Greek and Persian relations in ancient history

Greek & Persia

The causes of the Greek-Persian War can best be divided into primary and secondary causes. The primary causes come with the founding and subsequent immediate expansion of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great. This gradually transformed the primarily Asian Persian Empire to a Mediterranean power, especially with its enlargement during Darius the Great who conquered parts of Libya. At this time, however, the Greeks were the primary political and economical force in the Mediterranean Basin and it would be natural that the expansion of another empire would collide with their interests.

It is true, nevertheless, that the same type of rationale can be used in the case of the new Persian Empire. Defeating the Greeks would make it absolute ruler of the known world at that point and ensure that its further expansion would be limitless. At the same time, the primary reasons can also group some of the economic causes of the conflict and Darius's invasion. The Greeks traded throughout the Mediterranean Basin and their colonies, as the cities in the Peninsula, were very rich. In antiquity, defeat of a nation-state would be equivalent to huge material gains that went from the provisions and gold in the city itself to selling its people into slavery. Virtually, nothing was lost from such a conquest.

On the other hand, this was also a good moment for Darius I to attack Greece because of the internal political problems that both Athens and Sparta, the most important powers in Greece at that point, faced. Sparta had been involved in the Athenian internal politics and had tried to establish the tyrant Hippias back on the Athenian throne, afraid that an Athenian democracy would be dangerous for the Spartan society. At the same time, Demaratus, former king of Sparta, had found refuge with the Persians and had received, in compensation for his services, several cities in Asia Minor. Both Hipias and Demaratus brought their contributions in the identification of the weak spots in the Greek Peninsula and provided valuable strategic and tactical insight. Having somebody from the enemy camp could obviously be considered an advantage and encourage an aggressive act.

It was also a battle for resources, at the same time, like many other wars. One of the traditions of ancient times (notable in the Greek - Persian Wars) was that the conquerors would ask for the surrender of a certain city, region or country by asking for 'earth and water', both essential as means of survival during this period of time (indeed, earth would be used for agriculture and for means to grow one's food, while water was obviously essential to quench one's thirst). This is how the Persians, after conquering the Greek cities along the Minor Asia coastline asked for the surrender of the Greek cities on the mainland.

Finally, another primary reason is that the Persian Empire had, at this point, the initial force of expansion, where its power was believed to be almost unstoppable. The Empire would thus benefit from the momentum behind all its previous victories: indeed, in the course of less than half a century. The military, economic and political strength that the Persian Empire had acquired during this period of time made it obvious that it would it now attempt to defeat the remaining power in the region, after the Lydian Empire had already fallen.

This is not only strictly related to its military and political might - the communication system was extremely well developed for that particular age (the postal system was one of the most competitive in history), the system of satraps who ruled in their provinces functioned well and efficiently and the Persian Empire could boast the best administrative structure of its times. With this mechanism in place, it could coagulate large armies, maneuver them efficiently and use the strategic and tactical advantages to win in battle and in war campaigns.

The secondary cause that has been constantly put forth by different historians related the causes of Darius's invasion of Greece with the Ionian Revolt. However, if one follows on Herodotus and his the Histories as the main source of information, this will need to be nuanced. While the revolt was indeed used as an opportunity by Darius the Great to see his possessions going as far as the islands of the East Aegean (Herodotus VI 31-33), nevertheless, his attitude was not necessarily a provocative one and definitely not one directed at turning the local population or the other Greeks in revolt against the conquering Persians. Except for Miletus, which was sacked as an initiator of the revolt, the other cities were treated rather reasonably, going as far as recommendations for the settled Persians to respect local religious traditions (Herodotus VI 42-45).

This does not necessarily need to be seen only as a reasonable conquering policy, but also as a diplomatic and political approach: once Darius asked for the submissions of mainland Greek cities, many of them accepted, based on the previous behavior of the conquerors in Ionic cities. Athens and Sparta obviously remained aside, but this was also because they were also assuming a regional power status and would not find it calculable to surrender without a fight.

Reasonably enough, though, the Persian invasion could also be seen as a direct consequence in the involvement of the Athenians in the revolt of the Ionic cities and in their attempt to preserve a democracy here and consolidate a united front against the Persian invader.

Despite all these positive aspects for the Persian Empire at the moment of the war, the invasion itself failed because of several reasons. First of all, despite its excellent administrative system, the empire was already overextended and invading a foreign country, far away from the main basis of operations in the heart of the Persian Empire, would make it difficult to supply and replace the number of fallen warriors.

Herodotus is not a reliable source in matters of the number of invading Persians (his figures go well into the couple of thousands), but one could assume that the army numbered at least several tens of thousands. These needed to be supplied and fed in a country often hostile or, at least, in a land such as Attica that did not offer so much feeding possibilities. The land was also unknown, while the defending Greek armies could make use of every part of the landscape in order to find the best allies in the nature (the best example is probably given by the stand of the Spartans at Thermopylae, which allowed a very small army to stand up to the Persian army exactly because the terrain was difficult and the mountains protected the flanks).

At the same time, an important element in the Persian defeat was also the fact that the Spartans and Athenians realized the danger that the Persians represented for each of their individual freedoms and were able to put aside their differences and join forces in order to fight together. Their identification with a common Greek spirit made this possible and represented an essential asset in fighting an army that was formed of many foreigners with less of a will to fight.