S., the consequences could be bad, especially if combined with belligerent U.S. rhetoric. His well-argued point is that North Korea's striving for nuclear capability is a response to the perceived imbalance of power which is threatening to North Korea. It is an attempt to develop a deterrent to possible future U.S. aggression, a bargaining tool rather than an offensive strategy. Presumably, then, Kang would agree that if the U.S. lowered its military presence and changed its rhetoric, the fear would gradually dissipate. The North would have no incentive for risk. In addition, the mistrust and animosity between the two countries will not go away until the U.S. recognizes the legitimate national security concerns of North Korea. His argument is stronger than Cha's with respect to nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are less threatening than thought since the conventional war would still wipe out North Korea. The North has used targeted terrorism to destabilize the South in hopes of a coup for new government more favorable, rather than as a way to entice coercive bargaining (p. 63).
All of Kang's arguments are well-grounded in the realities involved. It is possible to read Kang, nonetheless, as being too optimistic. For one thing, simply because no new invasion on South Korean has taken place in fifty years does not mean there is peace and stability in the region. The absence of war does not mean that other forms of provocation and aggression are absent. Tensions persist and there is still a possibility...
The deterioration of the North's military capability does not necessarily eliminate it as a threat to attack. Some defensive response may be necessary beyond engagement.
On the issue of intentions, Kang seems to argue that North Korea has changed toward reform and desire for integration. Therefore, economic engagement is all that is necessary -- encouraged economic growth attenuates the chance of belligerence and increases stabilization. He is perhaps too trusting here. Who is to say that negotiating for economic aid will deter or decrease the likelihood of bad behavior? In fact, the weaker North Korea is, the more dangerous it may be because more desperate. Further, engagement so far has not eliminated the North's insecurity, out of which their irrational aggression has stemmed. And if they are in survival mode and just playing one day at a time, maybe they are more dangerous because, as Cha's argument says, they are more desperate to escape their current conditions (i.e., they are losing the battle).
Works Cited
Cha, Victor. (2003). "Weak but Still Threatening." In Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (pp. 13-40). New York, NY: Columbia University.
Kang, David. (2003). "Threatening, but Deterrence Works." In Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (pp. 41-69). New York, NY: Columbia University.
