Battle Of The Bulge Siege of Bastogne

Patton’s Employment of Mission Command: Siege of Bastogne
As a military leader, Patton is remembered for great accomplishments. As a matter of fact, his approach to leadership has led many to speculate that he was before his time in the military (reference module 6 notes). In many ways, Patton could also be remembered for his excellent application of what is now referred to as mission command. In basic terms, mission command has got to do with “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Unified Land Operations” (Department of the Army (ADRP 5-0), 2012, p. 1-1). It is important to note that during his time as general, Patton made extensive utilization of mission command – and effectively employed the operations process in this endeavor (reference module 6 notes). In essence, Patton could, in all engagements “understand his assigned mission, and he sought to build and maintain his understanding of the operational environment and the problem” (reference module 6 notes). Patton’s competency on the application of mission command and the operational process was displayed in most of his engagements – as was evidenced in the Siege of Bastogne in 1944 and 1945.
In basic terms, the Siege of Bastogne took place in a town known as Bastogne in Belgium, where German forces clashed with American forces in a sustained effort by the former to seize the town which was of great relevance as it could have provided a very strategic pathway for the German forces to expand northward (Barron, 2015). At the time of the German invasion, the town was under the active protection of the American forces, under the able leadership of Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe, who during the sustained 7 day German assault faced the real prospect of surrender. Then entered Patton, a battle-hardened general whose mission on this particular engagement was to redeem the besieged forces in this strategic town.
Patton’s orientation, throughout his service, was that attacks must be done aggressively and continuously. He felt that the swift annihilation of the enemy was a sure way to save lives. When the Battle of Bastogne commenced, Patton’s 3rd army was engaged in an eastward attack. It was at this point that Eisenhower committed the 3rd Battalion towards Bastogne – effectively meaning that to head to Bastogne, Patton’s men had to turn 90 degrees and head north. It was no easy task, but with pure confidence, guts, and courage, Patton was able to pull this off. He effectively broke off an attack and wheeled away, while at the same time avoiding a very probable situation of breaking his stride while heading in the opposite direction and giving the enemy the chance to wipe out his formation.
In all his engagements, Patton clearly understood and internalized his mission. The weather was in this case awful and there was virtually no air support, but Patton understood that he had to make a dash to Bastogne. In essence, “commanders assess continuously to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing” (reference module 6 notes). Patton clearly understood that the fall of Bastogne would effectively complicate matters and most probably give the German force an upper hand. He would latter on point out that “the relief of Bastogne is the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed and it is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of this war” (Morelock, 2015, p. 297). This is a clear instance of Patton’s ability to apply mission command. It is via sustained disciplined initiative that Patton managed to motivate his men through awful winter weather and constant enemy engagement and march right through the German encirclement.
It is also clear that Patton was, like a soldier, always prepared. The German offensive at Bastogne was largely unanticipated – effectively meaning there was no time for contingency plans to be made. With the 101st Airborne Division holed in Bastogne, Patton, on 19th December, met with other commanders in an effort geared at conducting an analysis of the courses of action to be adopted (Morelock, 2015). The meeting took place in Verdun, France. Patton always “visualized operations during the planning stage, and he was always able to describe his visualization to his staff and subordinates which facilitated a shared understanding of the situation, the mission, and their commander’s intent” (reference module 6 notes). However, when he gave his proposed plan of action – which comprised of a three day northward movement of the 4th Armored and two Infantry divisions – everybody thought he was nuts (Morelock, 2015). As I Have pointed out elsewhere in this text, Patton always sought to first gain clear understanding of his assigned mission. It is clear that in this case, he had already grasped not only the significance, but also the nature of the engagement better than everybody else. He had already established clear understanding of both the problem and the operational environment. For starters, Patton hand an uncanny ability of visualizing the battlefield and understanding the situation.
Despite his ‘rough’ and often vulgar self, Patton was always able to inspire those below him – and influence them towards the accomplishment of a specified objective, like was the case at Bastogne where his men fought valiantly. He was also brave beyond measure – he had this weird belief that he was a reincarnation of warriors of old (Harvey, 2008). A week after the presentation Patton made to skeptical commanders at Verdun, he was able to penetrate the circle German sources had formed in their besiegement of Bastogne. This he accomplished using Lt. Col Abrams’4th Armored 37th Tank Battalion. In the end, he effectively relieved the 101st Airborne Division and later on managed to push the opposing German forces east. In essence, Patton managed to burst his way through the encirclement by utilizing a great war tactic operationalized by Napoleon, where the enemy would be engaged from the front and then another force would be sent to ‘flank’ the enemy from the back – effectively engaging the enemy on two sides (Harvey, 2008). According to Harvey (2008, p. xxix), the success of this strategy was in in the fact that “the enemy ideally would have committed their own reserves to battle in an effort to overwhelm the frontal force before the flanking attack appeared.” The frontal force in this case was the 101st Airborne Division, and the force involved in the flanking attack was Patton’s 3rd Army.






























References
Barron, L. (2015). Patton at the Battle of the Bulge: How the General’s Tanks Turned the Tide at Bastogne. New York, NY: Penguin Publishing Group
Harvey, R., (2008). Maverick military leaders: The extraordinary battles of Washington, Nelson, Patton, Rommel, and others. New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing
Morelock, J.D. (2015). Generals of the Bulge: Leadership in the U.S Army’s Greatest Battle. Stackpole Books.
Reference module 6 notes