Ethics Sterba, James P. Three

¶ … Ethics Sterba, James P. Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. The title of James P. Sterba's work Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism, refers to what Sterba considers the three major new paradigms offered to oppose 'traditional' forms of ethical thought. Environmentalists, feminists and multiculturalists, according to Sterba, all argue that the traditional, that is to say, universalizing methods of reckoning ethical norms are in error.

Each new theoretical ethical system charges that what seems universal is in fact ridden with bias. Environmentalism demands that the anthropocentric nature of traditional ethics that places humans in the center of the universe be shifted, feminism suggests that traditional ethics unjustly prioritize what is sexed as male over what is sexed as female, and multiculturalism questions the entire paradigm of Westernization in general.

Although the paradigm shifts suggested by environmentalists, feminists, and multiculturalists are radical, Sterba attempts to take a more balanced perspective and find a truce between traditional ethical norms and these ideals. Sterba first begins his book with a definition of traditional, Western, universalizing ethics in the form of the debates between Aristotelianism, Kantianism, and utilitarianism.

To some extent, other than their universalizing schema, Sterba is faced with a challenge of suggesting that all of these ethical systems are somehow the 'same,' although other than the fact that the three modern paradigms he cites are responding to the philosophers of the past, they seem to have little in common. Kantian categorical imperatives and utilitarian 'the best for the greatest number' ideals seem inexorably opposed.

However, Sterba does make an important point that many new philosophies have injected new concepts into old ethical debates, like the rights of non-human entities such as the planets. Environmentalism requires humans not to see their concerns and needs, even their ethical needs, as the center of the universe. It can be difficult to think of the future of the planet when coming to a moral calculus of a situation, when traditionally only the rights of human actors might be called into question by an ethicist.

Taking a more future-oriented strategy in general is required of an environmentalist approach to ethics. But Sterba believes that fundamentally the ethical concept of proportionality is consistent with both traditional ethics and the new environmentalist ethics. For example, hunting for ivory does proportionately far more harm to all living beings than it does to help poor humans, while using animals in other ways might be ethically justified and thus permissible for either an environmentalist or a traditional ethicist who places human rights before animal rights (Sterba 37).

Banning the hunting of ivory thus is the greatest good for the greatest number of current and future human and animals and the planet. It also serves a moral categorical imperative of doing what is good, obeying the law. But examples such as these can somewhat frustrating, for Sterba selects his examples very carefully, rather than raises real-world challenges to his merging of traditional ethical norms and modern systems of philosophy like environmentalism.

For instance, it might be best for the planet that the industrialism in the developing world is radically contained, but members of the developing world might protest that Westerners have 'had their chance' to enjoy prosperity and they demand the same, in equal return.

Although Sterba might argue in the long run that the children of all the world's people will be best served by placing limits upon development, it is hard to argue that it is just and fair that members of the developing world may suffer fewer benefits from industrialization because of the developed world's excesses. Neither the principles of restitutive or distributive justice are really served by either example.

The wrongs done to the formerly colonialized peoples of the world are not addressed if they cannot attain parity with those nations that exploited them in a restitutive fashion, and the extent to which the earth must be and has been damaged by environmental harms caused by man to survive in a modern fashion suggests no restitution can be made to the earth from an environmentalist's perspective without an end to human development.

Also, in terms of distributive justice for the greatest number -- do whom is the ultimate moral obligation? The earth? Future humans? Present humans? The answer produces radically different policy prescriptions with no easy answers. One of the problems of viewing ethics in the abstract regarding environmentalism, feminism and multiculturalism is that these challenges to previous ethical systems are not simply philosophical challenges, but address basic social issues, like feminists' demand for better childcare but also more recognition in the workforce.

Sterba acknowledges that Rawls' claim that the traditionally gendered family can be 'just' is false, given that women are unduly penalized for leaving that workforce to raise their children. But Sterba prescribes as a solution a kind of feminism with a focus on justice to the family. However, as admirable as some of his policy suggestions may be --.