Meaning of Social Theory in the View of Phenomenology

¶ … Social Theory in the View of Phenomenology: Alfred Schutz

Who was Alfred Schutz, and why was his work on social theory and phenomenology so important? This is an important question that must be answered here, and will be answered, but there are other issues that must be examined as well. It is important to have an understanding of social theory and an understanding of phenomenology before Schutz is discussed too thoroughly, or what kind of contribution he made will not be as evident. Since he is no longer living, what he has done can only be discussed in the context of the past, up until the year he died, which was 1959. However, many of the works that bear his name and involve him very strongly were published after that time. This would indicate that those that published these works found that they were still very relevant.

This is similar to the way that Aristotle and others are still very relevant -- they might have lived a long time ago, but the work that they did and the information that they provided was of such quality that it has survived all of these long years. The work of Schutz appears to have a similar feel to it and it looks as though the work that Schutz had done in the past will continue to be relevant well into the future. This is important for social theory and phenomenology, since they have not changed that much since Schutz's time.

Schutz was certainly not the first individual to study social theory and phenomenology to any great degree, and also not the first individual to make his ideas known in this way. Instead, he studied the works of many other individuals in order to determine whether there were problems with what these individuals stated and whether there were changes that should be made. This may not seem that significant to some individuals because many people can study other's work and criticize it, but this does not mean that they are correct in their criticisms or their assumptions.

However, where Schutz is concerned, much of the work that he did not only agreed with but criticized the works of others. In other words, Schutz would find agreement with much of what an individuals stated in his philosophical work but would also find criticism with certain ways that individuals looked at various issues or whether the way that they felt about a particular issue was either too broad or two narrow to be realistic or helpful. This was is part of what made his work into both social theory and phenomenology so important. The Discussed here will be both social theory and phenomenology, as well as the life of Alfred Schutz. There is no need to delve deeply into Schutz's background, as some of what happened in his life is not really relevant to the subject at hand. However, it is important to understand who he was to some extent and why the work that he did was so significant in his life. Without knowing about his life and his background, this would not be easy to do. First, though, an understanding of social theory and phenomenology is needed, and so those will be looked at next.

Social Theory

Social theory is designed to analyze the various ways of organization that make up social life and also the ways that this same social life can be transformed (What, 2005). The everyday assumptions that generally shape individuals' lives are questioned by social theory and it utilizes a systematic manner to reflect on many specific issues such as the nature that identity has, how power is divided, and various forms of rationality and agency, as well as the experiences of individuals as either pre-modern, modern, or sometimes postmodern subjects of interest (What, 2005).

Social theory is also designed to take a critical assessment of how adequate many of the descriptions are, and analyze many of the critiques that are made in literature that deals with social science (What, 2005). It also works at making a response to many of the inadequacies that are seen in the social science literature, at least where the various levels of theory are concerned. Because it does these things, it helps to serve as part of the critical inquiry which is designed to be interdisciplinary and which also looks at various human and social sciences, as these are both important and significant (What, 2005).

Because social theory has such an interdisciplinary approach it helps to provide some context where substantive and theoretical issues are raised in various disciplines (What, 2005). These disciplines can include philosophy, history, sociology, political science, women's studies, cultural studies, and anthropology (What, 2005). Social theory helps to explore these further and reflect upon them critically. This helps to make a very appropriate choice for many students that have a strong critical interest in human or social science on any level (What, 2005).

Many programs that deal with social theory allow students to take individual subjects or to major in social theory. Many programs that deal with this issue also have four major concerns or themes that they see as being noteworthy in contemporary social theory (What, 2005). These are: critical theories, science and technologies; psychoanalysis, social theory and identities; social theory and the analysis of social and political relations; and contemporary critical theories (What, 2005).

Working with social theory allows an individual to explore various themes in courses that are taken but social theory is not just about coursework. It had to come from somewhere and many individuals that work with social theory or did work with social theory in the past spent a lot of time dealing with phenomenology as well (What, 2005). This is one of the main reasons that phenomenology will be discussed here briefly before the discussion turns to Alfred Schutz and his contributions.

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that looks at a different way to study human beings and address the uniqueness of every human being's life (McPhail, 1995). The movement is sincere in its efforts to study human consciousness and understand humanity from the perspective of the differences between individuals (McPhail, 1995).

Many people also see phenomenology as being a specific branch of philosophy. The general aim of it is to look at a study of human phenomena without considering objective reality, causes, or appearances (Embree, 1997). In other words, it is important to study how human phenomena are actually experienced in cognitive and perceptual acts, in consciousness, and how these phenomena may be either aesthetically appreciated or valued (Embree, 1997). It also seeks to understand how various persons can construct meaning and one of the key concepts is that of intersubjectivity (Embree, 1997).

All individuals have various experiences of the world that surrounds them, and the various thoughts that these people have about the world are based on these experiences. This is considered to be intersubjective because individuals experience the world not only through others but with others as well (Embree, 1997). Whatever the meaning that is created by an individual, it has its roots in the various human actions and the totality of various cultural and social objects that is grounded within human activity (Embree, 1997).

Phenomenologists conduct research in ways that share most of the following positive and negative features, and these figures are reproduced in their entirety from Wilson (2002).

1. Phenomenologists tend to oppose the acceptance of unobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative thinking (Wilson, 2002);

2. Phenomenologists tend to oppose naturalism (also called objectivism and positivism), which is the worldview growing from modern natural science and technology that has been spreading from Northern Europe since the Renaissance (Wilson, 2002);

3. Positively speaking, phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to what Edmund Husserl called Evidenz, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way for something of its kind (Wilson, 2002);

4. Phenomenologists tend to believe that not only objects in the natural and cultural worlds, but also ideal objects, such as numbers, and even conscious life itself can be made evident and thus known (Wilson, 2002);

5. Phenomenologists tend to hold that inquiry ought to focus upon what might be called "encountering" as it is directed at objects and, correlatively, upon "objects as they are encountered" (this terminology is not widely shared, but the emphasis on a dual problematics and the reflective approach it requires is) (Wilson, 2002);

6. Phenomenologists tend to recognize the role of description in universal, a priori, or "eidetic" terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds; and (Wilson, 2002)

7. Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl calls the transcendental phenomenological epoch and reduction is useful or even possible (Wilson, 2002).

Many people have difficulty with the idea of phenomenology and they do not understand what it means. They often have trouble pronouncing and it is important to look at phenomenology from a methodological standpoint (Embree, 1997). However, answering what this means should also be done in a historical context. The seven widely accepted features of what is considered to be the phenomenological approach have already been noted above by Wilson (2002). Phenomenology, however, began in the various philosophical reflections of an individual named Edmund Husserl back in the 1890s in Germany (Embree, 1997). Because of this, phenomenology to over 100 years old.

It began to spread before the First World War and had already made its way to Russia, Japan, and Spain by that time (Embree, 1997). In addition to this, it moved out of philosophy to a certain extent and into the realm of psychiatry (Embree, 1997). In the 1920s it began to spread rapidly and moved to France, Australia, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland (Embree, 1997). From that it moved into the United States and was examined in the context of research on communicology, which was originally called symbolism (Embree, 1997). It was also found in research on music, education, and religion (Embree, 1997).

Phenomenology continued to spread and in the 1930s it worked its way into Italy, Korea, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, as well as into research that dealt with literature, architecture, and theater (Embree, 1997). After the Second World War it spread farther into Scandinavia, Portugal, and South Africa, as well as into research that dealt with ethnicity, gender, politics, and film (Embree, 1997). During the 1960s and 1970s phenomenology worked its way into China, Canada, and India, and into various other areas of research such as psychology, law, geography, and dance (Embree, 1997).

Continuing its spread in the 1980s and 1990s, it worked its way into Great Britain and was seen in research in pathology, medicine, ecology, and nursing (Embree, 1997). There have been four philosophical tendencies and various stages that have been seen in phenomenology and these are generally seen as being successively dominant, although they sometimes overlapped as well. Phenomenology, well-being over a century-old, is also seen as multidisciplinary and planetary as a movement (Embree, 1997).

There is an expanding agenda of various issues that are often related to phenomenology to some degree. Because it continues to be developed and because it has spread into many disciplines and across the entire planet, it is often seem to be the most significant of the philosophical movements within the 20th century.

Originally, the movement began with Husserl's work that dealt with an attack on psychologism. This psychologism was actually an attempt to take logic and absorb it into empirical psychology (Wilson, 2002). The work that dealt with this reflected not only an interest in logic but also in language, mathematics, and perception, as well as some various types of representations such as imagination, expectation, and memory (Wilson, 2002). It also dealt with howl various ideal objects could be made evident and could be known (Wilson, 2002). Because phenomenology is seen to be evidential, reflective, and descriptive to both the objects that are encountered and the encounters themselves, the original beginnings of phenomenology are sometimes seen as being what is called descriptive phenomenology (Wilson, 2002).

This is seen to be the trunk of the tree and there are four large limbs that come out from it as this particular tree has continued to grow. It is important to look at these four specific branches. The first branch is realistic phenomenology which helps to emphasize the search that is often made for the universal essence that is seen in various types of matter including to the actions, selves, and motives of humans (Wilson, 2002).

Because of this, individuals have added the philosophy of law to phenomenology and others have added value theory, ethics, religion, and philosophical anthropology (Wilson, 2002). Philosophy that deals with human sciences has also been added to the mix and recognized recently for work that has been done on gender, and realistic phenomenology also deals with architecture, aesthetics, literature, music, and film (Wilson, 2002). This particular branch of phenomenology flourished most strongly in the 1920's in Germany but it also continues strongly today (Wilson, 2002).

The second branch is constitutive phenomenology and extends the original work that was done to include natural sciences (Wilson, 2002). This is generally seen to devote itself to various reflections on the phenomenological method (Wilson, 2002). This generally involves the suspending of acceptance of the pre-given or assumed status of conscious life as being something that exists within the world and is therefore performed in order to ensure that there is an intuitive and objective grounding for not only the world but the positive sciences that are seen within it (Wilson, 2002). Utilizing this type of method takes constitutive phenomenology that is seen in the modern tradition and dates it back to the work of the philosopher Emmanuel Kant (Wilson, 2002).

The third branch, existential phenomenology was originally designed as a project that would look at an analysis of various human beings in dealing with a means of fundamental ontology (Wilson, 2002). Some of this type of phenomenology appeared in Japan in the work of individuals that was performed within the late 1920s (Wilson, 2002). However, much of this branch was a tradition that has continued to grow within France (Wilson, 2002). Much of this happened within the 1940s and 1950s (Wilson, 2002). It was chiefly concerned with various topics such as desire, finitude, conflict, action, oppression, and death (Wilson, 2002). Political theory and many of the problems that were seen with ethnicity, as well as old age and gender were also dealt with in this context (Wilson, 2002).

The fourth and final branch of phenomenology is hermeneutical phenomenology (Wilson, 2002). This deals with the idea of human existence as being interpretive (Wilson, 2002). Originally, this came about in 1931 and then reemerged around 1960. All of the same areas of interest are seen in this particular type of phenomenology but the methods that are utilized for interpretation are somewhat different (Wilson, 2002). This particular branch has also had a lot of influence on various types of human science (Wilson, 2002). The hermeneutical phenomenology seems to the most active within the United States as opposed to other countries during the 1970s and 1980s (Wilson, 2002).

When the Soviet Union collapsed and there was greater contact with Eastern Europe and many of the traditions of phenomenology that were seen over in those countries, phenomenology became more popular throughout the world (Embree, 1997). What type of a shape phenomenology will take in the future is somewhat difficult to determine. It is certain that work will continue in the four established branches of phenomenology but it is also possible that a planetary that fifth type of phenomenology is emerging as well (Embree, 1997).

Who Was Alfred Schutz?

At this point is important to look at who Alfred Schutz was. He attempted, more than any other individual that worked in phenomenology, to relate much of his thoughts to not only social sciences but the social world as well (Barber, 2002). He wrote books that supplied various philosophical foundations for others' ideas of sociology and also for economics (Barber, 2002). He was familiar with economics through many contacts that he had with various colleagues in an Austrian school (Barber, 2002). He fled from Hitler and found himself in the United States in 1939 (Barber, 2002).

After this he worked to develop his thought much further in relationships not only to the social sciences but to logical empiricism, American pragmatism, and other fields that he felt were important such as literature and music (Barber, 2002). The work that he did has been very influential on many new movements that have come about in sociological thought such as conversation analysis and ethnomethodology (Barber, 2002). He was born in 1899 in Vienna, Austria, and died in New York in 1959 (Barber, 2002).

During WWI he belonged to the artillery division in the Austrian army and served in Italy before he returned to Vienna to pursue his studies at the University (Barber, 2002). While there he studied business, law, and social science with many renowned figures of his time but his most significant educational experiences occurred as a member of a Viennese circle of intellectuals (Barber, 2002). In this interdisciplinary circle he made friends that he would keep throughout the 1930s and 1940's, and many of these individuals were political scientists and philosophers (Barber, 2002).

He pursued his academic interests heartily, and in 1927 was named an executive officer of a banking firm in Vienna that had business relations on an international level (Barber, 2002). He entered into a pattern that led other philosophers to see him as being a banker only by day and being a philosopher by night (Barber, 2002). Even from the beginning of his studies, he had been very interested in many other methodological writings of various philosophers, most notably Max Weber, as he had seen this individual lecture in Vienna during the summer of 1918 (Barber, 2002). Max Weber's work was also very popular among intellectuals in Vienna at that time (Barber, 2002).

Despite the interest that he had in Weber's work, Schutz also felt that there were some unexamined and tacit presuppositions in that work that resulted from Weber having a strong lack of interest in many of the fundamental and epistemological problems that did not have any type of direct bearing on the sociological problems that he investigated (Barber, 2002). During the period from 1925 to 1927, Schutz began looking at Bergson's philosophy of consciousness and inner time in the hopes that it would help clarify ideas that he had about action, meaning, and intersubjectivity (Barber, 2002).

Many of the results that he found from looking at this were collected in various manuscript that were published. He was not entirely satisfied with this, however, and it was at that point that he discovered how relevant phenomenology was. In 1932 he produced what was considered to be his major work, entitled 'the phenomenology of the social world.' Husserl praised him quite strongly for this work and called him both profound and earnest (Barber, 2002). The rest of the 1930s were spent authoring very brief essays that indicated how the phenomenology of the social world would be able to come to terms with the economic thought of other philosophers of the day (Barber, 2002). He also developed a manuscript that dealt with personality within the social world and stressed many pragmatic elements that dealt with everyday social encounters (Barber, 2002). This was before he actually had any type of direct encounter with pragmatism on American level (Barber, 2002).

Both the business and academic career that Schutz had was changed when Adolf Hitler decided to implement an annexation of Austria by Germany. This took place in March of 1938 and Schutz was on a business trip in Paris, France at that time (Barber, 2002). This caused him to be separated from his family for three months and he finally managed to get his family emigrated to Paris (Barber, 2002). He was able to help many individuals, especially intellectual individuals, leave Austria because he was a business person and a lawyer on an international level. However, the Nazis continued to move westward and eventually Schutz believed that immigrating to the United States was the only safe thing to do (Barber, 2002). He accomplished this on the 14th July in 1939 (Barber, 2002).

Within the United States he continued to help many immigrants that were coming in from Austria and other places and he also helped the company that he was working for to re-establish much of its business (Barber, 2002). He supported the war effort of the United States and reported on Austria and German economic matters to the Board of Economic Warfare (Barber, 2002). He also helped to collaborate in founding and creating the international phenomenological society and he often mediated many of the battles that initially took place with this society (Barber, 2002). He began teaching at the new school for social research in 1943, and taught philosophy and sociological courses (Barber, 2002).

He was also responsible for presenting papers, serving as a chair of the philosophy department, and supervising dissertations (Barber, 2002). He managed to carry on many philosophical correspondences with other individuals that he had met and published many articles on various topics that explained and criticized other individual's thoughts, examined some of the work that had been done by American philosophers, and helped to develop many of his own personal philosophical positions on temporality, language, social sciences, multiple realities, symbolism, and responsibilities (Barber, 2002).

He addressed sociopolitical questions that dealt with homecomers, strangers, well-informed citizens, equality, music, and literature (Barber, 2002). There have been many individuals since Schutz's time that have continued the traditions that he started in sociology and philosophy, but Schutz's work has remained predominant and extremely significant to many individuals that have come after him (Barber, 2002).

Works by Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz wrote many different articles, books, and other works during his life. It is important to include a list of them here because it gives the reader a better idea of what Schutz's work was actually about and how dedicated he was to making sure that his voice was heard and that he talked and wrote about subjects that were important to him. The following list of collected works, reproduced in its entirety, comes from an entry on Schutz in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online (Barber, 2002).

1932, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehenden Soziologie, Vienna: Springer (also in 1960) and Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974; English translation: The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. G.Walsh and F. Lehnert, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.

1962, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1964, Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1966, Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1970, On Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writings, ed. H.Wagner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1971, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, ed. R.M. Zaner, New Haven: Yale University Press.

1972, "Choice and the Social Sciences," in Lester Embree, ed. Life-World and Consciousness, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 565-596.

1973, (with T. Luckmann), The Structures of the Life-World, trans. R.M. Zaner and T. Engelhardt, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, and London: Heinemann; German edition: Strukturen der Lebenswelt, vol. 1 (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1975; vol. 2: The Structures of the Life-World, trans. R.M. Zaner and David J. Parent, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1983; German edition: Strukturen der Lebenswelt, vol. 2, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984.

1976, "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" in Search of Musical Method, ed. F.J. Smith, London, New York, and Paris: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 23-71.

1978, (with T. Parsons), The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, ed. R. Grathoff, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press; German edition: Zur Theorie sozialen Handelns: Briefwechsel/Alfred Schutz, Talcott Parsons, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977.

1982, Life Forms and Meaning Structure, trans., ed. H.Wagner, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; German edition: Theorie der Lebensformen, ed., I. Srubar, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981.

1989, (with A. Gurwitsch), Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959, ed., R.Grathoff, trans., J.C. Evans, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

1996, Collected Papers IV, ed. H.Wagner and G. Psathas, in collaboration with F. Kersten, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

1999, "Some Considerations concerning Thinking in Terms of Barriers," "Memorandom (to Doctor Harold Lasswell)," "Report on the Discussions of Barrier to Equality of Opportunity for the Development of Power of Social and Civil Judgment," "Letter of Alfred Schutz to Clarence H. Faust, The Fund for the Advancement of Education," all in L. Embree, "The Ethical Political Side of Schutz: His Contributions at the 1956 Institute on Ethics concerned with Barriers to Equality of Opportunity," in Schutzian Social Science, ed. L. Embree, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 235-318.

Source: Barber, 2002.

As can be seen from the list of works presented above, Schutz wrote many books and essays dealing with social theory and phenomenology. He was very significant to the field in his time and much of his work has remained relevant today. Social theory and phenomenology have both changed to some extent, or rather it might be better to say that they have both evolved to some extent. The basic fundamental beliefs that belonged to both social theory and phenomenology have not actually changed from what they were in the beginning. However, many new ideas and beliefs have been presented by various individuals that have been incorporated into the ideas that social theory and phenomenology have presented as time has changed.

The significance of these changes and additions to phenomenology and social theory should not be overlooked and it was Schutz that brought about many of these changes. He was intensely interested in what individuals in the past had to say regarding phenomenology and social theory and many of his students went on to create works that dealt with these same issues based on what they had learned from others and what he had taught them as well.

Schutz, Phenomenology, and Social Theory

There are three specific essays that Schutz wrote in the first volume of his collected papers that details his methodological position (Wilson, 2002). The starting point he utilizes is that social research is very different from research that is done into the physical sciences. This is seen based on the fact that social sciences require an individual to deal with specific research objects that are by the very nature of being human contributing to a social world that the scientists also wish to interpret (Wilson, 2002).

Individuals are always engaged in a serious and ongoing process in which they attempt to make sense of the world, and the interaction that they have with others in that world (Wilson, 2002). The scientists that study them are looking to make sense of the way that these individuals make sense of the world (Wilson, 2002). In trying to do this, scientists must inevitably utilize some of the same types of methods of interpretations as the research subjects are using to make sense of their world (Wilson, 2002).

What distinguishes between the scientist that is studying the research subjects and the subjects themselves, however, is that the scientist is under the assumption that he or she is only a disinterested observer (Wilson, 2002). Because the scientist is not involved in the life of the individuals that are being observed, the activities that these individuals engage in are not seen to be of any type of practical interest, but only of a cognitive interest (Wilson, 2002). It is seen by Schutz that the ordinary individual that is going through the world and is doing what he or she does based on a system of relevances that enables this particular individual to look at the environment and the interactions that he or she has with others and utilize only the elements that help to make sense for the specific purpose at hand (Wilson, 2002).

On the other hand the social scientist operates on a set of relevances that are scientifically determined, as opposed to biographically determined (Wilson, 2002). In other words, the scientist chooses only the aspects of the specific situation that he or she has deemed appropriate in order to meet the objectives of the research (Wilson, 2002). Because of this the social scientist may look at an aspect of behavior that is generally taken for granted by an ordinary individual but that is seen as being a topic of cognitive interest to the scientist (Wilson, 2002; Embree, 1997).

Embree (1997) discusses specific postulates that take place based on these and it is important to re-create these in their entirety below. In addition to his postulates, there are also four ideal types that are seen as areas for socially acquired knowledge (Wilson, 2002). The information that Embree (1997) has provided for these postulates and ideals is so clear and concise that it has been reproduced verbatim here and has not been changed from the original wording in any way.

In behaving in this way, the researcher develops models of human action, the general postulates of which are (Embree, 1997),

i. The postulate of logical consistency, whereby the objective validity of the scientist's constructs are guaranteed and are distinguished from the constructs of everyday life; (Embree, 1997)

ii. The postulate of subjective interpretation, whereby the scientist can refer '...all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor." And (Embree, 1997)

iii. The postulate of adequacy: that is, the constructs created by the researcher should be understandable by the individual social actor and his/her fellows. Compliance with this postulate ensures that the scientific constructs are consistent with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social world (Embree, 1997).

Schutz also examines how socially-derived knowledge originates and, again, uses ideal types to explore this phenomenon. Apart from ourselves, as the central (to our minds) figures in social interaction, he suggests that the sources of socially-acquired knowledge can be seen as four ideal types (Embree, 1997):

i. The eyewitness, that is, someone who reports to me something that he or she has observed in the world within that person's reach (Embree, 1997);

ii. The insider: someone who, because of his relationship to a group which is more direct than my own, is able to report some event, or the opinions of others, with the authority of sharing the same system of relevance as the other members of the group. I accept the insider's information as 'true' or valid, at least in part, because the insider's knowledge of the context of the situation is deeper than my own (Embree, 1997); iii. The analyst: someone who shares my system of relevances, who has collected information and organized that information in conformity with that system of relevance; and (Embree, 1997)

iv. The commentator: someone who does not share my system of relevances, but who has collected information in the same way as the analyst and has presented that information in such a way that I can form 'a sufficiently clear and precise knowledge of the underlying deviating system of relevances (Embree, 1997)'

Embree (1997) also states that a number of research questions seem to follow naturally from what Schutz has to say. These research questions are very important to not only what Embree (1997) has to say but to consideration by other individuals as well, and these have also been reproduced verbatim from Embree's (1997) work:

How does the 'man on the street' discover his recipe knowledge? What channels of communication does he use? (Embree, 1997)

Today, how does the existence of information resources on the Internet affect the way the man in the street thinks of finding recipe knowledge? (Embree, 1997)

What typical uses does the man in the street find for recipe knowledge? (Embree, 1997)

What are the boundaries, in terms of information-seeking behaviour, between representatives of the three ideal types? (Embree, 1997)

How does the 'man on the street' respond to the information provided by the eyewitness, the insider, the analyst and the commentator? What information is regarded as most 'relevant' or reliable, and why? (Embree, 1997)

Assuming that the scholarly record consists of information provided by 'analysts', under what circumstances might the scholar seek information from 'eyewitnesses', 'insiders', or 'commentators'? (Embree, 1997)

It is important to think about these research questions when considering the information regarding phenomenology and social theory. It is also important to note that many scientists and other individuals learn from observing and that observation are seen to be one of the most fundamental methods for collecting data (Wilson, 2002).

This can be divided into two types: indirect observation where the scientists effectively collects information from respondents regarding their self observation, and direct observation where the researcher actually observes the individuals doing something and makes observations about this behavior (Wilson, 2002). Either of these types has a specific structure that is often imposed on the researcher and the data collection that he or she does, or the scientists may choose to allow the particular type of structure that will be utilized to basically emerge throughout the process of analysis (Wilson, 2002).

There is a representation of methods that comes from this and it is important to look at this representation. The easiest way to study it is through a figure created by Embree (1997), which has been reproduced here:

Source: Embree, 1997.

This figure is significant, as it indicates how different methods are acquired and how they can branch out into other methods if the researcher allows for this. Not all researchers will allow this, preferring something that starts out structured in one area and stays that way, but Schutz and others believed in branching out and studying things in the best way possible, instead of remaining with one particular method of study, regardless of whether it worked well or whether it seemed to be the best method for the study at hand.

Even though Schutz defended the worker Max Weber, he also held with many of the basic ideals of the Austrian tradition which focused on many of the subjective preferences of an individual that was purchasing something conferring the value on the object instead of trying to explain the value as being a result of many of the objective processes based on production costs or the time invested in labor (Barber, 2002). He also upheld many suppositions regarding the idea of value and freedom and economic science, the tasks that he saw instrumental to science, and the need to describe something rather than to validate the preferences of an individual (Barber, 2002).

A large believer in the necessity of showing how to achieve an ends to a mean as opposed to assessing the value of something, Schutz was very serious in his convictions. When he looked at social sciences and economic theory, Schutz saw the world as being very diverse with its motivations and believed that these motivations were generally at the base of all economic theory (Barber, 2002). He saw this type of theory as adopting a prospective that was reflectively governed by the idea of marginal utilities (Barber, 2002). In other words, any ideals that were created should be based on the idea that all individuals had oriented many of the plans that they have otherwise in order to see the greatest amount of utility with the minimal amount of cost (Barber, 2002).

He also believed that the sense of uneasiness that many individuals found in searching for satisfaction was due to the fact that an individual adopted an economic or other type of project rationally but found in retrospect that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with it (Barber, 2002). Social sciences often deal with economic issues, and Schutz looked at these very seriously. However, economic issues were not all that Schutz dealt with in many of his works. At one point he also addressed the larger issue of how the social sciences overall fit in with philosophy.

One particular essay that he wrote responded to another philosopher's view that issues in the social sciences should work to make use of scientific methods that were natural and identify evidence with senses that allowed for observable data (Barber, 2002). Schutz also agreed with this particular philosopher on several ideas, however, the largest one being that those who worked as social scientists needed to find ways to validate many of the theoretical ideas that they had and that the lack of predictability that was often seen within the social sciences did not work to disqualify the scientific character that they had (Barber, 2002).

He stated at that point that Max Weber would have basically been wrong if the method that he utilized for what he called subjective interpretation would have applied any type of empathy to introspective and unobservable states (Barber, 2002). However, there was one problem with this issue which was that the scientific approaches that were deemed natural when it came to the social sciences basically when along with what Descartes stated when he talked about divorcing the mind from the body and allowing only statements that came from the body to be verifiable in any type of scientific way (Barber, 2002).

This natural scientific approach also depended on an individual assuming that the object of social science must be examined first or an individual would be left to assume that the methods that were created for the natural sciences would be appropriate to the study that was being undertaken (Barber, 2002). Schutz worked at first attempting to clarify what social reality actually was and indicated how various individuals worked to sustain the reality that they had by working to understand the motives that other individuals had (Barber, 2002). Having a mutual understanding was very important to Schutz and took place without these particular individuals in question penetrating another individual's privacy or reducing an individual to the status where he or she responded only to stimuli as an animal would (Barber, 2002).

Schutz's account of social reality indicated that individuals gave a great deal of meaning to the world around them, and this was opposed to the physical reality where the objects did not interpret the world that they inhabited in any way (Barber, 2002). It was with this idea that Schutz began to argue that utilizing the social scientific method that was appropriate involved developing various constructs of these everyday individuals (Barber, 2002).

The idea between method and methodology also fascinated Schutz (Wilson, 2002). There is often some confusion seen when the relationship between method and methodology is looked at. Individuals, for example, often write about the methodology that they use when they are actually describing what method they are going to be using for a particular study (Wilson, 2002). However, methodology is much more fundamental than the actual method and should come prior to it. It does not provide the method but rather the philosophical groundwork for the method that is being utilized.

To state a methodological position is to describe the view that an individual has based on the nature of reality (Wilson, 2002). For an individual that is a positivist, the methodological position is that the facts that are seen in the world represent real objects (Wilson, 2002). For the phenomenologist, the methodological position is one that is based on constructed meanings and intersubjectivity (Wilson, 2002). Within the idea of phenomenology, there is an emphasis on the understanding of the experiences of individuals and the situation that an individual is involved in (Wilson, 2002).

Because of this, the research methods that would be utilized for this are based on methods of philosophy. For example, these methods could include linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, historical critical method, formal logic, hermeneutical method and praxis, and literary philosophy, among others (Wilson, 2002). Underlying these methods are some aspects based on qualitative approaches within information science as well (Wilson, 2002). For example, conceptual analysis is seen to be at the base of many activities within methods for and analysis of qualitative data and it has also been suggested that the hermeneutic approach deals with information science as well (Wilson, 2002).

Within phenomenological psychology, individuals find basically the same types of research methods that are utilized in phenomenology when it is seen as a philosophical discipline (Wilson, 2002). The emphasis then becomes the understanding of an individual's experience with the world and the situation that they are in. Therefore, qualitative interviews and narrative accounts are quite often employed as methods for research (Wilson, 2002). The various modes that are utilized for analysis will vary somewhat based on the researchers' theoretical perspective and based on what type of theoretical perspective arises from the data that is collected (Wilson, 2002).

It is quite possible in psychological research that interviewing enough individuals that suffer from the same type of diagnosis will yield results that some individuals see the problem as something they must deal with so that they can cope with the rest of their experiences whereas other individuals will find that the structure that they have in their lives is completely determined by the problem that they have (Wilson, 2002). In other words, their life is experienced through the problem instead of the problem simply being a part of their lives. This idea is suggestive of the fact that methods are quite capable of being utilized under different methodological ideas (Wilson, 2002).

Questionnaires, for example, can be utilized quite often to elicit many different things and the data that is obtained can be utilized to satisfy research objectives regardless of the phenomenological or positivist stance that is undertaken (Wilson, 2002). Individuals such as Schutz and other philosophers generally reject the division of quantitative and qualitative methods since it is often very confusing (Wilson, 2002). Qualitative interviews that are undertaken are often analyzed to identify concepts that underlie the problem and how these concepts occur based on various successions of interviews can be counted and related to demographic characteristics or other issues (Wilson, 2002).