¶ … Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927
How did the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 impact America? Author John Barry points to several important ways in which America was impacted, beyond the suffering and dislocation that was the immediate result of the flood. For one thing, the Great Mississippi Flood impacted politics. Herbert Hoover won the Republican nomination based the aftermath of the flood and because he was seen - albeit not legitimately - as a hero. On page 395 Barry writes that as far as the nomination for president, "The flood had swept him to it; made him once again a hero, once again the Great Humanitarian." What actually happened was that Hoover was aware that following the flood, the number of people afflicted with pellagra rose to 50,000 in the Mississippi delta.
But moreover, there was blatant discrimination against blacks in the refugee camps. Many blacks were barely surviving and yet all refugees were supposed to receive Red Cross assistance including feed, seed, tools, clothes, and "basic furnishings to start again" (388). Blacks who owned farms and lance "got almost nothing" to help them rebuild their farms and lives. Still, Hoover used blacks to make the case that he, Hoover, had been a good leader and had helped people who were victimized by the flood.
So, according to the author, politics went Hoover's way due to his use of the flood as an example of his stewardship. By creating a "Colored Advisory Commission" and appointing Robert Moton chairman, Hoover looked good (even though Hoover sabotaged the black effort). The author does explain how, in the end, Hoover benefited from the flood, and Barry emphasizes key issues that show how the public was led to believe Hoover was in fact a hero. Raising money from private sources, with much fanfare, made Hoover look good, although on page 371, Barry writes, "The government itself would do nothing to help flood victims recover." Even with a $635 million surplus in the national treasury, with a disaster "...that affected almost 1% of the nation's population," the federal government didn't even consider a "loan-guarantee program." The War Department tried to charge the Red Cross for the blankets they gave away, and by putting a stop to that, Hoover seemed a humanitarian, although he surely wasn't, if Barry's book is to be believed. Barry has provided ample evidence to support the case that Hoover just wanted to get nominated and elected, and that he really just used the flood and he used blacks to promote his own agenda.
This occurred in exactly the opposite way that it worked for George W. Bush in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Bush was loudly criticized for his administration's failure to properly help the people flooded out of their homes - especially the poor people and blacks - and indeed deal with the crisis Katrina causes. And while Hoover took credit for and was applauded for his efforts, his efforts fell far short of being truly helpful to blacks. But the appearance of Hoover being the great humanitarian did help propel Hoover into the White House.
Another impact the flood had on America was the fact that after heavy lobbying in Washington and many Congressional hearings, flood control legislation was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge, who initially opposed using federal money for the rebuilding of Mississippi River areas devastated by the floods. "The law set a precedent," Barry wrote on page 407, "of direct, comprehensive, and vastly expanded federal involvement on local affairs." The signing of the legislation "reflected a major shift" in the way Americans believed their national government should act.
Yet another impact the flood had on America was the decline of New Orleans, which according to Barry was severe. The city "decayed" after the flood, even though prior to the flood New Orleans had "...vastly more economic activity than any city in the South" (411). The city "shrank" and while banks prospered in Memphis, Dallas, and Atlanta, banks in New Orleans - even up to today - were never able to rebound from the flood. Even today - resulting from both the flood of 1927 and from the 2006 effects of Hurricane Katrina - New Orleans struggles. Barry waffles a little on page 411, saying that New Orleans has become a place for "tourists, and picture postcards" but has no economic vitality. "Perhaps all of this had nothing to do with the 1927 flood," he writes. "Or perhaps it did." How can he possibly question the facts presented in his own narrative? Clearly, the levies that are supposed to keep the Mississippi River out of New Orleans, and the river's busy port, which is supposed to be one of the most powerful economic engines for New Orleans, are not providing the sustaining support each is supposed to provide.
Barry mentions that because of Hoover's relationship with Moton (albeit Hoover used Moton to gain political support) Moton had access to the White House, "...more than any black man other than a servant had ever had." So the flood made interesting political "bedfellows" because Barry goes on to assert that though Hoover gave Moton "repeated promises" of help and of land resettlement actions, Hoover did "little for blacks" in his administration. There is nothing original or revolutionary in Hoover saying one thing and doing another (politicians are known for promising things they can't deliver) but by inviting Moton into the White House, Barry writes, as a direct response to the flood and its politics, this was news.
It cannot be overlooked that the 1927 flood actually gave huge powers to the Army Corps of Engineers, and it also presented engineers with "a legacy of new problems that engineers must deal with today" (Barry 422). Of course Barry's book was published in 1997, and so while he couldn't have predicted the Katrina disaster, he suggests cultural and social trouble ahead when he writes (422) that the flood "penetrated to the core of the nation, washed away surface, and revealed the nation's character." The flood then tested that character "and changed it."
Importantly, in the social aftermath of the flood, a whole population shift took place, which meant that geographically African-Americans were moving north, away from the troubles they experienced (in racial and social terms) in Mississippi and Louisiana. Barry writes that the flood "...shattered the myth of a quasi-feudal bond between Delta blacks and the southern aristocracy." What he means by that is blacks could no longer trust that the political and social leaders would protect them in times of crisis. "...Black Delta sharecroppers looked north to Chicago and west to Los Angeles, and out onto the freshly replenished fields" (422).
In his Appendix: The River Today, Barry acknowledges that "Project Flood" has several weak spots, and as was mentioned earlier, the rains and winds and high waters caused by Hurricane Katrina exposed some of those weak spots. The Corps of Engineers claimed that the levies they built would handle a flood "11% greater" in places than the 1927 flood could handle. That seems a bit out of place given what we know now about the levies around New Orleans.
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