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Giles v. Commonwealth
Cite as 672 S.E. 2d 879 (Va. 2009)
Facts of Case
Defendant, Christopher Lee Giles, took part in breaking and entering a house on September 28, 2005, in the City of Martinsville. The house belonged to Oscar Thornton, which was an inheritance from his deceased mother three months before. While Mr. Thornton has his primary home in Maryland, he treated the house he inherited from his mother as a vacation home. Since inheriting it, Mr. Thornton has visited the home twice a month. Prior to the break-in, Mr. Thornton had stayed a whole weekend in the house ten days before. Mr. Thorntons vacation home was a fully-furnished residence with fully-stocked food and sleeping quarters. During the break-in, Giles took food, sheets, towels, a videocassette recorder, two TV screens, and bathroom supplies.
While Giles involvement in the break-in is not in dispute, he moved to strike arguing that the Commonwealth failed to ascertain a prima facie case. In his defense, he further contended that the Commonwealth did not establish that the house was a dwelling house as required in Code 18.289. Giles stated that the house was not a dwelling house since no one was living there during the break-in and it was not used for sleeping on a regular basis. Giles motion to strike was denied by the Circuit Court, which found adequate evidence that it was a dwelling...…S.E.2d 879 (Va. 2009)] [2: Ibid., 1.]
Policy (if there is any)
None.
Reasoning
Based on the burglary statute, a house used for habitation is a dwelling house. Moreover, a house does not lose its dwelling status simply because an individual is absent for either a regular or irregular time period. Periodic habitation of a house does not necessitate that the residence is used at regular periods of time as long as its used for habitation purposes.
Holding
The Court denied Giles appeal and upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The court argued that the appellate court did not err in upholding the ruling of the circuit court since Mr. Thorntons house met the requirement of a dwelling house under…
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