Anti Terrorism Measures Effective Anti-Terrorism Measures Effective

Anti Terrorism Measures Effective Anti-Terrorism Measures Effective Anti-Terrorist Tactics The threat of terrorism involves many variables. The nature and degree of risk posed by a potential attack depends on a number of factors, including the goals of the attackers and their means of inciting terror. There are numerous terrorist organizations with agendas ranging from various political ideologies to animal rights, environmental, and reproductive issues. With so many diverse groups and causes in play, the number and variety of potential targets present an enormous challenge.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address likely goals and targets of specific terrorist groups. It is important to understand, however, that the risk posed to any company or environment is related to the nature of the particular threat posed by particular terrorist groups (Bauman, 1995).

In addition, while local police play a major role in gathering information about likely terrorist attacks, it is important that the general public (including, of course, employees of companies and organizations) maintain great vigilance Evidence of the value of vigilance can be illustrated in Israel, where ordinary citizens foil more than 80% of attempted terrorist attacks (Sothcott, 2003). Suggested Anti-terrorism Measures Security related to terrorism must encompass varied measures, with the key focus being on vulnerabilities, security measures, of course, are not just effective for terrorism prevention.

They are also useful -- and suggested-for crime prevention. In this sense, consider this quote from James Poland, who asserts that 'the concept of deterring acts of terrorism is based on the old police formula of preventing crime: desire + opportunity = crime,' This being said, the following security measures can be performed at little or no cost to the company -- and the surrounding environment:. Uphold situational awareness of world events and continuing threats. Encourage personnel to be attentive and to immediately report any suspicious activity or possible threat (Said, 2003).

Be acquainted with the location of the nearby police station, hospitals, schools, etc. Promote personnel to avoid routines, contrast times and routes, pre-plan for crisis situations, and keep a low profile-especially throughout periods of high threat. Give confidence personnel to take notice and report doubtful packages, devices, unattended briefcases, or other strange materials immediately. Instruct them not to handle or attempt to remove any such object. Encourage personnel to keep their family members and supervisors apprised of their locations.

Maintain a list of employee cell phones, identifying information, addresses, emergency contacts, etc. Encourage personnel to know emergency exists and stairwells, and practice these exit drills. Ensure all levels of personnel are notified via briefs, e-mail and voice communications, and signage of any changes in threat conditions and protective measures. Post emergency telephone numbers for police, fire, and rescue. Give confidence to personnel to learn by heart important phone numbers (David, 2004). Take any threatening or malicious telephone call, facsimile, or bomb threat seriously.

If such a threat is received, obtain and record as much information as possible to assist in the identification of the source. Record the time of the threat, the exact words, any distinguishing features of the caller, and any background noise or other information related to the threat. Develop bomb threat information forms to assist in codifying this information (Said, 2003). Rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, traffic cones, and road blocks to alter traffic patterns near facilities. Institute or increase vehicle, foot, and roving security patrols varying in size, timing, and routes.

Implement random security shift changes, and vary patrol procedures. Increase the number and visibility of security personnel, when- ever possible (Wacquant, 2000). Arrange for law enforcement vehicles to be parked randomly near entrances and exits. If practical, prohibit vehicles from parking within 30 feet of any building or facility. Conduct routine sweeps of common or adjacent areas, being attentive to trash, newspaper dispensers, mail boxes, planters, etc. If possible, consider removing any item that can be used to conceal bombs. In any case, keep environment clean and orderly (Bauman, 1995).

Appraise emergency plans and if not already in place, develop and put into practice procedures for getting and acting on. threat information procedures (Raban, 2004);. alert notification events;. terrorist occurrence response procedures;. evacuation procedures;. bomb threat events;. hostage and barricade measures;. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events; and. media relations and announcement events. When the aforesaid plans and procedures have been put into practice, conduct internal training exercises and request emergency responders (fire, rescue, medical, and police agencies) to participate in joint exercises (Katz, 1988).

organize and establish partnerships with neighboring authorities to develop intelligence and in order sharing relationships. Place personnel on standby for contingency planning. Limit the number of access points and strictly enforce access control procedures. Implement stringent identification procedures to include conducting 'hands-on' checks of security badges for all personnel, if badges are required. Remind personnel to properly display badges, if applicable, and enforce visibility. Require two forms of photo identification for all visitors (McEwan, 2001). Escort all visitors entering and departing.

X-ray all packages, if possible, prior to entry, and inspect all handbags and briefcases. Validate vendor lists of all routine vendor deliveries and repair services. Approach all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities, question drivers and direct them to move immediately, if owner cannot be identified, have vehicle towed. Review security camera footage daily (or often) to detect for possible indicators of operational surveillance (David, 2004). Consider installing telephone ID, record phone calls, if necessary. Increase perimeter lighting (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). Deploy visible security cameras and motion sensors.

Remove vegetation in and around perimeters, and maintain regular landscaping services. Set up a robust vehicle inspection program, to comprise checking under cart of vehicles, under the hood, and in the trunk. Give vehicle inspection preparation to security personnel. Arrange explosive detection devices and explosive discovery canine teams. Kick off mail and package screening process system. Install special locking devices on manhole covers in and around facilities. Implement a counter-surveillance detection program, including these factors:. Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel.

Inspection or observation of entry points, and access controls or perimeter barriers, such as fences and walls. Unusual behavior by individuals who stare or quickly look away from security personnel. Observation of security reaction drills or procedures. Increase in the number of telephone or e-mail threats (Unger, 2004). Increase in the frequency and nature of suspected surveillance incidents. Evidence of foot surveillance of two or three individuals who appear to be working together. Evidence of mobile surveillance using cars, trucks, motor- cycles, scooters, boats, or small aircraft (Raban, 2004).

Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, shoe shiners, news agents, street sweepers, and food or flower vendors who were not previously seen in the area Suicide Bomb Attack Indicators Terrorism necessarily requires an understanding of the threat posed by suicide bombers. This threat can be manifested in explosive-laden vehicles or explosives hidden on the bodies of individuals. The indicators mentioned above can be characterized as pre-incident factors. One or more of these factors may have occurred prior to a direct attack by a suicide bomber.

Data on suicide bombers in Israel suggest such individuals are usually young men, with 64% younger than 23, and 34% between the ages of 23 and 28 (Raban, 2004). Fully 84% are single at the time of their deadly act (Raban, 2004). These individual characteristics should be considered in light of the indicators listed below. Certain indicators may represent the presence of an immediate threat. Each of these indicators, however, may not be determinative of an imminent threat.

Indeed, as with any other security-based profile, the individual who exhibits one or more of these indicators may be completely innocent (Bauman, 1995). Nonetheless, these indicators have been shown to be valuable insights into potential suicide bombers, including the following: 1. Wearing inappropriate attire, such as out of season clothing and loose or bulky clothing that are inconsistent with current weather conditions 2. Protruding budges or exposed wires under clothing 3. Chemical smell or odor emanating from individual (Shaw, 2003) 4. Intently focused eyes; individual appears to be unusually vigilant 5. Sweating, mumbling, or praying 6.

Unusually calm and detached behaviors 7. Pale face suggesting a recently shaved beard 8. Carrying heavy luggage, bag, or backpack (Unger, 2004) 9. Holding hands tight to body (FBI, 1998). Attempting to gain position near crowds or VIP targets 11. Wearing public safety uniform (police, fire, medical, military) or a disguise to elude detection, such as pregnancy or religious attire 12. Driving vehicle modified to handle heavier loads, increase fuel capacity, vehicle speeds, or storage areas (McEwan, 2001) 13. Discovery of batteries, wiring, timers or other power supply or switching components in the passenger compartment of a vehicle 14.

Presence of stolen or unauthorized vehicles, or vehicle left unattended for extended periods of time (Hedges, 2003). These vehicles may be parked near buildings, in garage parking, or near a potential target These and other situational factors must be considered in any anti-terrorist plan. They also should be filtered through the considered judgment and interpretation of security personnel. Of course, to the extent practical, people should be made aware of these factors. Indeed, it is well advised to train employees, particularly security personnel, to be cognizant of these factors.

Going beyond awareness, relevant policies and procedures in how to react to these indicators are crucial to an effective anti-terrorism response. Obviously, this is easier said than done. However, short of direct intelligence or mind-reading abilities, these are the best security practices available to date. Above all, it is important to maintain vigilance -- and look for ways to prevent terrorist acts and its associated liabilities (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). Beyond this considerable intellectual desire, another aspect of this thesis paper is to look ahead into an uncertain security environment.

Much of this uncertainty relates to the level of threat posed by terrorism (FBI, 1998). Some may argue that the threat of terrorism is overstated. This argument is, at least partly, based on the lack of direct action on American soil since the tragic events of 9/11. In this thinking, the threat of terrorism is a guise, often based on a political agenda. On the other hand, others view terrorism as a real and significant threat. One such person, James M.

Poland, argues that 'terrorism is becoming the defining issue of the twenty-first century." I happen to agree with this thinking. However, these divergent viewpoints beg obvious questions: who is right, and what implications does terrorism pose? As to the former question, time will only tell who is right. Is terrorism overrated? Was 9/11 a 'lucky and isolated act,' as is often implied in the political discourse.

Conversely, are we being lulled to sleep again, such as what we fell into after the initial World Trade Center bombing and after the Oklahoma City bombing? Is terrorism really a pervasive threat, or were these attacks just isolated and unrelated events? Do ideologies and mind-sets sufficient to support a sustained terrorist movement actually exist? Are widely accepted ideologies even necessary to make terrorism a real threat? These are provocative and debatable questions. To me, however, there is no genuine question as to whether terrorism is a real threat.

I answer this question in the affirmative. Indeed, I strongly assert, as did Poland, that terror- ism is the defining issue of the twenty-first century. Unfortunately in this country, terrorism appears to be more of a political issue than a legitimate reality. Stated another way, terrorism has become the 'defining political issue' in American society. Liberals tend to view the issue much differently than conservatives (Unger, 2004). Gone are the days following 9/11 where the country was united around a common cause -- and a common foe.

My concern is that the common cause now appears to be the rhetoric of your particular political party. My fear is that the common foe is the other political party. Those who study terrorism will recognize that divisiveness is, in fact, a clearly defined goal of terrorism. Indeed, terrorism cannot succeed with- out causing divisions, either between respective political camps or between 'the people' and their government (Shaw, 2003) Either such division is dangerous. I see many trends that portend these divisions as real and growing (Kaldor, 2003).

I hope and pray that I am wrong. If I am not wrong, then this country is going to face difficult times ahead. Let me articulate a few trends that are likely to appear on the horizon. Since the rationale underlying these factors are complex -- and somewhat controversial -- an exhaustive explanation of the 'why' behind each factor seems beyond the scope of this dissertation. In addition, being sensitive to the tenets of this thesis, a detailed 'justification' related to each factor may be unnecessary (Hedges, 2003).

Instead, I present these factors as did Kaplan, who also sees many security and crime challenges in the years ahead. In this way, these factors are presented to describe the need for the security laws and methods contained in this paper (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). This being said, I believe:. The threat of terrorism is not limited to A1 Qaeda, or even to Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, as this paper is being drafted the most active terrorist groups in the U.S.

are single interest groups concerned with environmental 'protection' (Earth Liberation Front-E.L.F.) and animal 'rights' (Animal Liberation Front-A.L.F.). Other terrorist action will stem from racial, ethnic, and religious extremists. This threat, I believe, will manifest itself in widespread direct action. There will be a general increase-probably significant-in extremism from both the left and right wings of the American political system. These extremists will act out in response to 'direct action' (violent acts) of the other.

In addition, in response to such extremism, vigilante groups will likely grow in response to the generalized violence from both political extremes. Criminal gangs will grow increasingly violent, using more lethal weapons, with some even 'graduating' to terrorist groups. The transition of the Blank Panthers to the El Rukns in Chicago is a fore runner of this development. The Hispanic gang 'MS-13' is a classic contemporary example of this assertion (Hedges, 2003). The rule of law will be increasingly questioned, even disregarded.

The 'legal system' will be much more widely viewed as corrupt, irrelevant, or subservient to the higher law or the higher purpose of ideological, religious, political and racial extremists. Significantly, this mindset is critical for the development of terrorist movements, as the violence contained in a terrorist campaign must be rationalized as being superior to the existing legal system (Holmes & Holmes, 1994). If these occur, the challenges needed to confront and contain the violence will show a huge potential market for security firms (Unger, 2004).

Just as the latest asymmetric shape of warfare is altering the way the forces tackle and combat terrorism, so too police organization must reinvent the way of law enforcement. This alteration will leave a void, or at least, a gap, in how public safety services are delivered to communities. Security firms are uniquely prepared to bridge this gap. I believe that security firms will deliver needed order maintenance and related services to communities all over this country. In this sense, F.

Thomas Braglia, the former president of the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police, noted that in the current climate what was once considered a 'professional relationship' between the public and private sectors has now because a 'professional necessity (Holmes & Holmes, 1994). I believe this professional necessity presents the largest increase in the potential market of security firms since the 1850s, when security personnel 'policed' the American 'Wild West.' This opportunity, however, is a double-edged sword, replete with pitfalls for the unwary (McEwan, 2001).

As this thesis makes clear, security exposures and security liability have played a major role in the development of the security industry. The typical security provision has focused on client properties and interests. Of course, this usually entails protecting a particular private environment. If terrorism becomes more common, I believe that the private security industry will continue to expand (Merton, 1938), in both size and scope, as more security personnel are used to protect critical infrastructures and public places.

Making a fluid and thoughtful transition from private 'protected facilities' to serving communities in the public realm will bring the activities and operations of security personnel into plain view. Just as public police officers sometimes fail in the public eye, so will private police officers overreact and/or act in an inappropriate manner (Huntington, 1993). This is inevitable. The cases presented in this thesis illustrate this does and will occur.

What is not inevitable or certain is how the security industry or its component firms will respond in the countless discretionary decisions that will occur in this expanding marketplace (Huntington, 1993). If security providers act with professionalism, any deficiency can be overcome. Conversely, if security providers go into this new marketplace without developing the standards and principles to support this desire for professionalism, then the inevitable deficiencies will appear glaring or even reckless (Buruma & Margalit, 2004).

Going beyond the market opportunities, the desire for professional- ism within private policing must center on an even additional basic purpose: the security of the persons and societies we serve, and the steadiness of our behavior. It is significant to keep in mind that the danger of terrorism is intended not only to kill people and injure property, but moreover to obliterate the very fabric of society (Cohen, 2003).

Those in the security industry, especially those protecting public environments, trophy buildings, and critical infrastructure, will be on the front lines of this asymmetric conflict. Advancing standards and principles of professionalism is our best defense. One critical outcome of professionalism is the desire to prevent crime, or at least, address.