New Orleans' Hurricane Katrina Hurricane

New Orleans' Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina touched land near New Orleans, Louisiana on August 29, 2005 and its storm surge ripped the levees built to protect New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain, which bounds it in the North (Wikipedia 2005). With hundreds dead and damage along the coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama costing more than $200 billion, Katrina is considered the most destructive and costliest tropical cyclone to hit the United States.

More than a million people were displaced, resulting in a declaration of a humanitarian crisis on a huge scale since the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. Several sections of the levee system collapsed, prompting a mandatory evacuation of the people of New Orleans. A distance of 90,000 square miles was declared a federal disaster area, a size almost that of the United Kingdom, with approximately five million of the population without power.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff described these occurrences and the flooding of New Orleans as probably the worst catastrophe or set of catastrophes in the country's history The city lies 6 feet below sea level: the worst threat to the people of New Orleans is water (Galle 2005). It is bounded in the South by the Mississippi River and in the North by Lake Pontchartrain, dipping into the Gulf of Mexico, which is 100 miles to New Orleans. The Lake covers 630 square miles but measures only 25 feet deep.

Its shallowness is viewed by experts as the city's greatest threat during a hurricane. The levee system that protects New Orleans from the Gulf has proved ineffective in warding off waves from the Lake, as evidenced by the aftermath of Hurricane Georges in 1998, Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and Hurricane Katrina. The natural location of the city, the height of the levees, their design and funding are critical issues that must be addressed in view of the likelihood of succeeding hurricanes (Folkman 2005, Handwerk 2005). Review of Literature Galle, J. Vulnerable Cities: New Orleans, 2005.

Galle writes that many did not feel there was a threat of a surge from the Gulf because of the complex series of levees between New Orleans and the Gulf, many of which were built and improved at the start of the construction on Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project in 1966. These levees have holes formed by three large canals used to pump water out of the city and into the Lake daily.

But they are a flood threat in themselves, according to Galle, in case of a slow-moving Category 3, 4 or 5 hurricane, which can raise a surge of water as high as 30 feet. At this height, water will go over the top of the levees and fill up the city, the author quotes Frank Hijuelos, director of New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness. Wikipedia. Hurricane Katrina, Media Wiki, 2005 This source gives account on Hurricane Katrina's hitting land near New Orleans on August 29, 2005 and breaching the levees protecting it from Lake Pontrchartrain.

This damage on the major coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama made the Hurricane the most destructive and costliest tropical cyclone ever to hit the U.S. With damages costing more than $200 billion, it exceeds Hurricane Andrew as the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. Hurricane Katrina displaced more than a million people, a humanitarian crisis of unparalleled scale since the San Francisco earthquake of 1906.

The devastation of the levees led to federal declarations over an area of 90,000 square miles, a size as large as the United Kingdom, with an estimated five million plunged into darkness. Wikipedia quotes Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff as saying that the ruins of the Hurricane can be considered the worst catastrophe in the country's history. Carrns, A and McKay B.

New Orleans' Levee System Has Been Key to Survival The authors write that levees typically began as natural structures from silt deposited by large rivers, such as the Mississippi, when they overflowed their banks. The formal levee system dates back to the establishment of the Orleans Levee District in 1890. It was fortified along with most other levees in the U.S. after the destructive Mississippi River flood of 1927. Levees look like earthen dams but not as strong and nor permanent structures.

Levees are engineered to withstand flood pressure for only a few days at a time. Their durability was questionable as regards the entire northern edge of New Orleans warding off the waters of Lake Pontchartrain. They were built by the federal Army Corps of Engineers after the 1927 deluge. Most of those along the main Mississippi River were federally constructed according to high standards and said to be quite strong.

But those around the Lake were built privately or by the local governments without the same degree of engineering as others in other areas. Only 17 of the 79 levees broken down by the Mississippi River flood in the Midwest were federally built. The federal government claimed that it was rare for floodwaters to "overtop" levees because they usually seep underneath from the river and appear on the land slide. Sometimes, severe pressure leads to a phenomenon called "sand boils," wherein the soil within the levee liquefies, and then to structural failure.

The federal government, however, said that improvements to New Orleans' levee system were done only on piecemeal basis because these were very costly. Designs were aimed at reinforcing the pumping stations with walls to prevent the backflow of water into the city during heavy storms. It has been noted, though, that reinforcements were built in only one of the three major drainage canals. Bunch, W.

Why the Levee Broke, 2005 Bunch writes that Congress authorized the Southeast Louisiana Urban Floor Control Project or SELA in 1995 in response to a massive rainstorm in May 1995, which killed six persons. The Army Corps of Engineers implemented SELA and spent $430 million shoring up levees and building pumping stations and provided $50 million worth of local aid. At least $250 million worth of crucial projects had remained, as the conditions of the subsiding levees surrounding New Orleans deteriorated because of hurricane activity.

But after 2003, funding began to diminish due to federal tax cuts in turn due to the diverting of funds to the war in Iraq. Bourne, J Jr. Louisiana Wetlands, 2005 The author quotes climatologists as predicting more frequent occurrence of powerful storms this century and undermining chances of a strong storm hitting New Orleans. Nonetheless, Louisiana had already begun losing its protective marshes and barrier islands faster than any other place in the U.S.

Despite almost half a billion dollars spent in the last decade, approximately 1,900 square miles of coastal wetlands have disappeared under the Gulf of Mexico and the State continues to lose approximately 25 square miles of land each year. Louisiana has the hardest working wetlands in America. It consists of bayous, marshes and barrier islands that produce or transport more than a third of the country's oil and a quarter of its natural gas. Handwerk, B. New Orleans' Levees Not Built for Worst Case Events, 2005.

The author writes that the safety of New Orleans has depended on one of the world's most extensive levee systems, which according to Lt. Gen Carl Strock, chief of engineers for the Corps, was never designed to contain or resist a storm as strong as Katrina. He said that the levees could withstand only up to Category 3 and that, as the Category rises to 4 or 5, officials were to evacuate the people.

he also denied that recent federal funding decreases or delayed contract had any impact on the strength of the levees in the face of the destructive hurricane Katrina. It was simply that Katrina was stronger than the protection they had put in place. Pitting the level of protection needed against what Congress and the public were willing to pay required the weighing of acceptable risks, which included the statistical likelihood of catastrophic events and their possible consequences. Blenford, A.

New Orleans: Nature's Revenge, 2005 Blenford writes that the city's extensive levee system was designed to withstand only up to Category 3 storm, but Katrina was a Category 5 disaster, the strongest in the Atlantic for a generation. The two levees built to hold back high waters gave way under the strain. Drawn by the storm, the Lake spilled into the city and the failure of the levee system was just narrowly avoided. The U.S.

Federal Emergency Management Agency considers a direct threat on New Orleans as among the biggest faced by the nation, along with terrorist attacks and earthquakes. Galloway, GE. Report on America's Wetland during the Coastal Louisiana Technical Summit, 2003 The Campaign to Save Coastal Louisiana addresses loss rate for Louisiana's coastal wetlands to as high as 25,000 acres per year - 30% due to natural causes and the remaining 70% attributable to human effects on the environment.

The findings of the report include the establishment of clear, workable and supportable program goals; the leaders' realization of the unpredictability of environmental disasters; the early stage of ecosystem restoration as a science; and the necessity for passionately committed leaders to head the program and continuous effort at maintaining and supporting it. Folkman, MI.

California Engineer Sees Fears About New Orleans Levee system Come True, 2005 The author writes about the thoughts and experiences of Robert Bea, civil engineer at the University of California in Berkeley on the recent killer hurricane in New Orleans. Bea studied the city's levee system since 1954 when began working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, He discovered that it was not high enough and that parts of the city were far below sea level. Fixing the levee system permanently could be a multi-year and multi-dollar effort.

The Corps of Engineer reported that major breaches of the levees at the 17th Street and London Canals had been sealed and that water was being pumped out of the city. It, however, said that the entire system was designed to contain only up to Category 3 of a fast-moving hurricane. When Katrina reached land, it was a strong Category 4 disaster and the conditions exceeded the design of the levees system. Behar, M.

Hurricanes, 2005 The author writes that the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale defines a Category 5 storm as one with "winds greater than 155 miles per hour" and with a surge greater than 18 feet. It was assumed that one such storm was likely to occur only once in every 500 to 1,000 years, and if one did, its surge would swell, overtop the levees and put the city under water up to 40 feet.

When it would occur, the levees would serve only as a bathtub, the author quotes chief coastal engineer Harley Winer of the Army Corps at the New Orleans District. Winer then thought that the water getting trapped between the Mississippi levees and the hurricane-protection levees as highly improbable, though possible. Method This paper used the descriptive-normative research method in recording, describing, interpreting and analyzing information from various authoritative sources, such as books, reports, news and journal articles and professional accounts.

Findings Damaging winds are the primary concern with any hurricane, but the people of New Orleans know that their biggest threat is water (Galle 2005). They actually live in a bowl or underwater, according to Director Frank Hijuelos of the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness. The city is 6 feet below sea level. A complex series of levees built between the city and the Gulf (Folkman 2005). South of the city is the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain in the North.

The Gulf is 100 miles to New Orleans and covers 630 square miles yet is only 25 feet deep. This shallowness is precisely the greatest threat to the city during a hurricane. The formal levee system was established in 1890 along with the Orleans Levee District. To begin with, levees are not permanent structures and not as strong as earthen dams. They are also not engineered to sustain flood pressure beyond a few days. Most other levees in the U.S. were also fortified after the Mississippi River flood in 1927.

But those along the northern edge warding off the waves of Lake Pontchartrain were unlike other levees, which were built by the federal Army Corps of Engineers according to high standards and made quite strong. In comparison, those built around the Lake were privately or locally built without the same or similar degree of engineering. Only 17 of the 79 levees that were breached by the Mississippi River flood were federally constructed.

The federal government also said that it was unlikely for floodwaters to overtop these levees because they usually seep underneath the river and then appear on the land slide. Severe pressure sometimes leads to "sand boils," the soil within the levee liquefies and structural failure occurs. It, however, admitted that improvements on these levees were done only on piece meal basis because these were expensive. Instead, designs were made to reinforce and prevent the backflow of water into the city during heavy storms (Folkman 2005, Handwerk 2005).

It has been reported, though, that reinforcements were built in only one of the three major drainage canals. There have been lessons to learn from. The levee system already proved ineffective in warding off waves from Lake Pontchartrain as can be gleaned from the consequences of Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Betsy in 1965 (Folkman 2005, Handwerk 2005).

The natural location, the insufficient height of the levees, their design and the discontinuation of funding are significant issues to address, not only on account of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, but also in view of succeeding hurricanes of the same or similar intensities to which the city has become prone. According to civil engineer Robert Bea of the University of California at Berkeley (Folkman 2005), New Orleans used to be a flat, sea-level marshland when early settlers found it.

In order to inhabit it, they filled the marshland with sand and drew water from underground. As a result, the ground subsided and parts of it eventually sank. In time, low-level levees were put up to keep the waters of the Lake and the Mississippi River off the city (Carrn and McKay 2005). In the 50s, New Orleans prospered and became a major seaport. Big channels were set up to allow ships to enter the port from the Gulf of Mexico.

Civil engineer from the University of California in Berkeley Robert Bea said new Orleans was bordered by water in all sides and that the electric and gas pump systems for collecting water stood below sea level. This made the systems useless during floods. Bea recounted his experience when Hurricane Betsy stormed the city in the 60s. Many lost their homes and even their lives and damage to the Gulf Coast reached to billions of dollars.

Yet this destruction from Hurricane Betsy would not compare with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's wrath at Category 5. New Orleans' extensive levee system was designed to contain only up to Category 3 storm (Carrn and McKay 2005). When Hurricane Katrina raged into the city, the water levels in Lake Pontchartrain at the north border went up and the two levees in the south section yielded under the strain and siege.

The ferocious storm pushed the Lake's waves into the heart of the city, demonstrating what experts described as a catastrophic failure of this formal levee system. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency considers a direct and powerful hurricane surge against New Orleans as one of the biggest threats confronted by the nation along with terror attacks and earthquakes. Experts warned that a Category 4 or 5 hurricane would crush many more famous levees in New Orleans. They predicted that the city would drown.

Hurricane Katrina reached land near New Orleans in Louisiana last August 29 and its storm surge razed the levees protecting the city from the Lake (Carrn and McKay 2005). Waters poured into and flooded most of the city. Recent estimate of the damage exceeded $200 billion, surpassing that of Hurricane Andrew as the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. The damage spanned the coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama with hundreds dead and more than a million people displaced.

The scale of destruction also attained an unprecedented scale in the U.S. since the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. Mayor Ray Nagin ordered mandatory evacuation before the hurricane struck on August 28 and the order was repeated three days later. The following month, people were told to move to neighboring states. A spread of 90,000 square miles was declared a disaster area and, when it departed, Hurricane Katrina smashed power lines and plunged about five million people into darkness.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff described the destruction brought about by Hurricane Katrina as "probably the worst catastrophe" to occur in the country's history (Carrn and McKay). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers said that it had sealed the major breaches on 17th Street and London Canals and had begun pumping water out of the city (Carrn and McKay 2005). It, however, also warned that the entire levee system had become untenable.

It emphasized that the walls and levees were designed to contain a fast-moving Category 3 Hurricane only and Katrina grew into a strong Category 4 when it reached land. Accompanying conditions surpassed the design and its capabilities. Natural and human factors affect the coast. Delta soils by nature compact and sink in time, giving way to open water, except when fresh layers of sediments are placed to offset them. The Mississippi spring floods previously retained that balance, but yearly deluges were often destructive.

The strong flood 1927 erased the levees, lined with concrete and funneled marsh-building sediments to the deep waters of the Gulf. Engineers also severed more than 8,000 miles of canals through the marsh for petroleum exploration and ship traffic (Bourne 2005). These new ditches increased the incidence of erosion and allowed huge and lethal amounts of salt water to penetrate and infiltrate brackish and freshwater marshes. Louisiana has the hardest working wetlands in America and it consists of watery bayous, marshes and barrier islands.

These produce or transport more than a third of the country's oil and a third of its total natural gas. Louisiana is second only to Alaska in commercial fish landings. Lt Gen Carl Strock, who is chief engineer for the Corps, said that the levee system was never designed to withstand a storm as strong as Katrina. He also denied that federal funding decreases or delayed contracts adversely affected the structure and strength of the levees during the Hurricane.

He said that they were simply caught in a storm whose intensity surpassed the established level of protection. In response to a massive rainstorm in May 1995 that killed 6, Congress authorized the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project or SELA (Bunch 2005). During the last decade, the Army Corps of Engineers in charge of SELA spent $430 million in rebuilding levees and building pumping stations and in providing local aid. From this total, at least $250 in crucial projects had remained, while the levees around New Orleans continued to subside.

After 2003, however, federal funding for SELA began to diminish and the Corps did not hide the reality of federal tax cuts as the reason or cause for the lack of hurricane-and-flood control funding. Early in 2004, the cost of the war on Iraq rose and President George W. Bush proposed that there be 20% less spending for the Lake, according to sources. A major Corps project, the $750 million Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project has remained about 20% unfinished because of a lack of funds, says the project manager Al Naomi.

The project was supposed to build up levees and pumping stations on the east bank of the Mississippi River in New Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Charles and Jefferson parishes. This project was supposed to receive $3.0 million of the President's 2005 budget and the project manager said $20 million was needed. He said that at least six levee construction contracts must be funded and implemented to raise the protection level of these levees back to where it was.

At present, he said they owed around $5 million to contractors and interests had to be paid. Emergency management chief Walter Maestri of the Jefferson Parish in Louisiana observed that the money must have been moved in the President's budget to finance homeland security and the war in Iraq. The people of New Orleans expressed concern that these levees had not been finished and they said they would do everything to let those in the proper position know that this was a security issue for them.

The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan or EOP lists down the phases of emergencies and disasters as prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Office of homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Plans 2005). It is an all-hazard plan for the welfare of its citizens against the threat of natural, technological and national security emergencies and disasters. It is designed to coordinate closely with the National Response Plan and the Parish Emergency Operations Plans.

It is assumed that the Emergency Support Functions performed by the agencies and organizations during emergency operations generally parallel their regular or normal daily functions. Normal and emergency situations would use the same personnel and material resources. The Governor assigned the implementation of the Plan to the Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. The emergency action levels established by this Plan are I to IV. These levels indicate the level of seriousness of an incident or disaster. In Level IV, operations are normal.

In Level III, events present a potential or actual threat to the safety and welfare of the people in a given area. In Level II, disastrous events are occurring or have occurred, which have imminent or actual impact.