Imperialism in the Middle East

Imperialism in the Middle East

The Impact of Imperialism in the Middle East

Imperialism and Decolonization:

A Case Study of Egypt and Iraq

In this paper, a discussion will be offered on the consequences of Western imperialism, notably British, that not only impacted on the immediate aftermath of their comportment in previously colonized areas, but also contributed in forming their prospective social, economic and political future, through examining imperialism in Egypt and Iraq. The powerlessness of the Egyptian and Iraqi authorities can be linked to the socio-economic modifications the British enforced and their disinclination to assume a choice to the Western construct of power.

It can be said that historically speaking, the Middle East has not been considered to be charitable to the power of western influences. Up until the fall of the Ottoman Empire it was a social centerpiece as well as a key trading post. The downfall of the Ottoman Empire led in colonization by the British and French. The imperial forces that occupied the Middle East have not had a good outcome on the region, despite the age of colonialism now being consigned to history. The imposition of western style 'Nation- States' has frequently broken up ethnic territories. The example of the Kurdish population in Iraq is a case in point. The formation of Nation States has led to often artificial state-centric politics where previously the nation executed a more important role. Indeed Bromley suggest that it is the state which is the barrier to democracy in the Middle East and not Islam as is popularly concluded (Deegan 1993). The acculturation of tribes such as the Sunnis and The Shiite does not fit with the concept of nation sates. The existence of Israel in 1948 has left Palestinian refugees scattered all over the Middle East, especially in Jordan and the Lebanon. The Nation State in the Middle East is one historical example of unsuccessful western influence; it is this failure which helps to form the negative opinions of western policy-making phenomena, indeed Anwar Sadat writes:

"The problem therefore is not one of a Muslim East, it is that of an east deceived, an East colonized by a West that has sucked its blood. That East wishes to avenge itself, but not in the western manner of hostility and usurpation. All it wishes is to live freely and independently, that each nation shall make its own destiny, exploit the riches of her soil for the benefit of her own children, and respect the independence of other nations be they eastern or western." (Karpat 1982, 23)

An assessment of state formation 'must attend to the precise matrix from which [it] was launched' (Bromley 1994, 45) (yet it is evident that the British failed to appreciate this. The Western, Weberian, conception of a state, in which the territoriality and legitimacy of the system are paramount (Anderson 1987, 2) was fundamentally incompatible to the nature of Middle Eastern societies, which had previously comprised of a tributary empire, nomads and a tribal state (Bromley 1994, 34). Although both the administrative and coercive capabilities of the bureaucracy and the military were fulfilled, their interpretation within the states was not aligned to a traditional Western model. For example, the role of the military in overthrowing successive governments is a feature that appears repeatedly in both Egypt and Iraq. The 'compulsory model' (Zubaida 1993, 121) of the nation-state assumes that the cultures of Egypt and Iraq are essentially the same as those in Western Europe, which hinders the possibilities of their own political evolution.

The aftermath of the First World War was a pivotal moment for much of the Middle East due to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq emerged as a result of the peace settlement and was arbitrarily formed of three former Ottoman provinces; Mosul, Basra and Baghdad. Although Egypt had been occupied, supposedly temporarily, by the British since 1882, it became the 'cornerstone of British colonial supremacy' (Ayubi 1995, 88). In order to 'secure its essential strategic needs without incurring the expenses of directly governing the territories' (Cleveland 2004, 193), Britain installed a pliable monarch in both states.

The behavior of the British in these states did not adhere to the traditional imperialist standard but was, in effect, an 'empire by treaty' (Cleveland 2004, 193). Unlike in African or Asian colonies, neither Egypt or Iraq experienced direct British colonial rule but were instead granted a limited form of independence that allowed them the freedom to manage domestic issues but had, as a caveat, the continued presence of the British military and the implementation of foreign and defense policy amenable to their imperial masters (Cleveland 2004, 193). The intrinsic conflict that rendered this process problematic can be summarized by Cromer, who states that the colonizers were;

'striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive -- the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his [English] supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of his supreme position.' (Wilson 1931, 72)

While purporting to be installing a system politically superior to its predecessor, the British fail to cultivate any notion of political freedom, rights of the individual or mass representation that are traditionally linked with Western liberal democracy (Haj 1997, 81). Therefore, once true independence is obtained, the peoples of Egypt and Iraq are left with an inadequate understanding of a democratic political system, which could account for the primacy of the military within government and the erratic allegiance to democracy.

The lasting impact of the physical, and artificial, formation of Iraq is the key differentiating factor in relation to Egypt. The 'sheer arbitrariness' (Bromley 1994, 135) of the geographical delineation has affected the governance and existence of Iraq as a state. Formed due to a desire to protect Britain's strategic interests within one sphere of influence, the population consisted of one-fifth Sunni Arabs, one half Shi'ite Arabs and one-seventh Kurdish tribes. Therefore;

'In Iraq there is still…no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected to no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever.'

(Faisal 1933, Quoted in Yapp 1991, 70)

In addition to the inevitable conflict between the social groups, Iraq was also subject to great friction between the urban and rural communities, described as 'two almost separate worlds' (Batutu 1993, 503). Instead of seeking to resolve this great divide, the British solidified it by implementing a dual justice system that excluded tribal communities from national law, who were instead subject to the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation. This is a concrete example of the British governing principles of classification and differentiation (Haj 1997, 81), perhaps a more sophisticated notion of 'divide and rule'. By reinforcing old divisions, the imperialists were able to manage smaller groups more effectively and, due to the lack of consensus, prevent the formation of an agreed national identity that would threaten their manipulation of the state. These social tensions have endured and much of the social instability can attributed to them.

The nature and creation of class within Egypt and Iraq relate to another key factor of British imperialism. The process of state building was hastened via the creation of a new class of large landowners and the existing elites, previously loyal to the Ottoman Empire and therefore distrusted by the populations. The main focus of Egyptian politics was found in the capital city where the main political actors were drawn from a mere 53,000 individuals identified as 'professionals'. Similarly, the first Iraqi elections results conferred power to tribal shaykhs, aghast and old notables (Haj 1997, 82), almost exclusively Sunni Arabs, which set a precedent for all preceding elections, where members of the assembly were chosen bi-il-tazkiya (unopposed). This contributes to the volatility of the regime due to the minority position, in sectarian terms, of those in power (Tripp 2002, 31).

In addition to the "old" aristocracy of officials, the ex-Sharifian officers and the Muslim Merchants, this new landed class had come to form the socio-political backbone of monarchical Iraq. And, as in Egypt, the new bourgeoisie was openly collaborationist with the colonial power, leaving the task of national struggle to the intelligentsia and the urban masses, and eventually to the army officers' (Ayubi 1995, 95).

The fact that the first governments of both Iraq and Egypt displayed a continuity of Ottoman personnel and an inclusion of the new landed class reinforced the lack of legitimacy given to the system as a whole and prepared the climate for repeated military takeovers.

The illegitimacy of the client governments of Iraq and Egypt was reinforced by the choice of a monarchical system preferred by the British. The kings appointed in both states were, previously, respected figures in the Arab world and possessed natural authority, in addition to being predictably amenable to British demands. 'Within the restricted field imposed by British control, the constitution enabled the king to keep a government out of, but not in, power' (Bromley 1994, 130) and there is significant evidence of arbitrary dissolution of governments. The Egyptian King Faud (1922-36) repeatedly disbanded popularly elected Wafd governments, despite huge majorities, due to their distinctly nationalist platform. The fickleness of the British position is exemplified by their later coercion of King Farouk (1936-52) to appoint an enfeebled Wafd government due to their need for a neutral Egypt during the Second World War. This intense irony does not detract from the fact that the monarchs in Egypt and Iraq were very powerful political actors but were 'so closely associated with the structures of colonialization that they did not outlast them' (Owen 1992, 19). The British imperialists exploited the constitutional power of the King to dismiss any elected government of nationalists 'that threatened to tear up or amend the arrangements…defining Britain's rights' (Owen 1992, 19). Hence, once again, diminishing the authority of the regime they installed and creating a lack of respect for lawfully elected governments.

Pan-Arabism Causes Conflict in the Middle East

Since its formation in the wake of World War I, the contemporary Middle Eastern system based on territorial states has been under sustained assault. In past years, the foremost challenge to this system came from the doctrine of pan- Arabism (or qawmiya), which sought to "eliminate the traces of Western imperialism" and unify the "Arab nation," and the associated ideology of Greater Syria (or Suriya al-Kubra), which stresses the territorial and historical indivisibility of most of the Fertile Crescent. Today, the leading challenge comes from Islamist notions of a single Muslim community (the umma). Intellectuals and politicians, denouncing the current system as an artificial creation of Western imperialism at variance with yearnings for regional unity, have repeatedly urged its destruction. National leaders -- from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Saddam Husayn [Hussein] -- have justified their interference in the affairs of other states by claiming to pursue that unity. Yet the system of territorial states has proven extremely resilient.

One lasting and significant effect of Western imperialism in Egypt and Iraq is the ideological legacy left behind and the 'determinant role' (Halliday 2005, 83) played by nationalism. Substantiation of this can be seen in the proto-nationalist revolts of 1919 and 1920 in Egypt and Iraq respectively. Opposition parties were united in the demands for total independence and, as 'ideologies arise in conditions of crisis' (Salem 1994, 4), nationalism provided an opportunity to 'adopt many of the patriotic, secular and progressive outlooks of the West, recast them in nativist form, and then use them as a weapon against the domination of the West' (Salem 1994, 71). When faced with the social ordeal of colonial rule, the populations of these territories search for new identities that can link the past to the future and demonstrate an awareness to create a strong state. However, therein lies the problem; the self-proclaimed Arab nationalist parties, such as Iraq's Ba'ath Party, took control of a state whose very legitimacy they challenged, hence undermining the legitimacy of their claim to govern. Despite this, nationalism was the prevailing ideological response to imperialism and remained so. For example, Nasser's longevity rests on the fact that he was everything the Arab world aspired to; "assertive, independent, and engaged in the construction of a new society freed of the imperial past' (Cleveland 2004, 301). Therefore, British presence in Iraq and Egypt 'gave birth to the familiar dialect by which imperial rule cannot help but generate the nationalist forces that will eventually drive it out' (Owen 1992, 20).

The predominant role of the military in overthrowing government and the use of violent revolt to express discontent with a regime originated in the imperial era but has persisted well into the 21st century. Initially, the 'weak consolidation of the state was shown by the spate of inconclusive military interventions in politics' (Bromley 1994, 137) but gradually, regimes would only be seen as legitimate for as long as they could stave off a military coup d'etat. The success of a takeover was not relevant as its very existence had achieved its aim of creating instability, thus, the army became the 'arbiter' (Cleveland 2004, 211) of politics in Iraq and Egypt and army officers 'significant political players' (Tripp 2002, 78). The prevalence of army-based revolts can be attributed, in part, to the creation of the landowner class and the subsequent repressive character of the states -- the response by a middle-class military is therefore a logical progression (Bromley 1994, 161). The use of public disorder was equally significant as it was related closely to the nationalist opposition and therefore a 'key element in the vernacular language of the argument against British domination' (Tripp 1998, 112). However, the series of military regimes in Iraq left the country in a position of such political uncertainty that any reforms promised were rarely implemented.

An Example of Decolonization:

The Suez Crisis and Rapid Decolonization in Africa

The Suez Crisis started on 26 July 1956 in reaction to the United States' decision to withdraw its offer of a grant to assist the building of Egypt's Aswan High Dam. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which instigated a plan by the British and French to invade Egypt. Britain and France collaborated in mid-October 1956 to enjoin a joint interposition in Egypt, aware that the Israeli's had plans to invade Egypt as well. Aware of the upcoming Israeli plan to invade the Sinai, French officials suggested that a Franco-British force could enter Egypt ostensibly to separate the combatants, while actually assuming command of the whole Suez waterway (Carlton 1989).

What ensued following the Suez Crisis is an example of what imperialism meant for the colonizers, and the colonized, while demonstrating the conflict arising from the ultimate lack of power on both sides to effectively manage their interests. The nationalistic movement of Egypt which fueled the Suez Crisis is a consequence of the inability of Western Imperialism to firmly take root, hence resulting in decolonization.

The Suez conflict, which erupted over the decision by Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, was a major escalation of anticolonialist and, by association, anti-Zionist sentiment in the Arab world. The Suez Canal was built in the 1860s and by the late 1880s came under British and other foreign control (via a number of shareholders), maintained by British occupation of Egypt. The British saw the canal as an essential element in their control of the main sea route to India. In the 4-year period leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser embarked on a programme of pan-Arab cohesion and made military pacts with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Nasser's goal was the restoration of the Arab nation under Egyptian leadership and an end to foreign influence in the area. The nationalization of Suez was the first time that a Third World country had successfully regained one of its major foreign-owned assets (Carlton 1989) (McIntyre 1998).

Many historians hold that British withdrawal from much of Africa was by no means a well-managed adjustment to the inevitable but assumed, in the aftermath of Suez, an appearance of near panic. "The wind of change" (as Macmillan described it) was, according to this view, more like a hurricane, resulting in the British being evicted from the whole of Africa within a decade of Suez rather than over a protracted period that was otherwise the likely prognosis.

Nationalist movements were strengthened and encouraged with Nasser proving that Britain could no longer stand up to determined nationalists. Nasser was presented as David who had slain Goliath and became a figurehead for the anti-colonialism movement. The other imperial powers felt this effect too, especially France with her problems in Algeria intensifying and eventually leading to the collapse of the Fourth Republic. The Suez Crisis also brought the two superpowers into Africa with the United States establishing the Bureau of African Affairs in 1957, and a young John F. Kennedy made a speech to the Senate challenging outdated assumptions in foreign policy and arguing that the growing African nationalist movements needed support from the United States. Neff argues that, 'Suez was a hinge point in history. It spelled the end of Western colonization and the entry of America as the major Western power in the Middle East' (Carlton 1989, 99).

The first concern to take under consideration is the part that nationalism in the colonies played in bringing forth the end of the British Empire. Advocates of the nationalist reasoning state that in order for decolonization to happen there must be nationalist and anti-colonial forces within a colony. The circumstances within which these movements would be allowed to grow were made possible by the imperial powers after the conclusion of the Second World War. They tried to build up the productivity of their colonies, and this resulted in the colonized people challenging imperial rule. Springhall argues that, 'rapid urbanization plus social and political mobilization were behind the ideology of anti-colonial nationalism' (Springhall 2001, 8). Moreover, the post-war growth of the global economy paired with the economic establishments in place resulted in conditions in which nationalism in the colonies could grow. Hence the aftermath of Suez would not have been so grossly felt had their not been any nationalist sentiments in the colonies.

The second element to study is the global forces Britain found facing in the post-war world. Springhall expresses that in a world of Cold War political orientations and nuclear deterrents, 'colonial empires appeared as quaint survivors of a pre-war age, to be quickly dismantled lest they be knocked to pieces in the turbulent wake of superpowers' (Springhall 2001, 9). Britain also found that in the young atomic age the alternative outlook of having nuclear superiority seemed to be more tempting than possessing a large empire and a nuclear capability would move her nearer to being on par with the superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were anti-colonial in their mindset and estimations of self-rule for all individuals, stanching from Wilson's Fourteen Points, the covenant of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter and the charter of the United Nations, produced a clime which made the ownership of colonial dominions seem intolerable. The United Nations also played a role in decolonization since the newly independent nations, such as India and Sri Lanka, used the U.N. As a political platform to set apart and stymy the foregoing colonial powers. As a result the U.N. passed the, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' (Springhall 2001, 11) which in issue made colonial rule a denial of important human rights. Indeed, such impressive modifications in international relations after the war, the dissolution of an empire can appear to be normal and predictable with or without the Suez Crisis.