Interagency Cooperation; Insurgency Interagency Cooperation

Interagency Cooperation; Insurgency

Interagency Cooperation -- Even prior to the events of 9/11, the political and military changes that occurred from the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in awareness and need for greater coordination designed to more appropriately coalesce all instruments of national security in focus. This mandate became clearer after 9/11 and subsequent investigations that pointed out just how endemic a lack of appropriate interagency cooperation proved to be.

During the final part of the 20th century and the end of the Cold War, a number of weak, underdeveloped nations often destabilized to the point that their issues in military, political and social genres became so frequent that the United States was unprepared to adequately handle them. As a result, by 1994 it became clear that new and more cooperative measures were needed if the destabilization of the developing world was not going to negatively impact the domestic and foreign policies of the United States, to the point of a National Directive and policy change emphasis (Bush, Directive NSPD-44, 2005).

DISCUSSION -- Interagency cooperation is a logical, sound, approach to dealing with numerous domestic and foreign policy issues and is, in theory, a policy that should be implementable. In fact, however, this has not, nor ever, proved to be true. The events of 9/11 pointed out that even domestically interagency cooperation was far from common; and had very real effects. However, in order to advance the domestic and national agenda appropriately, it became necessary to direct one agency, the National Security Agency, as the overall management locus for all national security related issues; forming a strategic process that regularly coordinates with domestic agencies to form a broad, cogent, and above all, useful picture (Jones, 2009).

Former chief of U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zini, noted that as early as 1999 his group was examining these destabilization issues with the task for finding a way to integrate military and civilian planning. Since then, he believes integrated planning is a top priority that still lacks focus and directive and, above all, an investment in prevention rather than a reaction to stimuli (Strohm, 2004).