Crimea Reignites the Battle Between the Age Old Concepts of Sovereignty and Self-Rule:

Sovereignty vs Self-Rule: Crimea Reignites Battle Inclusion of Russia into Georgia in 2008 provoked political fear among the west political arena and the media. They dreaded that similar intervention by the Russian military would be possible in other CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) with minority states such as Crimea of the larger Russian community. Crimea was part of the imperial Russia until 1954 when it was handed over to soviet Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev, the secretary general of communist party and Soviet Union.

In 1991 it joined the independent Ukraine community while concurrently the Soviet Union broke apart. The question of Crimea region is often interpreted as a problem from the Russian community. Fear arose due to the Ukrainian domestic politics as well as the Russian external ambitions. The Crimean situation is interlinked and inseparable to the Russian-Ukrainian political relations (Hedeskog, 2008).

An interesting element of the argument amid Russia and Ukraine is that Ukraine has a minority of 11.3million Russian population .A large number of this population resides in Eastern Ukraine; while it represents a majority population of the Crimean population. Approximately sixty seven percent of the Crimean populations were Russians while Ukrainians were only twenty five percent of the total local population. Moreover, the traditional Ukrainians in Crimea considered Russian as their native mother tongue.

Though self-identification does not follow distinct ethnic lines this was not the case after the conduction of the 1991 vote for independence which got nearly fifty four percent of support in line with ethnic division. This displayed the ethnic ridge amid these two ethnic groups. The division between is an image of the political scene not only in Crimea but in the entire Ukraine. Crimea was the region that was in dispute of Ukrainian independence. The entire Ukraine regions were in unanimous support for the nation's sovereignty.

It may easily be concluded that the Ukraine's Russian population is rebellious to national interests of Ukraine. However, from another perspective it is true to say that Russians have a different vision of their country. Crimea, besides the quagmire surrounding it is the only region in modern Ukraine that has been able to enjoy the benefits of an independent republic. This shows the distinctly peculiar state of the political climate of Crimea (Trenin, 2008).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the military coalition brought together in 1947 in order to offset the threat posed from the Soviet Union. Ukraine's decision to become a member of this organization has been a major factor in shaping the current political situation in the region, especially the intensification in groups that support Russia.

The decision of Ukraine to become a member of NATO has led to conflicts between the Eastern European nation and Russia which views the organization as a threat to its national security as well as foreign policy (Bukkvoll, 2001). These changing relations between the two countries are the backdrop through which there has been a rise in pro- Russian political parties as well as civil society organizations in Crimea.

In an attempt to ensure that Ukraine does not get admitted into NATO and also to prolong the Sevastapol's military base lease where the Russian Black Fleet is positioned, Russia has tried to blow the danger posed by these political and cultural associations out of proportion. However, several analysts have argued that the small groups in Crimea who are agitating for the region's the independence are insignificant and could not possibly cause any major threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Currently, Crimea has attracted the attention of the West, albeit temporarily, due to the political turmoil within the Eastern Ukraine. But the current situation cannot be understood without a closer look at the history of the area, both distant and recent (D'anieri, 1999). Crimean Historical Relevance The space which Ukraine occupies has always been strategically important to whichever power is in control of the region at any given time. As a result this space and its residents have always been governed by one foreign power or another.

It is the first time that the borders within which Ukraine is established as a sovereign state have the right of self-determination in its long history. Ukraine has been under the rule of major powers such as the Ottoman Empire, the Commonwealth of Polish-Lithuanian, the Crimean Khanate and Muscovy. In more recent history, the space has been governed sporadically by the Russian, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires (Mizrokhi, 2009). The Crimean Peninsula is located in the South Eastern Ukraine.

In the past, its strategic position was fought over mostly by the Russian and Ottoman empires. Their occupation of the region has greatly influenced every aspect of the culture of Crimea. The reason that this area was important to these major powers is that it separates the Azov from the Black seas. Any power seeking to be in control of the maritime bodies would have a great advantage over its rivals simply by having control over the Crimean Peninsula (Kuzio, 2006).

Crimea spent two centuries under the colonial rule of the Russians, both the Imperial and Soviet Russia. Probably because Russia was the last outside power to govern Crimea, its presence in the region changed the country's ethnic and political composition. Crimea was obtained by Russia after a couple of campaigns targeted at the Ottoman Empire. It came under Russian rule in 1783. Surprisingly Crimea is never presented in either Tsarist or Soviet history as the region of one ethic group, despite this being the reality.

It is the Tatar National assembly named Krultav that brought back the use of the name Crimea (Qirim) through the slogan 'Crimea for Crimeans' during the October revolution. In the revolution, the Tartans wanted to achieve self-determination in the Russian federation. The National assembly joined hands in this quest with the National party, Milli Firqa, to demand for the autonomy of Crimea (Sasse, 2007). Instead of Obliging to their demands, the Russians responded by silencing the intellectuals among the Tatars.

The 1930s which were an era of repression in the Soviet Union saw some forty thousand Crimean Tartars being deported to Siberia. Those who survived during that period suffered the same fate after the Second World War. They were deported to the Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan among many other states in the Soviet Union.

Soviet policies of regional growth and development led to Slavic influx into Crimea (Sasse, 2007).This influx made the tartans, who had a long history on the territory and felt that Crimea belonged to them, feel like they were the foreigners. There was a lot of emphasis on a Crimea that was more Slavic than anything else, therefore alienating the natives. This was a Stalinist strategy to completely remove any Crimean Tatars in the territory, who had survived after the deportations in 1944 (Sasse, 2007).

In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev decided to hand over Crimea to the Ukraine. Notwithstanding that this period was characterized by de-Stalinization which occurred after the death of the leader, there are no other clear motives that point to the reason why Krucchev made the transfer of Crimea (Sasse, 2007). What remains a fact however is that by the time of the transfer, the linguistic and ethnic makeup in Crimea was different from what it had previously been.

The reasons for this change are directly related to the Soviet policies of regional development and deportation of Tartans as well as silencing of the intelligentsia. In the past, Crimea was a region with non-Russian roots. However, the time when Crimea belonged to Russia a lot of Russian history was added to the region. Another factor that demonstrates the multiethnic nature of Crimea was the deeply rooted, emblematic, literary as well as historical memoirs that can be used to lay claim on the territory by different groups (Sasse, 2007).

There are three opposing views about the history of Crimea presented by three groups. The Tatars view the region as their only homeland, citing their statehood between the 15th and 18th centuries as considerable evidence. The Russians view Crimea as a member of Russia, claiming that the Tatars were a part of Mongol invasion. The area serves as a reminder of the rules of both Catherine the great and Tsarist Russian Empire.

The third group, the Ukrainians, have always had links with Crimea through geography, ethnicity and culture even before and during the Kyiv Rus state (Kuzio, 2007). In as much as these differing views exist they have not led to any civil wars or even any kind of serious conflicts. They have, however, continued to be a bone of contention and ethnic tensions between the Ukrainian Central government, the Russians as well as the Tatars.

The reason why a fully fledged civil war has not resulted from these tensions is the multiethnic nature of Crimea, making it hard to mobilize people politically which would lead to the kind of divisions that lead to civil war. The pro-Russian feelings in Crimea are due to the Russian population living in the peninsula still having a level of nationalism towards their country of origin which has reduced the chances of autonomy in Crimea (Pirie, 1996).

But the nationalism movement has proved weak due to vague Russian and Soviet identities (Sasse, 2007). There are contradicting views among the Crimeans concerning the future of the region. Most people living in the region do not support the idea that Crimea ought to secede from Ukraine. At the same time, the great majority want Crimea to be part of Russia. So exactly what would they like to happen to Crimea (Pirie, 1996)? There is a generally accepted view that Crimeans should get dual Russian and Ukrainian citizenship.

This need to belong to both countries demonstrates how East and South Ukraine residents have been in the quest of a status which incorporates the Russian element of the region's history (Pirie, 1996). This region's attitude towards being a part of Ukraine is largely indecisive. The residents of the region want to be part of Ukraine and at the same time be a part of Russia, but always being discontented with their dealings with either one of the two countries. The majority of Russians come from the Crimean community.

In spite of this fact the reality is that they have not been the only community pushing for a policy that is centered on Russia and the whole of Ukraine. This means therefore that the political situation in the region is more of a reflection of the general feeling of all the ethnic groups. The feeling is shared by both the pro-Russians as well as the Ukrainians. The lack of a dominating ethnic line of influence in Crimea is enough proof that the conflict is ethnically motivated nor politically influenced.

In fact political groupings demonstrating ideological differences on national agenda emerged in the 90s but their ability to sustain political mileage was unbarring. The political party affiliations that transpired after the sovereignty of Ukraine were quickly disjointed. The existent political groups in Russia after the presidency of Vladimir have only stood on due to the external interests aimed at depicting Crimea as a center of ethnic battles. The condition as it is set to hinder the succession of Ukraine to NATO.

The many political groupings in Crimea make it impossible to portray the battle in Peninsula as an ethnically instigated conflict. It is far from that. The majority of Russians within the Crimea region is symbolic play ground for the power struggle ambitions for Russia. The Russians in the region have not identified themselves with Russia unlike the South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Herein lays the proof of Russia's imperial intentions (Kuzio, 2009).

The onset of autonomy demands for Crimea The Russian Separation, as commonly referred, in the Crimea region started in the yielding environment of politics in the early 90s. During the period, the Kaleidoscope actors group brought forth some political demands. The possibility of conflict existed way in back in the 1st half of the 90s due to two factors: The historical grievance of the Tatar which is a minority group. The Tatar always wanted ethnic cleansing. They also claimed discrimination politically, socio economically and racially.

The presence of a large group of majority Russians in Crimea. This happened after the fall of the Soviet Union that caused the Russian minority to remain in the region Crimea. This is a factor that largely threatened the peace of peninsula region. The separation of Crimea was in fact not instigated by the Russians of Crimea. It was the communists and the Tatars that were rigorously advocating for this politically. The Russian coalition in isolation was not created until 1993.

There was emergence of many political affiliations in the era of transformation that run from 1984 to 1991. The transformations were championed by Gorbachev. The pro-Ukrainian and Pro-Russian political groupings emerged in the Crimea region later developing to become political parties. The 1st mission of the parties was to demand the re establishment of the autonomy of the Crimean region. The motivation was inspired by the unique status of Crimea region in the year 1989.

The demands advanced to calling for a referendum on the status of Peninsula concurrently with the national referendum on the future of Ukraine on the 1st day of December 1991. The communist party of Crimea was the 1st to marshal the public in the support of the self-determination of Crimea. The elections of March 1990 in the region were proof enough that the communist party had gained grounds on the government of that region. In addition to this, the deliberations on the potential autonomy of the region intensified afterwards.

The Oblast' soviet of Crimea emerged as the championing move towards acquisition of autonomy in September of the year 1990. The soviet embraced the statement issued for the RSFSR and the U.S.S.R., which stated the need to annul the decision of 1945 and 1946 referring to the changes in the autonomy status of the republic of the Soviet socialists into the oblast. The hierarchy in administration dismissed was inferior to republic status as desired. The chairman of this movement was Nikolai Bagrov.

His core principal was Leonid Grach and together they pushed for the advancement of the debate on the need for autonomy in the region. After the declaration of sovereignty by Ukraine, the demands intensified. This happened in July of the year 1990. The separatist movement during the 1990s was largely inspired and catalyzed by the declaration of the nationalism of Ukraine. The drive for sovereignty in the region intensified as time passes. The Crimea Soviet in its supremacy declared the legality and stature of the Peninsula.

The Soviet eradicated the autonomy of Crimea as unlawful and held that Crimea was entitled for redemption of their Nationhood in the Crimean (ASSR) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The deputies resolved to settle for a referendum in the 20th of Jan 1991, the subject question was the independence of Peninsula. The referendum attracted 81.4% voters across the region and 93.3% of those who voted supported the move to redeem Crimea to the ASSR.

Majority of the Tatars of Crimea decided to boycott the referendum holding that they were the only group entitled to establish the fate of Crimea. The last soviet ASSR was established in 1991 but it was however the only establishment through popular vote. The local parties that were formed from the sovereign push attempted to gain root as a result of the success of the vote. There was another referendum on the way aimed at establishing an independent Crimean republic in unison with other states.

At the onset of 1992, the campaigns for the referendum were in full gear. The movement of the RMC (Republican Movement for Crimea) was established within a matter of months. The pro-Russian political party was able to gunner signatures above the 180,000 mark, the benchmark required in law for a vote to be held. There was therefore good ground for confrontation with Kyiv. The decision to hold a referendum was preceded by a strong statement from Leonid Kravchuk, the president of Ukraine.

He condemned the campaigns for a referendum maintaining that the referendum was an agenda of the separatists aimed at disrupting the situation; incite the people of Crimea, Ukraine and the people residing around Crimea. He maintained that the decision would only worsen relationship with Russia. It was however not in the interest of the Ukrainians nor the authorities of Crimea to negotiate for any other settlement. The regional leaders of Crimea focused on achieving their ambitions that were largely separatist.

At this point the government of Ukraine engaged in efforts to seek solution that were Federalist in the tension hit Peninsula. The parliament of Ukraine notably passed a law in draft form that would define power between the Crimean republic and Ukraine. The agreement document stated that the Crimean region would enjoy autonomy as part of Ukraine giving jurisdiction to the region to handle matters within their competence. The final draft of the agreement was however very different from the original version.

The agreement had been interpreted by the Tatars and the Crimean's as insult and betrayal. The "agreement" was condemned by the Mejlis specifically due to the nature of power division between Ukraine and Crimea. The conclusion on the said agreement was reached without consent from the Tatars of Crimea. The mismanagement of the deal catalyzed the call of autonomy by the Crimean's. The situation led to a more catastrophic Separatist atmosphere.

The tension in the region intensified on the 5th day of 1992 when Verkhovna Rada, which is the parliament of Crimea adopted the agreement act on the independence of the Crimean state and the advent of a new constitution. The parliament additionally decided to execute a referendum agreement for the independence of Crimea and the union with other regions on the 2nd day of August 1992.

The new constitution was very ambiguous since it recognized Crimea as a separate state while at the same time indicate that Crimea was a state in Ukraine. Nikolai Bagrov issued a threat of his intent to push for referendum with the objective of negotiating a deal that was more objective. The parliament of Ukraine eventually intervened (Solchanyk, 1994). The act was condemned by Verkhona from Ukraine as unlawful and instead suggested that the parliament of Crimea should cancel the law within 2 weeks.

Bagrov, the commanding leader and President Kravchuk reached a compromise that within the next two weeks the decision would be revoked together with the referendum by the current parliament. The involved parties agreed to this on the status that Crimea would remain part of Ukraine though there would be legal and political chance of realization of the distinct potential of the Crimean region. This included the freedom to associate with other regions socially, economically and on the cultural scale.

The agreement was quickly formulated into law by the parliament after the June meeting. The settlement was ground enough for formation of more radical political ascendancy (Solchanyk, 1994). The context in the political sphere disillusioned Kyiv and the situation that was once perceived as supported in the interest of some degree of separation of power from the government of Ukraine lead to the ascendance to power by the separatists of Russia in the Crimean region. The presidency in Crimea was won by Yuri Meshkov in Jan 1993.

The president used the ticket of the newly established bloc of Russia. He did promise to champion a referendum on the status of Crimea. The pro-Russians were the key subjects of appeal for the essence to power of Meshkov. The Russian ethnic group, must be remembered, was the majority in this region along with many Russian speaking Ukrainians (Tkachuk, 1996). The presidency of Meshkov was not motivated by the presence of Pro-Russians or the separatists.

The party was in fact unsettled as to whether to support union with Russia or the independence of Crimea. The victory in the election was probably made possible by the stance of the pro-Politicians of Russia.

The motivation of the victory was made possible by the overall target of the entire region irrespective of ethnic identity in the interest of uniting Crimea as a state, stabilizing the economy from crisis, improvement of the standards of living, the defense of the people of Crimea both politically and their interests in the economy. The drive for an independent policy on foreign issues was also a unifying factor. The president did not however take time before he revealed his political ambitions.

In spite of the fact that there was no clear program after the election, he got into collisions with Kyiv often. The recently elected President of Crimea went ahead and held a regional plebiscite, which he said, would not be a binding one. He has also chosen and made Evgenii Saburov, an economist and citizen of Russia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea and entrusted him with the task of handling the financial matters of the country.

Simultaneously, he also asked his people to not take any part in the elections for the Ukrainian parliament. He has also changed the Crimean time zone to that of Russia (Sasse, 2007). The Crimean President's request to not take part in the parliamentary elections has boomeranged because it has severely curtailed his (Meskhov's) ability to have any say regarding decisions being made in Kiev.

Meshkov's blunders and his tactical errors and the faltering economy of the region have allowed Kyiv to slowly but surely regain control over the region and its power structures (Sasse, 2007). The upshot of it all is that the quick and speedy way in which Russian separatists rose to power on the back of discontent with policies being pursued by Kyiv is also one of the reasons why the movement has quickly faltered and lost the confidence of the Crimean population.

Russian separatists now realize that the Russian Bloc is not able to make a positive impact on the socio-economic situation of this peninsula. The poor socio-economic situation was the main reason why the region had quickly become discontented with the national government of Ukraine (Sasse, 2007). What effect did the Georgian crisis of August 2008 have on Ukraine's troubles? The crisis in Georgia in August 2008 has greatly impacted our vision of the CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) space.

Russia's declaration of war on Georgia has taught a valuable lesson to those people who had somehow overlooked the fact that use of military force was still a tool being employed by Russia in its dealing with foreign countries. However, one should not compare the crisis in Georgia with the one troubling Crimea as each country harbors different ambitions. Even so, the two situations are similar in many respects especially when we take into account the manner in which Russia behaves when dealing with these two regions.

Although it is hard to imagine Russia sending its troops into Crimea there no doubts the fact that the conflict in Georgia does raise a number of questions in regard to Russian foreign policy intentions vis-a-vis the CIS space (Hedeskog, 2008). Russia continues to hold sway over Crimea and there are several reasons for this. One is because of its Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and the second is because of the overpowering presence of Russian media, and thirdly because the native Russian majority in Crimea supports Russia.

Kyiv still does not have the clout required to implement its policies in Crimea and nor is it able to counter the increasing influence being exerted by Russia in that part of its territory (Hedeskog, 2008). The manner in which Russia behaves in Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia is also very worrisome. Russia backs and also reassures separatist movements in both these regions and takes full advantage of separatist tensions which it has used as an excuse to send "Russian peacekeepers" into those places (Hedeskog, 2008).

Besides, residents of Abkhaz and South Ossetia have been given citizenship of Russia by Russia, which tried to vindicate its recent adventures in Georgia by saying that it was only acting to protect citizens of Russia. Once the crisis in Georgia ended, Volodymyr Ohryzkho, Ukraine's Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed a finger at Russia and accused it of distributing Russian passports en-masse in Crimea.

However, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry countered and protested this and said that these allegations were nothing but an incitement adding that Ukrainian law bans its citizens from holding two passports (Larrabee, 2007). At present, it is believed that between six thousand and one hundred thousand people in Crimea are holding a Russian passport.

This is reason enough to be alarmed especially as Russia is vindicating itself by saying that it had to invade Georgia to defend "Russian citizens" after having first distributed passports to South Ossetians for the past twenty years. Furthermore, Ukrainian laws do not allow passports to be distributed and nor do they allow its citizens to hold passports of two different countries (Kuzio, 2008). A few academics argue that Russia is using twin strategies.

The first strategy is to encourage volatility in the Crimea so that Ukraine is prevented from joining NATO. Secondly, Moscow wants to use the increasing political instability in the Crimea as reason to pressurize Kyiv into asking for help and in doing so increase its control over a weakened neighbor.

This form of defense is strikingly similar to the tactics used in the twin separatist territories where Russia first of all encouraged ethnic troubles and then made an offer of 'CIS' (another name for Russians) 'peacekeeping troops' whose goal was to suspend the conflict in favor of Moscow. Putin has said that' Russia cannot be unresponsive to what takes place in Ukraine as well as Crimea'(Kuzio, 2006).

International law of Self-Determination and Sovereignty in the context of Crimea The global political structure is undergoing a gruesome test in Crimea as the system has already failed to respond to the continuing humanitarian emergency in Syria. In Syria it also failed to provide any solution to the security crisis. In such a predicament the international political system has run into a new challenge in Crimea while an independent region in Ukraine is being formed (Cakmak, 2014). The challenge is to escalate the possibility of bringing stability to the region.

Though the Crimean Parliament decided to go for a referendum to let its people vote for or against joining the Russia, it didn't wait for the results. There is no denying the fact that Russia is behind the scenes and she is trying to have control over the whole situation. At the same time, it is also a fact that the Crimean Parliament has taken an active role amidst the tension as it tried to push people into making a decision.

Russia has taken advantage of the ambiguity in international law as the consequence of the Cold War while this country moves cautiously as well as vigorously to play the key role in this situation. Though Russia has sent this message without fail that it has no interest in annexing Crimea, she leaves no ambiguity in stating that it would.