Emergency Management Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Florida in August, 1992. Andrew had already devastated parts of the Caribbean, killing three in the Bahamas en route to Florida. Andrew struck just south of Miami, at Homestead, but did significant damage in Miami and the rest of South Florida. Hurricane Andrew killed 23 people in Florida and caused...
Emergency Management Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Florida in August, 1992. Andrew had already devastated parts of the Caribbean, killing three in the Bahamas en route to Florida. Andrew struck just south of Miami, at Homestead, but did significant damage in Miami and the rest of South Florida. Hurricane Andrew killed 23 people in Florida and caused $26.5 billion in damage, mostly due to winds (Rubin, 2012). The disaster was declared as a hurricane, since the damage was primary due to the winds. The President at the time was George H.W. Bush.
The FEMA Director was Wallace Stickney, but Bush appointed Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card to head the recovery effort. This was a deficiency in the response, because Card had no experience in disaster management, and moreover created problems for FEMA. One thing he did was to insist that FEMA pay money directly to people, rather than utilize the channels by which they normally issued disaster relief, something that caused confusion (Rubin, 2012).
FEMA would ultimately pay out $290 million in federal assistance to 108,000 people who were affected by Andrew, and spend more than $746 million to repair public infrastructure. FEMA was able to work with survivors on the recovery program, which took years, and the agency sees Andrew as a real learning experience, since it was the most destructive hurricane in a while at the time, and the most destructive in dollar terms (FEMA, 2012).
At the time, however, Bush's move to put Card in charge also sent a signal that he did not trust in FEMA's ability to administer the recovery effectively, and wanted his own people in charge. The move was not particularly successful, owing to Card's lack of experience in the area, however. Reports at the time also noted a slow delay, whereby officials were ready to deliver aid, but the delay from the President in ordering the relief meant a delay in rolling it out.
There was apparently a breakdown in communication and coordination at different levels of government in the aftermath of Andrew with respect to the aid program (Pear, 1992). The Pentagon had been tracking the hurricane and was ready to deliver aid even before the storm hit, but was unable to do so without authorization, as the people in charge seemingly were unaware of the Army's level of preparedness. The appointment of Andrew Card was also quite contentious.
He was appointed in the aftermath of Andrew by the President to head an independent agency called the Task Force on Hurricane Andrew. Card traveled to Florida to report back to the President before the President did anything, so basically no relief occurred for around 72 hours after the hurricane (Pear, 1992). After Hurricane Andrew, there were some shifts in policy regarding hurricanes, according to Rubin (2012).
First, FEMA at the time was more prepared for Cold War issues like nuclear fallout than it was for natural disasters, but Andrew and the geopolitics of the time refocus FEMA on natural disasters. Second, FEMA had the Hurricane Preparedness Planning Program, and more energy was put into this in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. Evacuation routes were plotted, zoning regulations were changed, and there was also adjustments to things like building codes for areas vulnerable to hurricanes. So part of the response to Andrew was in long-range planning.
There are many beneficiaries to the changes with Hurricane Andrew. The insurance industry was hit.
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