Homeland Security the 21st Century

Homeland Security The 21st century has been a challenging time for the American society so far. The 9/11 events have proven that there are no more conventional threats and pointed out the vulnerabilities inside the U.S. security system. The terrorist phenomenon makes the daily headlines through violent and indiscriminate attacks, a constant presence which determines the convergence of all forces and initiatives towards identifying its source and preventing any further manifestations on American soil.

The National Security Strategy is an obvious proof of the attention given to this new security issue. However important this may be, the turn of the century also saw one of the most devastating natural disasters America has ever experienced, hurricane Katrina.

On an estimative scale, "many reporters and critics have compared Katrina to September 11." (Brown, 2005) Nonetheless, this natural catastrophe did not entangle such national unity, but rather the human tragedies were overshadowed by the apparent lack of competence from the part of the authorities who, according to the general opinion, could have prevented the loss of human lives and the destruction of so many homes.

Therefore, although the size of the natural disaster is still hard to grasp, more important for the future prevention of such tragedies is the analysis of what really went array and what needs to be done in order to prevent a replay. There has been numerous criticism on the way in which the entire crisis was conducted.

When the 911 tragedy occurred, a new structure that would encourage a better cooperation between the levels of government was set in place in order to allow the flow of financial, medical, and human resources to be more rapid and more efficient in states of emergency. In this respect, the signing of the Homeland Security Act in 2002 was cheered and hopes ran high because, at least in theory, a more efficient and flexible structure would make rescue operations deliver on their promises.

Still, the events in the Katrina situation proved exactly the opposite. The weak response from the authorities, along with the several mix-ups and controversies are the obvious evidence that the U.S. lacks a proper agency that would be able to coordinate the aid relief in case of natural, biological or even terrorist catastrophe. There are several explanations given in this respect. First, the matter of authority raised a serious problem that slowed down the relief efforts and the rapid distribution of assistance and resources.

In most cases, the decentralized system of decision making leaves up to the local authorities to act in the eventuality of a natural crisis. As Arnold Howitt notes, "This "bottom-up" system of emergency management has a long history and continues to make sense in most circumstances. Because local governments are proximate to disaster sites and have at least some emergency capacity, they can respond quickly to initial alerts.

They have detailed knowledge of local conditions, and in many cases have agreements for mutual aid to secure additional help rapidly from nearby jurisdictions." (Howitt & Leonard, 2005) However, in this case, it took a log time before the federal authorities decided to intervene, taking into account the fact that in the beginning Katrina was ranked a level one storm, and therefore did not need any special attention or any different measures to be take in preparing the population.

According to weather reports, on August 25th, Katrina became for the first time a level one hurricane, "making serious wind damage unlikely. However, flooding was a major concern from the slow-moving storm." (CNN, 2005) in response, local authorities acted as in any hurricane situation, and according to news reports, "people were being told to take cover in their homes.

Residents of low-lying areas, barrier islands and those living in mobile homes were urged to evacuate, though evacuations remained mostly voluntarily." (CNN, 2005) Still, by the time the situation worsen, the authorities responsible failed to evacuate the citizens and subsequently, when the hurricane was ultimately downgraded to a tropical storm level, the population in New Orleans was caught unprepared and the number of victims rose.

Thus, while local authorities failed to take the precautionary action, the federal ones did not see the threat such a storm would pose, despite the fact that "the National weather Service issued a special statement in advance of Katrina's arrival outlining the damage that will likely be caused. If Hurricane Katrina makes landfall as strong as category 4 or category 5 storm, most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks, perhaps longer. At least one-half of well-constructed homes will have roof and wall failure.

All gabled roofs will fail, leaving those homes severely damaged or destroyed." (Moyen, 2005) Overall, there was a shortage of instructions and reactions from both sides, which eventually led to the escalation of the number of victims. Secondly, even when finally decisions were being taken, they were inadequate for the respective situation. Katrina was a special case with a particular impact, unlike any other ordinary annual storm, largely because of the geographical positioning of the city of New Orleans, the hardest hit by the storm.

Many even pass the blame of the failed rescue attempts on the natural conditions of the city. Thus, according to the proponents of this theory, "conditions - on the ground along the Gulf Coast and in the New Orleans area when the storm hit - contributed significantly to the catastrophe.

The partially successful but (inevitably) incomplete evacuation in advance of the storm - who had and who had not self-evacuated or been evacuated - coupled with the severity of the storm itself and its after-effects (principally, the overtopping of the St.

Bernard's Parish levees and the breaching of the New Orleans levees) created a nightmare scenario." (Howitt & Leonard, 2005) in this context, the authorities that managed to come to the rescue of those who found refuge in the Super Bowl Stadium were unable to set aside personal and professional ambitions and issues of authority and help those in need. William Anderson gives an eloquent description for pointing out the exact situation that was on the ground.

Thus, "immediately after the hurricane had stopped in New Orleans, for example, a Wal-Mart had brought a truckload of bottled water; FEMA officials turned the truck away, declaring that it was 'not needed'," all this despite the fact that people were left without electricity and other basic needs such as drinking water. (Anderson, 2005) Thirdly, in dealing with the emerging crisis, those in charge failed to point out the exact issues at hand, and to consider a proper response given the special details that made this case particular.

As stated before, indeed, Katrina was more than an average storm because of the place it hit, and due to the complexity of the response needed. However, the authorities were unable to see the priorities and the need to rescue those stranded on rooftops or those without possibility to move. In such conditions, the inefficient emergency management became obvious, especially when aid did not arrive until days later in New Orleans, although promises were being made constantly.

Therefore, the despair of those isolated grew in intensity as the emergency units were struggling to coordinate their efforts. For instance, people were seen on their rooftops trying to avoid being taken by the high waters. Nonetheless, the National Guard took time before intervening to their rescue. Still, this was done rather successfully, as Lt. Col.

Robert Horton of the Alabama Guard "We're making history again, never before have we supported so many state and federal missions." (Sappenfield, 2005) Although the operations managed to save numerous lives, another question arises in connection to the distribution and use of forces in such cases. Therefore, the National Guard example is eloquent to point out the fact that indeed, there are little resources available for the authorities to intervene in cases of catastrophe. The reasons for this shortage are various.

On the one hand, there are divergent opinions over the need to have permanent stand by forces, such as intervention units specially trained for such occasions, as pointed out, "it is a far more complex matter to address the need for reserve or "surge" capacity in large scale disasters, in which many kinds of emergency response functions, equipment, and personnel must be mobilized." (Howitt & Leonard, 2005) However, on the one hand, it is considered a "waste" of funds, while those supporting the idea consider it part of a preparedness strategy, which would even raise the awareness among the population about these sorts of possible disasters.

The situation on the ground though clearly underlined the need for sufficient resources, both financial and human ones, to be at the disposal of the authorities. For instance, the evacuation actions undergone in order to save those unable to move or trapped in remote corners of New Orleans proved the fact that there were not enough transportation available and therefore the operations took longer, probably costing someone's life. The soldiers called for duty in the Katrina case represent yet another example of stretching the limits of existing resources.

They were mostly former soldiers from Iraq, called in to help with the relief ops.

Those supporting the use of the National Guard in these types of actions point out that "the National Guard already has a significant emergency response capability and the Constitution of the United States establishes the authority to employ the National Guard in significant and leading domestic roles against terrorism." (Oates, 2002) on the other hand, however, it can be said that the part time soldiers are stretched beyond their limits and are sometimes forced to work to exhaustion in order to achieve the task they were called in for.

This can lead to poor performances, which in turn may cost lives. According to a study conducted in the Atlanta metropolitan area, "among 16 fire departments, an average of 22.2% of employees holds two or more public safety positions.

Moreover, a significant percentage of the public safety workforce has commitments to the military reserve or National Guard." (Oates, 2002) Thus, Oates underlines that often double condition of most public safety workers are engaged in more than one job and subsequently it is more difficult to asses the exact number of workers one can rely on in case of natural disasters. Moreover, because of their different specializations, it is hard to establish a professional system of intervention, seeing that there are little and limited training courses.

Another issue somewhat important in assessing the failure to manage the Katrina crisis in a more professional manner and with fewer human losses is the plan that was set in place for intervention. The traditional response to storms in the U.S. is usually drafted in general action plans, which include evacuation of the possibly affected population, providing shelter and basic needs, assuring permanent medical assistance. However, as specialists have agreed, the Katrina case differed largely from any traditional storm alerts.

Because of the magnitude of its development and the particularities of the area, it became more than just an average storm. This is why it would have been essential for the authorities to provide a more elaborated plan for rescue; this would have had in mind the exact necessities of the population affected and with due regard to the elements of novelty engaged in the situation.

Howitt and Leonard conclude, "Katrina was a crisis primarily because of its scale and the mixture of challenges that it posed, not least the failure of the levees in New Orleans. Because of the novelty of a crisis, predetermined emergency plans and response behavior that function quite well in dealing with "routine" emergencies are frequently grossly inadequate or even counterproductive.

"Crises" therefore require quite different capabilities from "routine" emergencies." (Howitt & Leonard, 2005) Finally, the most important aspect of the post Katrina analysis is the role FEMA was supposed to play in organizing and coordinating the relief operations. Generally speaking, people tend to search for the guilt inside the authority chain and to consider them responsible for.