect on the security of U.S. allies, specifically Greek and Turkey to the south and the U.S. allies, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the north. Albright states that Kosovo is "surrounded by small and struggling democracies that are being overwhelmed by the flood of refuges Milosevic's ruthless policies are creating." (Albright, 1999)

The action of Belgrade which rejected a peace plan that the Kosovo Albanians had accepted which included disarmament provisions for the KLA and which would safeguard the rights of all of Kosovars which included the ethnic Serbs, has "created a critical test of NATO, whose strength and credibility have defended freedom and ensured our security for five decades." (Albright, 1999) Because of this reason, Albright states that the decision to use force against Milosevic and his regime was "necessary and right and the conditions the Alliance has set for ending its campaign are clear, just and firm." (Albright, 1999) in 1999, Albright states that the policy for diplomacy has several objectives:

1) to ensure that NATO remains united and firm;

2) to help leaders in the countries directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis;

3) to prevent a wider conflict;

4) to ensure that NATO's message is understood around the world; " (1999) Stated as the specific goal is the transformation of the Balkans from the "continent's primary source of instability into an integral part of the European mainstream...[and];

5) "...to build a solid foundation for a new generation of peace - so that future wars are prevented, economies grow, democratic institutions are strengthened and the rights of all are preserved." (Albright, 1999)

II. SEVEN WEEKS INTO U.S./NATO INTERVENTION (1999)

The work of Starr (1999) entitled: "The Choice in Kosovo" states that since the Soviet Union collapsed Americans have held a sense of uncertainty regarding precisely what the bases of U.S. foreign policy should be and specifically as related to military power usage. Since fighting communism is no longer the primary cause the question posed was stated by Starr in 1999 to be whether the U.S. should "follow the dictates of national interest narrowly understood, or do democratic values and commitments to human rights oblige us to conceive of our role more broadly?" (Starr, 1999) Starr addresses as well the question of whether it was a mistake "to distinguish sharply between national interests and humanitarian concerns because our security depends on an international moral order and the rule of law? And if we do intervene abroad with humanitarian aims, how far are we willing to go? Are we willing to put American soldiers at risk?" (Starr, 1999)

According to Starr, the U.S. was faced with a: "critical test..." (1999) when the Serbs began their assault on the Kosovar Albanians in March 1999" and in fact Starr believes this test was of more consequence than the one posed by Iraq in 1991 because in the Gulf War the United States "faced a clear act of international aggression that threatened to put vast wealth in the hands of a murderous and hostile regime." (Starr, 1999) in Kosovo, the situation was quite different because there was "no obvious strategic or economic interest" which compelled intervention and Milosevic, "unlike Saddam...did not threaten any nation outside his region." (Starr, 1999) the Kosovar Albanians are predominantly Muslims and therefore it was not likely that the U.S. would have assisted in addition to the fact that we had not real ties with Kosovo. Starr writes that it is highly unlikely that the United States would have become involved "if the majority in the Republic House had controlled foreign policy" and notes the statement of John Kasich who said that since the "people of the Balkans have been fighting each other for centuries, we are unlikely to settle their differences." (Starr, 1999) Those who protested involvement in Kosovo cited the possibility of a "quagmire...another Vietnam." (Starr, 1999)

Starr writes that seven weeks into the involvement of the United States and NATO, that the operation was being executed from the air and that the U.S. And NATO were: "...wary of any ground involvement and desperate to avoid failure," it appeared that the U.S. And NATO were attempting a "merciless war" from the air as suggested by Tom Friedman of the New York Times who stated "Every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related factory has to be targeted...the stakes have to be very clear [to the Serbs]: every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing it. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389." (Starr, 1999) However, as noted by Starr, this war had been entered with a purpose that was of the nature of "humanitarian" and therefore to bomb the enemy "back to the Middle Ages would undermine the original rationale." (1999) Starr states that there was a better, although more risky alternative which was mobilization of "overwhelming force on the ground" which was more likely to result in surrender of the Serbs, less civilian deaths and "full autonomy for the Kosovars within what would necessarily be, for some time, an international protectorate." (Starr, 1999)

III. STARTLING SERBS to the REALITY of VIOLENCE WITH BOMBS

Nevertheless, bombing did take place as evidenced from the work of Laura Rozen (1999) entitled: "Outlaw Nation?" published by the Salon website states that a Serbian translator who has assisted Western journalists in covering the Kosovo crisis stated "You have the most disgusting president in the world. He's a pig and he's a bastard." (Rozen, 1999) the Serbian translator, named Sasha was speaking from Belgrade on the second night of the airstrikes by NATO against her country." (Rozen, 1999) Rozen reports that Sasha went to college at an American university and has many friendships with Americans and has "even flirted with the idea of immigrating to the United States. Unlike most of her fellow Serbian citizens, she has seen firsthand the devastation and violence Serbian security forces have unleashed on the ethnic Albanian citizens of Serbia's southern province of Kosovo, in her role helping journalists cover the crisis. But despite her many ties with the United States and direct knowledge of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo that triggered NATO involvement, Sasha's hatred of the U.S. And NATO is raw. And understandable, after a sleepless night punctuated by air raid sirens, arrests of foreign journalists in her charge and the explosion of 2,000-pound precision-guided bombs not far from her family's home in a suburb of the Serbian capital, Belgrade." (Rozen, 1999) According to Rozen, "For the first time since World War II, Serbs are experiencing war in their own territory." (1999) While the Serbian government has assisted in perpetrating war through support of Bosnia and Croatia - wars that have altogether killed almost 300,000 people. War has now come to Belgrade..." (1999) the war mafia in Belgrade was stated by Rozen to have been "reactivating, with Zeljko Raznatovic 'Arkan' showing up at Belgrade's Hyatt Hotel tea room to intimidate remaining foreign journalists and calling for volunteers to staff his paramilitary thus armies in Kosovo." (1999) However, NATO, with the airstrikes which "shattered and insulted" the self-image of Serbia has shocked, outraged, and finally gained the attention of Serbia who has been committing "slow genocide against its ethnic Albanian inhabitants, after committing genocides against non-Serbian peoples in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The trappings of civilized European life have blinded many Serbian citizens to the atrocities that have been committed in the name of Serbian security forces in Kosovo." (Rozen, 1999) Rozen goes on to relate that while the Serbians are outraged, the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are quite used to "the proximity, terror and uncertainty of conflict. Over the course of the past year, some 400,000 Kosovo Albanians - almost a quarter of the population - have been forced to flee Serbian security forces, who have gratuitously torched villages after shelling the people out. Some 2,000 people have been killed, many in cold blood." (1999)

The work of Lituchy (2000) entitled: "KFOR and the Crime of Genocide" reporting the issue brought before the International Tribunal in June 2000 states that: "The United Nations Convention on genocide specifically mentions five actions, which, when carried out against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in a deliberate attempt to destroy that group in full or in part, fall under the definition of crimes of genocide." (Lituchy, 2000) Those actions are stated by Lituchy (2000) to be: (1) killing members of that group; (2) causing grievous bodily or spiritual; (3) enforcing living conditions designed to exterminate that group; (4) preventing births from that group; and (5) removing the children of that groups and transferring them to another group." (Lituchy, 2000) According to Lituchy (2000) there is evidence that all of the five listed previously "pertain to NATO/KFOR's occupation and aggression in Kosovo..." (2000) Lituchy states that the American and British NATO forces "attacked the so-called KFOR occupation army in Kosovo- Carried out, either by themselves or in collaboration with the KLA, numerous acts that fall under the United Nations' definition of crimes of genocide against members of the Serbian, national minorities in Kosovo." (2000) it appears that the Serbs did not mind so much the killing, destruction, abuse and violence, that is, as long as it was not committed to them, in their homes and in their neighborhoods. It is unfortunate that more violence had to ensue to gain the attention of the Serbs and to bring the Serbs in Kosovo to the point of negotiation instead of a continual genocide against other ethnicities in the region.

The work of Woehrel and Kim (2006) entitled: "Kosovo and U.S. Policy" reports that in 2002 an exit strategy was stated which included a "series of benchmarks for Kosovo's institutions and society that should be achieved before addressing Kosovo's final status." Those benchmarks included:

The existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions;

Rule of law;

Freedom of movement;

Sustainable returns and reintegration;

Development of a sound basis for a market economy;

Clarity of property rights;

Normalized dialogue with Belgrade;

Reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its mandate. (Woehrel and Kim, 2006)

IV. KOSOVO TALKS ENTER FINAL PHASE (FEBRUARY 2007)

In February 2007 the work entitled: "Kosovo Talks Enter Final Phase; March Deadline Set" relates that the future of Kosovo has, entered in to the phase of final talks in Vienna Austria..." And reported is a settlement "developed by the United Nations" which is the best solution known that has the capacity to finalize the years of ethnic conflict that have ensued in the Kosovo region. (Crawley, 2007) U.S. representative Kyle Scott is stated to have informed U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari that: "after years of uncertainty, it is now time for us to resolve the last major unsettled issues related to the breakup of Yugoslavia." (Crawley, 2007) on February 2, Ahtisaari, former president of Finland is stated to have "proposed that Kosovo govern itself democratically and be allowed to make international agreements while remaining, at least temporarily, under international supervision." (Crawley, 2007) the United Nations has administered Kosovo, which is in the province of Serbia since 1999. While there is assistance of international parties with the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, it will depend on Kosovo and Serbia to form a lasting agreement. Scott stated that: "[W] e recognize that the parties themselves bear ultimate responsibility for brining this chapter of Balkan history to a peaceful close," Scott said. Kosovo and Serbia face "stark" choices -- to "accept and embrace a European future" or "to cling to the disastrous policies of the past, We should not play God and solve the problems for them. But nor should we ignore our responsibility to prevent the region from descending into new conflict. However, further delays to the settlement process could lead to widespread violence." (Crawley, 2007) There was a reported clash which occurred between: "...pro-independence demonstrators clashed with U.N. police in Pristina, and two protesters died as a result of injuries from rubber bullets fired by U.N. security forces..." On February 21 and it was reported by Ahtisaari that "negotiators from Kosovo and Serbia remain far apart on their positions." (Crawley, 2007)

V. BOTH ALBANIANS and SERBS DESIRE to REMAIN in KOSOVO

In a March 12th report entitled: "Majority of Serbs Intend to Stay in Kosovo, U.S. Diplomats Says" it is reported that the Serbs in Kosovo, have communicated a strong disagreement with the proposal for settlement that had been submitted to the U.N. Security Council, also it is reported by a senior U.S. diplomat that most of the Serbs presently living in Kosovo have no intentions of leaving there: "...and seek a future of peace and prosperity." (Crawley, 2007) Daniel Fried had traveled to Serbia and throughout the Kosovo region communicating with leaders in the government as well as moderate community leaders, although he states he did not meet with "some hard-line minority leaders who seek to block a settlement" (Crawley, 2007) and from these communications has gained the impression that "the Kosovo Serbs - who may not like this process, who wish there were in a different situation altogether - are determined for the most part to stay in Kosovo once the status process is completed." (Crawley, 2007) Fried goes on to state that it is the desire of the Kosovo Serbs "to live in peace and security, but they want to live in Kosovo...I did not hear the mayors talk about mass exodus. I did not hear threats of violence. I did not hear demands and threats of disruption." (Crawley, 2007) Instead, Freid reports that both the "Albanian and Serb communities...expressed a strong desire for a continued international presence in Kosovo, the people of Kosovo also support strongly the continued presence of the NATO-led Kosovo Force." (Crawley, 2007) While it has become quite "clear that the people of Kosovo...do want to live together...they are apprehensive about each other; there is clearly not a great deal of trust. But there is at least a determination to try to make the Ahtisaari plan work." (Crawley, 2007)

VI. DEBATE on POSSIBILITY of 'SETTING PRECEDENT'

On March 21, 2007 it was reported by Crawley in the work entitled: "U.S. Believes an Independent Kosovo Would Not Set Precedent" states that: "The United States believes that if Kosovo is separated from Serbia under a U.N. plan, the move would not set a precedent for other breakaway regions, particularly the 'frozen conflicts' near the boundaries of the Soviet Union." (2007) According to Daniel Friend of the State Department assistant of Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs: "Kosovo is not a precedent for any other situation." (Crawley, 2007) in this 2007 report it is stated that: "Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari is negotiating a settlement on the future status of Kosovo, a province of Serbia that has been administered by the United Nations since the 1999 NATO war. The international intervention ended human rights abuses by Yugoslav Serb security forces but also put on hold a drive for independence by Kosovo separatists." (Crawley, 2007) While the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo seek independence, this is strongly opposed by Serbia and ethnic Serbs within Kosovo. The prime minister of Serbia, Vojslav Kostunica is reported to have given a warning that Kosovo independence would be a "dangerous precedent" for the U.N. As well Russian diplomats are reported to have given a warning "than an independent Kosovo would set a precedent for breakaway regions, such as Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistra, in around the former Soviet Union." (Crawley, 2007) This types of disputes are known are "frozen conflicts" due to unresolved outcomes since the early 1990s. The United States has held a diplomatic position upon Kosovo's representation of what is termed to be a unique situation "with an unprecedented level of involvement by the U.N. Security Council and NATO. Between 1993 and 1999, the U.N. Security Council issued seven resolutions on Kosovo, four of them in 1998 when Serbian forces responded to an armed uprising by uprooting Kosovo Albanian communities, creating hundreds of thousands of refugees and killing at least 2,000 Albanians. NATO's 78-day military campaign required a consensus decision by all 19 member nations at the time, and 17,000 NATO-led forces continue performing peacekeeping duties in Kosovo today, primarily protecting minority Serb communities." (Crawley, 2007) in other words, due to the intervention of the United States and NATO in Kosovo, this unique situation is deemed different. While Fried holds that "there are a great many parts of the world that have issues between minority and majority communities...there are a great many parts of the world that have separatist communities. there is no situation in the world that bears a resemblance to Kosovo. There is no place where the U.N. has been administering for seven, now close to eight years. There is no case where NATO was forced to intervene to stop a massive process of ethnic cleansing." (Crawley, 2007) it is stressed that the current "democratically elected government is not responsible for the actions" of Milosevic who was, in October 2000, voted out of office and upon his attempt in manipulating the results of the vote was "removed from power" and transferred to the Nederlands in 2001 to be tried for war crimes before the Hague tribunal. Milosevic passed away in 2006 while still in prison. According to Crawley (2007) it has been related by Fried that there is no longer "an ideal set of choices...the ideal set of choices went away as Yugoslavia broke up..." Fried states that in reality Yugoslavia didn't actually break up but was "murdered by extreme nationalists." (Crawley, 2007)