Interagency Cooperation; Insurgency Interagency Cooperation

Interagency Cooperation; Insurgency Interagency Cooperation -- Even prior to the events of 9/11, the political and military changes that occurred from the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in awareness and need for greater coordination designed to more appropriately coalesce all instruments of national security in focus. This mandate became clearer after 9/11 and subsequent investigations that pointed out just how endemic a lack of appropriate interagency cooperation proved to be.

During the final part of the 20th century and the end of the Cold War, a number of weak, underdeveloped nations often destabilized to the point that their issues in military, political and social genres became so frequent that the United States was unprepared to adequately handle them.

As a result, by 1994 it became clear that new and more cooperative measures were needed if the destabilization of the developing world was not going to negatively impact the domestic and foreign policies of the United States, to the point of a National Directive and policy change emphasis (Bush, Directive NSPD-44, 2005). DISCUSSION -- Interagency cooperation is a logical, sound, approach to dealing with numerous domestic and foreign policy issues and is, in theory, a policy that should be implementable.

In fact, however, this has not, nor ever, proved to be true. The events of 9/11 pointed out that even domestically interagency cooperation was far from common; and had very real effects. However, in order to advance the domestic and national agenda appropriately, it became necessary to direct one agency, the National Security Agency, as the overall management locus for all national security related issues; forming a strategic process that regularly coordinates with domestic agencies to form a broad, cogent, and above all, useful picture (Jones, 2009). Former chief of U.S.

Central Command, General Anthony Zini, noted that as early as 1999 his group was examining these destabilization issues with the task for finding a way to integrate military and civilian planning. Since then, he believes integrated planning is a top priority that still lacks focus and directive and, above all, an investment in prevention rather than a reaction to stimuli (Strohm, 2004).

Further, it is important to note that formal interagency cooperation is not limited to military or intelligence organizations, but must, by its very nature in order to be effective, encompass all of government in a transparent manner. Each level and hierarchical structure is established in Joint Publication 3-08 (2006), establishing level of cooperation, to whom, where and when cooperation should occur. Moreover, this document defines the expectations each agency has toward one another and to the overall government.

The process continues, but we may be sure that it must continue to evolve and professionalize as technological advances and non-combative forces continue to threaten our security. REFERENCES Bush, G. (December 7, 2005). "National Security Presidential Directive NSPD- 44." The White House. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (March 17, 2006). Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. II. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Jones, J. (March 18, 2009). Memorandum: The 21st Century Interagency Process. The White House, Document 4409001013, Unclassified. Strohm, C. (December 7, 2004).

"Former Commander Calls for New Military- Civilian Planning Organization." Government Executive. Cited in: http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1204/120704c1.htm SUBJECT: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency -- Insurgency is a rebellion against a legally recognized government; counterinsurgency is the means with which to combat that. Of course, not all rebellions are insurgencies, simply because a state of conflict may exist between one of more sovereign states and rebel forces -- the prime example being the American Civil War, when the South was not recognized a sovereign state, but as a viable belligerent power.

This is important in the 21st century since the clear lines of dominance between the Soviet and American spheres of influence no longer exist, and more and more conflicts focus more on terrorist or other sectarian groups with no national power, but funds and some level of popular support. It is a method of warfare that is counter-intuitive to the United States, yet addressing it is critical (Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009). BACKGROUND: Until the fall of the Soviet Union, political and military conflicts were drawn between the lines of capitalism and communism.

While both sides aggressively supported their own agendas by funding appropriately placed groups in the developing world, the definition of friend or foe was easier to grasp. Particularly after 9/11, however, the face of the "enemy" has changed from political to a variety of cultural, religious, territorial, social, and even historical conflicts in which not only have tactics changed, but the dramatic evolution of technology has changed the level of the playing field.

DISCUSSION -- Typically, there are four elements that form the overall rubric of an insurgency: 1) secret cell-networks, often operating globally; 2) terrorism used to foster insecurity among the civilian population; 3) new and creative means designed to foster support within civilian (local and international) populations; 4) attacks against the government, or governments (Metz and Millen, 2004).

Because these practices are so endemic, the United States must change its overall strategy towards international conflict, its methods of collecting and analyzing data, and most importantly, the response necessary to form what many call "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" (Sepp, 2005). One particular paradigm shift within military thinking is changing the way battles become numerous skirmishes as opposed to more formal, all-out battles. Additionally, the focus is more unclear.