Anti Terrorism Measures alert notification events;
Effective Anti-Terrorism Measures
Effective Anti-Terrorist Tactics
The threat of terrorism involves many variables. The nature and degree of risk posed by a potential attack depends on a number of factors, including the goals of the attackers and their means of inciting terror. There are numerous terrorist organizations with agendas ranging from various political ideologies to animal rights, environmental, and reproductive issues. With so many diverse groups and causes in play, the number and variety of potential targets present an enormous challenge. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address likely goals and targets of specific terrorist groups. It is important to understand, however, that the risk posed to any company or environment is related to the nature of the particular threat posed by particular terrorist groups (Bauman, 1995). In addition, while local police play a major role in gathering information about likely terrorist attacks, it is important that the general public (including, of course, employees of companies and organizations) maintain great vigilance Evidence of the value of vigilance can be illustrated in Israel, where ordinary citizens foil more than 80% of attempted terrorist attacks (Sothcott, 2003).
Suggested Anti-terrorism Measures Security related to terrorism must encompass varied measures, with the key focus being on vulnerabilities, security measures, of course, are not just effective for terrorism prevention. They are also useful -- and suggested-for crime prevention. In this sense, consider this quote from James Poland, who asserts that 'the concept of deterring acts of terrorism is based on the old police formula of preventing crime: desire + opportunity = crime,' This being said, the following security measures can be performed at little or no cost to the company -- and the surrounding environment:
. Uphold situational awareness of world events and continuing threats.
. Encourage personnel to be attentive and to immediately report any suspicious activity or possible threat (Said, 2003).
. Be acquainted with the location of the nearby police station, hospitals, schools, etc.
. Promote personnel to avoid routines, contrast times and routes, pre-plan for crisis situations, and keep a low profile-especially throughout periods of high threat.
. Give confidence personnel to take notice and report doubtful packages, devices, unattended briefcases, or other strange materials immediately. Instruct them not to handle or attempt to remove any such object.
. Encourage personnel to keep their family members and supervisors apprised of their locations.
. Maintain a list of employee cell phones, identifying information, addresses, emergency contacts, etc.
. Encourage personnel to know emergency exists and stairwells, and practice these exit drills. Ensure all levels of personnel are notified via briefs, e-mail and voice communications, and signage of any changes in threat conditions and protective measures.
. Post emergency telephone numbers for police, fire, and rescue. Give confidence to personnel to learn by heart important phone numbers (David, 2004).
. Take any threatening or malicious telephone call, facsimile, or bomb threat seriously. If such a threat is received, obtain and record as much information as possible to assist in the identification of the source. Record the time of the threat, the exact words, any distinguishing features of the caller, and any background noise or other information related to the threat. Develop bomb threat information forms to assist in codifying this information (Said, 2003).
. Rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, traffic cones, and road blocks to alter traffic patterns near facilities.
. Institute or increase vehicle, foot, and roving security patrols varying in size, timing, and routes.
. Implement random security shift changes, and vary patrol procedures.
. Increase the number and visibility of security personnel, when- ever possible (Wacquant, 2000).
. Arrange for law enforcement vehicles to be parked randomly near entrances and exits.
. If practical, prohibit vehicles from parking within 30 feet of any building or facility.
. Conduct routine sweeps of common or adjacent areas, being attentive to trash, newspaper dispensers, mail boxes, planters, etc. If possible, consider removing any item that can be used to conceal bombs. In any case, keep environment clean and orderly (Bauman, 1995).
. Appraise emergency plans and if not already in place, develop and put into practice procedures for getting and acting on . threat information procedures (Raban, 2004);
. terrorist occurrence response procedures;
. evacuation procedures;
. bomb threat events;
. hostage and barricade measures;
. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events; and . media relations and announcement events.
. When the aforesaid plans and procedures have been put into practice, conduct internal training exercises and request emergency responders (fire, rescue, medical, and police agencies) to participate in joint exercises (Katz, 1988).
. organize and establish partnerships with neighboring authorities to develop intelligence and in order sharing relationships.
. Place personnel on standby for contingency planning.
. Limit the number of access points and strictly enforce access control procedures.
. Implement stringent identification procedures to include conducting 'hands-on' checks of security badges for all personnel, if badges are required.
. Remind personnel to properly display badges, if applicable, and enforce visibility.
. Require two forms of photo identification for all visitors (McEwan, 2001).
. Escort all visitors entering and departing.
. X-ray all packages, if possible, prior to entry, and inspect all handbags and briefcases.
. Validate vendor lists of all routine vendor deliveries and repair services.
. Approach all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities, question drivers and direct them to move immediately, if owner cannot be identified, have vehicle towed.
. Review security camera footage daily (or often) to detect for possible indicators of operational surveillance (David, 2004).
. Consider installing telephone ID, record phone calls, if necessary.
. Increase perimeter lighting (Buruma & Margalit, 2004).
. Deploy visible security cameras and motion sensors.
. Remove vegetation in and around perimeters, and maintain regular landscaping services.
. Set up a robust vehicle inspection program, to comprise checking under cart of vehicles, under the hood, and in the trunk. Give vehicle inspection preparation to security personnel.
. Arrange explosive detection devices and explosive discovery canine teams.
. Kick off mail and package screening process system.
. Install special locking devices on manhole covers in and around facilities.
. Implement a counter-surveillance detection program, including these factors:
. Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel. Inspection or observation of entry points, and access controls or perimeter barriers, such as fences and walls
. Unusual behavior by individuals who stare or quickly look away from security personnel
. Observation of security reaction drills or procedures. Increase in the number of telephone or e-mail threats (Unger, 2004)
. Increase in the frequency and nature of suspected surveillance incidents
. Evidence of foot surveillance of two or three individuals who appear to be working together
. Evidence of mobile surveillance using cars, trucks, motor- cycles, scooters, boats, or small aircraft (Raban, 2004)
. Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, shoe shiners, news agents, street sweepers, and food or flower vendors who were not previously seen in the area
Suicide Bomb Attack Indicators
Terrorism necessarily requires an understanding of the threat posed by suicide bombers. This threat can be manifested in explosive-laden vehicles or explosives hidden on the bodies of individuals. The indicators mentioned above can be characterized as pre-incident factors. One or more of these factors may have occurred prior to a direct attack by a suicide bomber. Data on suicide bombers in Israel suggest such individuals are usually young men, with 64% younger than 23, and 34% between the ages of 23 and 28 (Raban, 2004). Fully 84% are single at the time of their deadly act (Raban, 2004). These individual characteristics should be considered in light of the indicators listed below. Certain indicators may represent the presence of an immediate threat. Each of these indicators, however, may not be determinative of an imminent threat. Indeed, as with any other security-based profile, the individual who exhibits one or more of these indicators may be completely innocent (Bauman, 1995). Nonetheless, these indicators have been shown to be valuable insights into potential suicide bombers, including the following:
1. Wearing inappropriate attire, such as out of season clothing and loose or bulky clothing that are inconsistent with current weather conditions
2. Protruding budges or exposed wires under clothing
3. Chemical smell or odor emanating from individual (Shaw, 2003)
4. Intently focused eyes; individual appears to be unusually vigilant
5. Sweating, mumbling, or praying
6. Unusually calm and detached behaviors
7. Pale face suggesting a recently shaved beard
8. Carrying heavy luggage, bag, or backpack (Unger, 2004)
9. Holding hands tight to body (FBI, 1998). Attempting to gain position near crowds or VIP targets
11. Wearing public safety uniform (police, fire, medical, military) or a disguise to elude detection, such as pregnancy or religious attire
12. Driving vehicle modified to handle heavier loads, increase fuel capacity, vehicle speeds, or storage areas (McEwan, 2001)
13. Discovery of batteries, wiring, timers or other power supply or switching components in the passenger compartment of a vehicle
alert notification events;
Rational choices are limited in this setting, and may merely consist of making the best of the worst available alternatives. The American public is becoming increasingly frustrated with national policymakers who seem to be firing global broadsides but are not able to hit anything. In fact, Butler even questions whether the war on terrorism is a struggle against Osama bin Laden, his Al Qaeda network, and a few similarly minded
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