Covert Action by Callahan

Covert Action in the Cold War: U.S. Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations This paper acts as a book review of the piece of non-fiction literature, "Covert Action in the Cold War" by James Callahan (2009). This particular book emerged from the experiences of World War II and looks at how the CIA was developed as a means of countering the difficulties that the Soviet Union and all related forces presented as a means of protecting U.S. interests worldwide.

Fundamentally, the book looks at the wealth of covert operations run by the CIA from the time it was created in 1947 up until the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The author, James Callahan taught at a range of universities in the northern parts of England and the primary focus of his work in general is on the pioneers of America's cold war intelligence community. Largely Callahan uses the book as a means of describing this community and their unique connection to communism.

For example, some of the book is dedicated to describing the CIA's conservative counterintelligence chief James Angleton, as being prescient about the communist menace and how they view the agency's early maneuvers in Italy as both dirty tricks and also as necessary and successful endeavors.

This book looks at how the CIA was able to develop and unfold into an organization which was highly multi-faceted and how it was often used as a way to avoid standard military action and as a means of offering necessary back-up when certain tensions started to become aggravated, such as when the Cold War started to manifest more aggressively in Korea and Vietnam. Callahan is able to provide a nuanced discussion of many of the murkier subjects connected to these issues, such as CIA action in general and specifically.

Callahan is able to write in a precise and detailed manner by relying on government records and documents as a means of describing the evolution of the CIA from its nascent stages and from its more proactive goal of advancing U.S. foreign policy.

Because Callahan relies so strongly on these documents which are generally inaccessible to most people, Callahan is able to present a truly persuasive viewpoint on a more nebulous period of American history, by providing insight on global politics during some of the most difficult times of U.S. foreign relations. One of the things that Callahan does from the start which is so intelligent about this book, is he is able to call attention to the overall necessity of more literature written about the CIA in general.

Some criticize his book as offering a rehashing of what most scholars already know about the subject, but such a viewpoint just isn't fair. The detail with which Callahan offers a comprehensive chronological summary of CIA covert action is truly special. Callahan offers a very detailed description as well, using three means of labeling operations: offensive, defensive and preventative. For instance, the Bay of Pigs invasion was considered offensive, and actions taken in Italy during the 1940s were considered defensive.

On the other hand the coup in Iran in the early 1950s was considered preventative. Countries like Vietnam and Laos are dealt with by Callahan with distinction. There's also a strong emphasis on the political ramifications of such operations, along with their needs in general terms. One strength of the book is that while Callahan is able to treat each incident with precision, but without getting too hung up on highly technical details.

Certain subjects that Callahan covers force him to engage in a certain amount of outsourcing, which can get him into difficulty in some instances. For example, when Callahan talks about the influence of Philby on the Cold War, he uses books such as one by Cookridge and another by Brown. These books are problematic because the field and scholarship of CIA and covert operations in general consider these books to be largely spotty and not always strong pillars of evidence.

Thus, there are many times when Callahan's analysis feels like it needs more validation and overall support. One obvious instance of this is Callahan's scrutiny of Albanian covert action which can be weakened when he agrees with Brown's argument that both James Angleton and Frank Wisner had already believed Philby was a soviet agent in 1950. Other scholars have pointed out that Philby was not under official suspicion until May 1951; on the other hand, other scholars assert that while Philby was not under official suspicion.