Army and Vietnam
Krepinevich, a. (1986). The Army and Vietnam. New York: JHU Press.
The book The Army and Vietnam by Andrew Krepinevich take a close look at some of the greatest and most controversial debates regarding Vietnam and paints them in a new light, examining them with a higher level of closeness and scrutiny. One of the contentions that the book looks at very intimately is the assertion that many ex-Army leaders have made that had they enough weapons and soldiers, America could have easily won the war in Vietnam. The remarkable aspect of this book is that Krepinevich states that this was exactly the mentality that caused America to lose the war. The bulk of the book is dedicated to examining the losing strategy that America used when fighting in Vietnam, such as the war strategies that were used in World War Two, with great success and how and why they proved to be unsuccessful in Vietnam. One of the major points of the book revolves around the fact that Vietnam was a war characterized by insurgency and counterinsurgency and the requirements of such a war meant that light infantry formations, restraint of firepower and the resolution of political and social issues within the country. "The elements of a successful strategy for the counterinsurgent involve securing the government's base areas, separating the guerilla forces from the population and eliminating the insurgent infrastructure. In an area infested by insurgency, the army must concentrate...
The contentions and divisions which persisted throughout the period of the Vietnam War were incredibly damaging to the cohesiveness of the entire country and the sense of solidarity among all Americans. Many of these contentions revolved around what the very essence of war was and what the American army was responsible for doing in terms of the nature of war. Krepinevich bravely engages in some of the most invasive forms of research and looks at a range of declassified materials and interviews with officers and men and their battlefield experience. Much of Krepinevich's research consistently demonstrates that many of the soldiers experienced a form of conflict and combat that previous incidents of war had sheltered them from. Krepinevich's book details how conventional strategies of warfare ultimately were ineffective. The majority of the book demonstrates time and again how America had a role in a war which it was largely unprepared to participate in. One of the major strengths of the book is how Krepinevich is able to show how these issues are applicable even today with U.S. presences in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thus, the author's main purpose was to demonstrate…
Conventional Wars The rules of Engagement (ROE) used during war remains were established as recognition to the general or international law in the conduct of war, specifically the protection of civilian (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2007). Rules of Engagement are composed of procedures, power of decision and limitations which the military forces may employ to achieve goals and objectives during the conduct of war. It is issued by authorities in
Fundamentally, the insurgents are fighting an enemy with superior weaponry, technology, and resources, so therefore, must seek avenues to mitigate these disadvantages. In other words, insurgent forces out vastly outdone in the traditional aspects of warfare, so they are forced to resort to unconventional modes of attack. Early in his book, the Army and Vietnam, Krepinevich provides the broad game plan an insurgent force must follow to achieve final victory: As
American Way of War The history of the American Way of War is a transitional one, as Weigley shows in his landmark work of the same name. The strategy of war went from, under Washington, a small scale, elude and survive set of tactics practiced by what seem today to be relatively "quaint" militias, to -- in the 20th century -- a full-scale operation known as "total war." True, "total war"