Ethical Behavior According to Mill,

Ethical Behavior According to Mill, Kant and Aristotle Morality is a difficult concept to pin down, appearing to us as a concrete term which is underscored by certain rational assumptions about the universe. However, it is also true that that which one considers to be vice may, to another, be seen not as such. The reverse may also apply, for where one sees himself as performing in virtue, others might perceive some ulterior drive. Thus, it is rather difficult to reconcile that which does in fact define our cause for moral behavior, though all figures of importance to the historical discourse on philosophy have ventured a framework. Considering the ideas of philosophers such as Kant, Mill and Aristotle, and in light of some of the ideas expressed by authors D'Arcy McNickle and George Eliot, we can see that ethical morality is a concept which is vulnerable to a high degree of ideological disagreement. The 18th century in particular would witness a flurry of activity, with the latter generation of the Enlightenment Era providing a spirited exchange across decades of literature on that which constitutes moral behavior. In our investigation here of the notion of Universal Law as one possible lens through which to understand morality, consideration of German theologian Immanuel Kant's 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals provides an endorsement which is rather strict in its prescription of proper ethical behavior. His perspective being derived in no small part due to his religious piety, we recognize that there is, at the very least, a consistency between his moral foundation and the same Judeo-Christian ethic which forms the base of western society. Emmanuel Kant's examination of the topic deems any 'bad' behavior as an unacceptable deviation from moral standards though, advising that it violates human responsibility. His entire premise, in fact, for the set of ethical regulations by which we are directed to abide, is based on the nature of man. Describing the dignity of the human as an aspect which makes it 'better' than other creatures, Kant attributes the task of moral responsibility singularly to our species. He dictates that our sentient rationality, a compositional basis for dignity, orients us toward moral goodness. The only way that this can be achieved, Kant argues, is "for rational creatures to apprehend what they should do and, acting from a sense of duty, do it. This, Kant thought, is the only thing that has 'moral worth.' Thus, if where were no rational beings, the moral dimension of the world would simply disappear." (Rachels, 129) This rationality, he asserts, is a gift which inclines us with the responsibility to preserve moral order. To accomplish this, man cannot be entitled to make conditional exceptions to hard-and-fast rules of conduct. Accordingly, Kant lays out a concise framework for justice, admonishing that "'if you slander another, you slander yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.' This is the only principle which . . . can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty." (Rachels, 134) The purpose of Kant's explication here is two-fold. First, he dispatches with the notion that there is ever an acceptable instance in which immorality is appropriate. By his standard, one who wrongs another, wrongs himself. This is an act which, motives aside, invokes the danger to universal order of moving lines of morality. But further, as an extension of the nature of humanity according to Kant's view, a violation of another man's dignity is to use or to objectify him. Kant draws a proverb directing us on how to align with this notion of dignity: "'Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.'" (Rachels, 128) This is the sentiment which provides the strongest ideological thrust away from John Stuart Mill's advocacy of utilitarianism. Guided by the central principle that morality may defined as the creation, extension or preservation of happiness for the largest number of people at all times, Mill's ideas are conceptually antithetical to Kant's devotion to absolute morality. Where Kant presents the argument that moral order is impossible to define without permanent standards that are shaped by man's dignity, Mill works within a system that must inherently be pragmatic. In his perspective, "morality is no longer to be understood as faithfulness to some divinely given code, or to some set of inflexible rules. The point of morality is seen as the happiness of beings in this world and nothing more; and we are permitted-even required--to do whatever is necessary to promote that happiness."(Rachels, 92) Still, if Kant's points are to be assimilated when adopting a moral stance which is consistent with man's dignity, such absolute terms are inevitably defined by dominant social structures. The inextricable relationship which policy, theology and morality have shared throughout history tends to have a tangible impact on the way these hegemonic standards are defined. A consideration of the fictional text, Surrounded, by D'Arcy McNickle lends reinforcement to what we might suggest is a strong argument against the value of Kant's ideas. In this narrative about the indignities of Native American reservation life, we are shown the conditionality promoted by an assumption as to the relationship between hegemony and moral authority. In this instance, the unbending ideas in which Kant associates morality and social order creates the destructive exception shown here, where white morality presupposes an entitlement to subjugate and isolate the Native Americans. In the story's protagonist, Archilde, we are shown an individual deeply torn by this ethical contradiction. The outcome is most acutely portrayed in the suffering of his family, which is drawn apart by the imposition of white culture and the persistence of a native identity distinguished now by oppression and humiliation. Here, McNickle describes that "quarreling, stealing, fighting. His brothers knew nothing else. And his mother knew nothing but the fear of hell, for herself and for her sons." (McNickle, 5) Here is shown in stark fashion the internal failure in Kant's logic, which presupposes a necessary consistency between human impulse and religious morality. The dogmatism inherent to this idea is undermined by the scenario facing Native Americans, abused to the abandonment of culture and religion and thus left to drift dangerously into anger and hopelessness. This is especially pertinent to the religious imposition correlated to white culture in America. Indeed, "the dominant moral tradition in our society is, of course, the Christian tradition," which casts no small impact on the way that Kant characterizes morality as being inflexible. (Rachels, 93) This jars with Mill's utilitarian view however, which does not readily accept biblical tradition as the most likely route to collective human happiness. Mill would argue that "according to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain. and as rich as possible in enjoyments.'" (Rachels, 91- 92) Within the framework of this notion, it would be morally unacceptable to avoid deviation from hard and fast tenants of social construction, such as the isolation and conversion of the Native Americans, when this conformity has the potential to provoke unhappiness. The flexibility of Mill's approach asserts that one must consider this balance before making an ethically informed decision between the acceptance or rejection of hegemonic principles, whether related to policy or theology. This is especially true in such a context, where we can see that the supposedly ethical standards imposed by white culture upon Native Americans would be directly instigative of the latter's removal from happiness. This does not necessarily help us to gauge that which is moral, however, as the attainment of one's happiness is, discussion incurring Aristotle will show, inherently variable. In the novel Middlemarch by George Eliot, we can see that the acquisition of happiness for some may have little to do with ethical disposition. For instance, the character Rosamond, in her unfailing materialism, demonstrates the need for caution in associating happiness and ethicality. A creature driven by vanity, Rosamond is characterized as "being from morning till night her own standard of a perfect lady, having always an audience in her own consciousness, with sometimes the not unwelcome addition of a more variable external audience in the numerous visitors of the house." (Eliot, 163) It is this desire which allows her to marry the character, Lydgate. Though she never loves him, she is both the object of his worthy affections and believes that his medical career will help to support her excessive lifestyle. Rosamond's emotional detachment from the concept of marriage or romance bespeaks a distinctly callous definition of happiness which causes us to speculate as to the conditions relating it to moral behavior. To this end, the nuance which distinguishes Mill from Kant may be said to relate closely to Aristotle's conception of morality in his Nicomachean Ethics. Here, Aristotle recognizes the variances which appear to define our establishment of the means to pursuing happiness, musing that "the characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity." (Aristotle, I: 8) Aristotle uses this as a divining rod for dissecting the various relationships which are perpetuated amongst individuals. His argument engages in the dialectical process to discern that which is 'good' apart from that which is 'evil' or 'neutral.' Through such an engagement, he achieves a satisfactorily defended notion of 'good': "Aristotle identifies the distinctively human phenomenon of action arising from reason as the function of the human being: 'Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be the soul's activity and actions that express reason.' (1098a 11-14). The good person is taken to be that person who lives and acts in accordance with reason (as opposed to, say, feelings or whims). Such a person will aim at fine, right actions - human virtues - thus excelling as a human being" (Thunder, 1) It is here that Aristotle anticipates the need for a qualification of morality that, like Mill's ideas, is based upon rationality. The need for a rational participation in social order and positive interpersonal relationships produces what the thinker would define as the parameters for good and evil, and thus for the navigation of ethical behavior. The resolving view espoused here is that the ethical attention to one's duty is the fulfillment of that which is 'right,' forces one to acknowledge that there are a full range of possibilities in the concession to moral impropriety. It is to this end that thinkers such as Kant find a potential danger in moral pragmatism. He points out that the pursuit of the greatest possible degree and pervasion of happiness is an approach which could be susceptible to deviations in standards. Indeed, Mill and Aristotle alike seem to endorse the fact that this is inevitable. However, to judge this negatively is to conflate the outcomes expressed by McNickle and Eliot which respectively portray the dangers of extreme ethical uniformity and a cessation from all ethical consideration in defining human happiness. Balance and pragmatism, it should seem, must be naturally tempered by a clear sense of the rational relationship between happiness and ethically 'good' behavior.