Husserl Language and Consciousness

Husserl, Language & Consciousness: Reconciliation of Edmund Husserl's Fourth Logical Investigation and Fifth logical investigation

Husserl's theory of consciousness in the fifth Logical Investigation is reported to be "one of the most profound and one of the most difficult theories of consciousness to have as yet been developed." (Smith, 1977) The account of consciousness given by Husserl is descriptive "in terms of a sensation, an intentional act that interprets the sensation, and an intentional object that is referred to by means of the interpretation of the sensation." (Smith, 1977)

The primary efforts of Husserl are committed to an analysis of the relation between what he refers to as 'matter' and 'quality' of the intentional act, and how these two components can be used to understand Brentano's famous proposal that "every act is either a presentation or is founded upon presentation." (Smith, 1977) It is stated that no matter the "brilliance of many of his descriptions, Husserl's final formulations suffer from ambiguities and difficulties in certain of their main theses." (Smith, 1977) The first of Husserl's Logical Investigations are related to setting out the basic consciousness structures and this is accomplished by Husserl through "offering three definitions of the term 'consciousness' as follows:

(1) Consciousness is defined as the "entire, real (reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness. These psychic experiences are composed of two contents: (i) the sensations; and (ii) the objectifying interpretation of the sensations. The sensation is referred to by Husserl as "a hyletic datum…an immanent (reele) part of our experience, and is not to be confused with the property of the object that is corresponds to." (Smith, 1977)

The Fifth Logical Investigation is subtitled "International Experiences and Their 'Contents'" is reported in the work of Moran (2008) to make the attempt to separate ambiguities in the prescriptive psychological analysis conducted by Brentano on conscious acts, their contents and objects." (Moran, 2008) Husserl specifies what is meant by consciousness and the relation that conscious acts have to the ego with a particular focus on the intentional character of conscious experiences deriving from Brentano's rediscovery of intentionality. However, Husserl, regards, Brentano's characterization of intentionality as misleading and inadequate, trapped inside the old Cartesian dualism of subject and object and with all the problems inherent in that representationalist account." (Moran, 2008)

Under the notion of objectifying act Husserl is stated to offer "a more precise account of what Brentano called 'presentation and then goes on to address what he calls 'cardinal problem of phenomenology, namely the doctrine of judgment…" (Moran, 2008) According to Husserl "logic must decide which meaning of presentation is most appropriate for its own needs. Logic does not follow linguistic usage as logical definition is a kind of artifice." (Moran, 2008)

The Fourth Investigation is stated to have "extensively revised and expanded and is a study of what Husserl terms 'pure grammar' of the formal laws governing the combining or binding of meanings into a senseful unity rather than simply yielding a nonsensical string of words, and is, generally speaking an application of his part-whole theory to the field of semantics." (Moran, 2008) Husserl is said to speak of "the pure theory of forms of meaning (die reine Formenlehre der Beheutunge, LI IV Section 14) The objective is the provision of a "pure morphology of meaning that lays the basis by providing possible forms of logical judgments whose objective validity is the focus of a formal logic proper." (Moran, 2008) Husserl is stated to be pointedly "reviving the old idea of a priori grammar against both the psychological interpretations of grammar dominant in his day and the empirical theorists who were imprisoned in a false paradigm." (Moran, 2008)

Simple meanings combine to produce complex meanings and simple objects combine to produce complex objects and meaning-parts are not required to mirror parts of the object and the converse is also true in that meaning has "its own parts and wholes and "all combinations are governed by laws." (Moran, 2008) Husserl holds that "it must be possible to identify the rules of all such valid combinations a priori, combinations that produce well-formed expressions as opposed to nonsense." (Moran, 2008) Nonsense (unsinn) and countersense or absurdity (Wiudersinn) were distinguished by Husserl and he is famous for this. The concept of a square circle is stated to be non-sensical and to constitute an absurdity or contradictions "in terms a counter-sense that cannot be realized." (Moran, 2008)

Formal grammar is stated to have the potential to culminate "only nonsense but not able to eliminate absurdity therefore, is "not yet formal logic in the sense of specifying what can be objectively valid." (Moran, 2008) Husserl refers to the logic of inference as the "logic of truth." In his later writings Husserl "is more careful…to emphasize that he is dealing with formal combinations of meanings rather than material combinations or meanings. Whereas in the Fourth Investigation he tends to misleadingly to employ examples drawn from the material sphere." (Moran, 2008) Stated to be the core of the analysis of Husserl is "his use of traditional distinction between syncategorematic words and categorematic words and his analysis of these terms of independence and dependence relations." (Moran, 2008)

Syncatgorematic expressions are treated by Husserl as "meaningful but dependent, incomplete parts of wholes, which is this case are well-formed expressions which are complete or 'closed'." (Moran, 2008) It is possible to distinguish verbal parts "in terms of those that are separately meaningful or meaningless. The work of Peter Koestenbaum states that a statement that is both brief and general in regards to the contribution of Husserl to philosophy can be summarized in five specific points, which he states as follows:

(1) Husserl's philosophical work takes its inception from mathematical and logical studies. He was interested in developing an analysis of the nature and warrant of mathematics and logic other than the then popular psychologist of John Stuart Mill, Theodor Lipps, and Herbert Spencer. Psychologism -- a term used not only by Husserl, but also by other important students of mathematics and logic such as Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, and Alexius Meinong -- is the view that logical and mathematical Jaws are empirical generalizations about the thought-processes as these are determined by experimentation in psychology. Husserl sought a firmer foundation for logic, one that avoided the reduction and absurdum of psychologism. His conclusions, however, differed substantially from those of modern mathematical logic.

(2) Husserl's researches in logic and mathematics led him to the thorough study of the precise appearance, manner of presentation, intuited structure, and the formation of logical "objects," as these objects manifest themselves when considered altogether removed from any adventitious psychological concomitants.

(3) Eventually Husserl generalized the methodology, which he had developed for his logical analyses. The result was the method of phenomenology, which he felt was the sine qua non-for genuine philosophical insights and progress. The outstanding features of phenomenology are these: (a) Phenomenology is a method that presumes to be absolutely presuppositionless. (b) Phenomenology analyzes data and does not speculate about world-hypotheses. (c) Phenomenology is descriptive, and thus leads to specific and cumulative results, as is the case with scientific researches; phenomenology does not make inferences, nor does it lead to metaphysical theories. (d) Phenomenology is an empiricism more adequate than that of Locke, more skeptical than that of Hume, and more radical than that of William James. (e) Phenomenology leads to certainty, and is, consequently, an a priori discipline. (f) Phenomenology is a scientific enterprise in the very best sense of that term, without at the same time being structured by the presuppositions of science and suffering from its limitations. Furthermore, Husserl strongly believed that phenomenology can and does offer essential contributions to the foundations of science.

(4) In addition to providing insights about logic, the phenomenological technique as applied by Husserl resulted in the development of three major and important conclusions. The first of these was the "discovery" and the elaboration of the intentionality of experience. Husserl helped to disclose, in far more detail and with considerably more acuity and penetration than any previous thinker, the rich, varied, and complex nature of our contribution to experience. He developed multifarious careful analyses showing precisely how and to what extent the world is our construction. The second of these is the evocation and description of transcendental subjectivity, which is the unobserved observer that resides in all our perceptions, feelings, and thoughts. The explicit articulation of the idea of transcendental subjectivity is quite new to Western philosophy, whereas in the East it has been one of the oldest, most pervasive, and important insights. Finally, Husserl hints at a "transcendental idealism," which is perhaps his only quasi-metaphysical commitment -- although he denies it. Many of his students and disciples, however, have abandoned him in these idealistic claims.

(5) The actual and potential influence of phenomenology is quite extraordinary. Phenomenology has rejuvenated many philosophical studies and given a particular fillip to realism in philosophy; it is also considered to be the methodological foundation and theoretical justification of existentialism. Phenomenology has lent itself particularly well to applications in psychology, psychiatry, and in the behavioral sciences generally. Furthermore, phenomenology has found its way into logic and mathematics, literary criticism, law and jurisprudence, and other disciplines. (Koestenbaum, 1967)

Koestenbaum states that in order that Husserl's view be made intelligible "one must grant a number of important but suppressed premises. Attacks, actual and possible ones from non-phenomenological sources are usually directed at these suppressed premises. No serious attempt it made here to defend these premises but pointing out their existence facilitate she elucidation of Husserl's doctrines." (1967)

Koestenbaum states that the first premise must be "…that there are two current philosophical methodologies: philosophy is either the description and analysis of language, or correlatively that of experience. The possibility and justification of these matters are rarely studies in isolation. Much contemporary philosophy is being carried on without a clear understanding of this difference. In general, phenomenology -- which is entrenched at present in the continent of Europe and from which ensued the burgeoning of existentialism -- pursues an experience-oriented methodology; whereas positivism, naturalism, and the philosophies of analysis -- more typical of England and America -- follow language-oriented methods" (Koestenbaum, 1967)

In order that one understand Husserl it is necessary that first one "grant that this distinction is actual and legitimate." (Koestenbaum, 1967) The second premise is consequent to the first. It establishes the logical and ontological primacy of experience over language. The phenomenological method is the descriptive analysis of experience. The necessary presupposition, therefore, is that language embodies experiences, i.e., that the structure of language is parallel to and representative of experience." (Koestenbaum, 1967)

I. Language Oriented Method

The language oriented method contains a function of philosophy that serves to demonstrate that the relation between "…philosophic problems -- or "puzzles," as these are often called -- and both the grammar and function of language. The assumption inherent in the semantic approach is that at least some, and perhaps all, philosophical problems are the logical consequences of quasi-grammatical errors or of ambiguities in the use of language." (Koestenbaum, 1967)

Koestenbuam states that Husserl must be understood "…to assume that language reflects the structure of experience, or, if it does not, that we can examine experience independently of language. It follows that the analysis of experiences, with all their subtleties, is the presuppositionless beginning of philosophy." It is important that one not restrict their efforts to the "simple, the clear and the distinct." (Koestenbaum, 1967) Instead the analysandum is stated to be comprised by "obscure, fuzzy and cloudy clusters of experience." (Koestenbaum, 1967) Koestenbaum states that the fact that the experiences under analysis are "often vague" does not "diminish their certainty." (1967)

II. Importance of Experiences and Clusters of Experience

According to Koestenbaum it is not possible to "deny the existence nor the importance of these experiences." (1967) Art is reported to explore experiences "that are as vague as they are certain and important. Metaphors and numerous other devices thus needed to effect communication and expression in art. Therefore, the fourth premise is stated to be that "certain vague experiences must and can be analyzed because they are both certain and important." (Koestenbaum, 1967) Koestenbaum reports a tendency in non-phenomenological approaches "has been to ignore any experience that cannot be placed into sharp focus by terming these meaningless or relegating these to the status of 'mere' emotive ejaculations." (1967) Koestenbuam writes that since philosophy "begins in media res, it is sound logic and necessary in practice to analyze some terms and their corresponding experiences without prior definitions." (1967)

Koestenbaum states that the "paradox of definition" is such that must be "invoked in Husserl's discussion of the ego, the 'I', consciousness, world, other minds, etc. . Regardless of the complexities of the problem suggested here, its satisfactory solution must be assumed in order to make sense of Husserl's view -- as well as of almost any other philosophical position. Husserl frequently uses the term "transcendental." The penultimate premise, therefore, is that transcendental terms are non-contradictory and thus meaningful. The notion of transcendental terms springs from scholastic philosophy, and later assumed particular importance in the philosophy of Kant. In general, a term is used in a transcendental sense if it applies or refers to all of experienced being. If we make the additional distinction between "experienced being" and "unexperienced being," then the term "transcendent" refers to characteristics of unexperienced being, whereas the term "transcendental" designates properties pervasive in experienced being alone. However, in Husserl's later, idealistically oriented writings, this ontological bifurcation of being is questioned, and even rejected. In that case, a transcendental term designates a ubiquitous property of being per se, unqualified and absolute." (Koestenbaum, 1967)

Koestenbaum states that Husserl has demonstrated that "descriptive research can modify, and in fact has modified, theoretical views in epistemology and metaphysics." (1967) In addition, Husserl, "addresses himself, through the phenomenological epoch…to this task of description" which is reported to be the "prerequisite and matrix for all philosophic problems." (Koestenbaum, 1967) It is reported that the "familiar difference between, on the one hand, watching and enjoying a movie, and, on the other, later analyzing its aesthetic, technical and sociological aspects and implications may serve to illustrate the distinction between a natural or straightforward experience and that same experience bracketed." (Koenstenbaum, 1967) Koenstenbaum relates the following:

"When I watch and the film I am "one with it"; I am engaged and involved. When, later, I analyze it, I distance myself from the straightforward experience of the film; I observe the film independently of my emotional involvement and identification with it. Criticism depends on the successful exercise of this latter attitude. When I bracket the reality of the film's contents by detaching myself from it, I consider the film as a film and not as a real state of affairs in which I participate. While engaged, I think of the events in the film as real: I view these as happening to me or around me. When distanced, I see the film for what it really is: an illusion. Film criticism invariably involves bracketing. Bracketing our natural involvement with the film is not only necessary for the critical appraisal of the film, but it also enables us to analyze something that is closer to us than the object of apprehension: our personal mode of perceiving and reacting to the film. We can focus on the act and mode of perceiving as well as on the film itself. The examination of the act of perceiving -- as will be discussed later -- discloses an intimate relation between the act (the cogito) and the object (the cogitatum). The act synthesizes the object. The object, in other words, is said to be an intention: the object is meant and intended by the act. The act of apprehension constructs, fashions, constitutes the object. The precise nature of this process -- central to epistemology -- is discussed in Husserl's theory of intentionality. Eventually, through what Husserl calls successive "reductions," the focus can retreat even further from the objects (cogitata), behind the acts (cogitations), and rest on the ego itself (ego). When the ultimate locus of apprehension and subjectivity has been reached, we understand and experience the true source of knowledge and constitution: the transcendental Ego." (Koenstenbaum, 1967)

The Fifth Logical Investigation which is subtitled "International Experiences and their Contents" is the attempt of Husserl to "sort out ambiguities in Bretano's descriptive psychological analysis of our conscious acts, their contents and objects. Husserl begins by specifying what he means by consciousness, bracketing discussion of the relation of conscious acts to an ego, and focusing exclusively on the intentional character of conscious experiences design from Bretano's characterization of intentionality as misleading and inadequate, trapped inside the old Cartesian dualism of subject and object and with all the problems inherent in that representationalist account of what Brentano called 'presentation' and goes on to address what he calls 'cardinal problems of phenomenology' namely the doctrine of judgment…" (Koenstenbaum, 1967)

It is stated that Husserl "is especially critical of the unresolved ambiguities in Bretano's foundational concept of presentation and carefully differentiates between the many sense of the term stressing however that logic must decide which meaning of presentation is most appropriate for its own needs. Logic does not follow linguistic usage as logical definition is a kind of artifice." (Koenstenbaum, 1967)

III. Older Logical Tradition Used in New Global Distinction

Husserl is stated to "draw on the older logical tradition in offering a "new global distinction between the matter and the quality of intentional acts. Acts of different quality may have the same matter. Not all of our experiences are intention in the sense of presenting something to our attention. According to Husserl, sensations in themselves are not intentional, they are not the object which we intend, rather they accompany the intention act and fill it out. Sensations belong to the matter (and are grasped as such only in reflection) whereas the act quality provides the form of the act." (Koenstenbaum, 1967)

With an eye to distinctions made by Bretanos' followers, especially Kasimir Twardowski, Husserl goes on to develop the differences between the contents of experience and the properties of the mind-transcendent object. When I see an object, I only ever see it from one side, in a certain kind of light, from a certain angle and so on. As I walk around the box for example, I see different profiles or aspects of the box and yet I know I am getting glimpses of the same object in the different perceptual acts. The same object is presenting itself to me in different modes. Husserl's distinction in the Fifth Investigation between the object which is intended and the particular mode under which it is intended forms the basis for his later distinction between noesis and noema in Ideas I. Furthermore Husserl regards it as an a prior law that physical objects are displayed in Abchattaungen." (Koestenbaum, 1967)