. . . Such things must happen" (New International Version 1984). Therefore, although it is possible to have a general theory of war, any such theory will be limited in its ability to explain the why's and how's of its occurrence. According to Gray (1999), in his seminal text, on War, Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, set forth a modern general theory of war, but Sun Tzu's Art of War also addressed this issue. Clausewitz, though, is cited time and again in the relevant literature as having propounded a general theory of war. For instance, Reid (2004) reports that, "In particular, he seeks to explain the methods to establish a general theory of war. Clausewitz was the thinker who pursued this quest most successfully" (p. 414). Even Clausewitz, though, recognized the limitations of any general theory of war. In this regard, Lebow (2003) notes that, "The central intellectual problem with which [Clausewitz] grappled was how to construct a scientific and general theory of war when its every aspect was so heavily context-dependent. Warfare was shaped by culture and technology, both of which were constantly evolving, by individual goals, choices and emotions and pure chance. All of these features make war in practice markedly different from war in theory. The best one can do, Clausewitz insists, is to get a 'feel' for war through reading and experience" (p. 169). Based on his extensive analysis of the work by Clausewitz and others, Gray (2008) subsequently determined that any general theory of war should seek to address the following six questions:

1. What is war? (nature);

2. Why does war occur? What is it about? (causes, origins, and triggers);

3. Does war lead to peace? Does peace lead to war? (consequences);

4. What is war like? (nature and experience);

5. How is war fought? (character); and,

6. Why is war won or lost? (methods and means) (p. 15).

These six foregoing questions must be answered in order to develop a general theory of war that can be used by policymakers and military strategists in prosecuting a war and winning it. In this regard, Gray goes on to note that, "What is most essential for understanding war and strategy is to maintain the clear conceptual distinction between war and strategy, singular, and wars and strategies, plural....

15). While a general theory of war is therefore possible, any such theoretical perspective will remain constrained by the exigencies of the unique circumstances that are involved and the context-specific factors that contribute to conflicts of every sort. As Gray concludes, even the general theory of war propounded by Clausewitz was limited in this fashion: "Current understanding of war and strategy is excellent in its parts, but it has yet to be assembled properly; even Clausewitz leaves something, albeit not much, to be desired" (2008, p. 15). Finally, as a part of any general theory of war, it should be noted that wars have been fought for countless reasons throughout the millennia, but competition over scarce resources appears to be an important part of all wars.