International bus transportation law

Business

International Business Law

In the case of Lucy v. Zehmer 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954), the Supreme Court of Virginia had to figure out the enforceability of a writing, which the defendants, a seller and his wife, claimed was not enforceable because it had been written by the seller when he was intoxicated. The writing presented that the seller agreed to sell a certain farm to complainant buyer for $50,000. The writing was signed by both of the husband and the wife.

The complainants, a buyer and his brother, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County Virginia against the defendants. They were seeking to have specific performance of a contract by which complainants alleged that defendants had sold the buyer a certain farm that defendants owned. The buyer allegedly transferred a half interest in the purchase of the land to the brother. After depositions were taken, the circuit court entered a decree in favor of defendants, ruling that complainants had failed to establish their right to specific performance and dismissed their claim. Complainants then brought an assignment of error to the circuit court's action to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

In this case, the Supreme Court set forth the rule that it was a contracting party's outward manifestation of an intention to be bound, rather than the party's unexpressed intentions, that determined whether there was the existence of a contract. The Supreme Court ruled that, whether the writing signed by defendants and the buyer was the result of a serious offer by the buyer and a serious acceptance by defendants, or was a serious offer by the buyer and an acceptance in jest by defendants, it constituted a binding contract of sale between the parties. The court ruled that if a party's words and actions, judged by the reasonable person standard, made apparent an intention to agree, then there was a contract. The Supreme Court held that a person was not entitled to set up that he was merely joking when his conduct and words would make a reasonable person believe that he intended a real agreement.

In the case of Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store 215 Minn. 188, 86 N.W2d 689 (1957), plaintiff brought an action against defendant for damages for defendant's failure to sell to plaintiff an item advertised in the newspaper. After the publication of ads by the plaintiff, the defendant was the first to be there at the appropriate place in the defendant's store and on each instance demanded the coat and the stole that had been advertised. He indicated his willingness to pay the $1 sale price. On both occasions, the defendant declined to sell the goods to the plaintiff. On the first trip he was told that because of a house rule the offer was intended for women only and sales would not be made to men. On the second visit he was told that he knew the defendant's house rules.

The court determined that the offer by defendant of the sale of the item was clear, definite, and explicit, and left nothing open for negotiation. The plaintiff having successfully complied with the terms of the advertisement, and having offered the stated purchase price of the article, was entitled to performance on the part of defendant. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that the conduct of the parties created sufficient support of obligation to constitute a contract of sale. The court affirmed the judgment awarded to plaintiff for breach of contract.

In cases where the offer is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, taking of which will complete the contract. The sale of the fur advertised by the plaintiff was clear, definite, and explicit, and left nothing open for negotiation. The plaintiff was the first one to appear at the seller's place of business to be served, as requested by the advertisement, and having presented the stated purchase price of the article, he was entitled to performance on the part of the defendant.

In the case of Hodge v. Garrett 101 Idaho 397, 614.2d 420 (1980), the buyer wished to purchase land located next to the sellers' drive-in movie theater. One seller signed the contract. The testimony was conflicting as to whether the buyer was told that the remaining members of the sellers' partnership would have to agree to the sale. The buyer brought suit when the sellers refused to sell. The trial court found that the one seller, as an agent, bound the sellers' partnership.

Voeller testified that he had told Hodge prior to signing that Hodge would have to present him with a plat plan which would have to be approved by the partners before the property could be sold. Hodge denied that a plat plan had ever been mentioned to him, and he testified that Voeller did not tell him that the approval of the other partners was needed until after the contract was signed. Hodge also testified that he offered to pay Voeller the full purchase price when he signed the contract, but Voeller told him that that was not necessary. The trial court decided that Voeller had actual and apparent power to execute the contract on behalf of the partnership, and that the contract should be enforced. The partners of the Pay-Ont Drive-In Theatre appealed, arguing that Voeller did not have authority to sell the property and that Hodge knew that he did not have such authority.

The court reversed on appeal, finding that the one seller had no authority to make the sale. The seller had no actual authority, and his apparent authority could not extend to matters outside of the ordinary business of a drive-in movie theater. Under Idaho Code 53-309(1), the usual business of the sellers' partnership did not include dealing in real estate. Thus, the contract was unenforceable.

In the case of Konic International v. Spokane Computer Services 109 / Idaho 627-708 P.2d 932 (1985), one of the buyer's representatives spoke to the seller about purchasing a surge protector. The representative had priced units, getting prices from $50 to $200. The seller offered to sell a unit for $5,620, which the representative misinterpreted as $56.20. The representative worked up a purchase order for $56.20, and placed an order with the seller. The unit was installed while the buyer's president was on vacation. When the president returned from vacation, he immediately ordered that power to the equipment be turned off because the surge protector was obviously worth more than $56.20. The president contacted the seller to have them pick up the protector, but the seller refused and brought suit for the purchase price.