International Order That Is Emerging

¶ … international order that is emerging and will be present in the future. The concept of international order or world order is nothing new; however technological innovations have created a world that is increasingly more global. In light of this globalization the type of international order that will emerge is in question. The purpose of this discussion is to examine if the emerging international order is increasingly liberal.

International Order

Traditionally scholars have asserted that international order can be defined as an interaction amongst sovereign nations who operate in a global environment that is governed by anarchy (Ikenberry 2005). As it relates to the classic Westphalian philosophy it is asserted that states are in control of how their military power is used domestically, but order as it relates to international affairs is governed by both a diffusion and balance of power between nations (Ikenberry 2005). For many years international order has been dependent upon two underlying principles which involve diffusion and balance of power among nations with significant powers in addition to sovereign territorial states (Ikenberry 2005).

This means that on the domestic front state governments have control over how violence is utilized (Ikenberry 2005). On the other hand, internationally this control or authority over military actions is distributed among various nations (Ikenberry 2005).

However, at the current time there seems to be movement towards a more Westphalian philosophy because America has established a quasi-monopoly at the international level (Ikenberry 2005). This means that instead simply enforcing control over military forces on the domestic level America is now controlling violence at an international level with little or no support from the group of nations that are suppose to control the use of force on an international level (Ikenberry 2005). Because of this diversion from the traditional international structure, the sovereignty of nations' is less sovereign (Ikenberry 2005). As a result of this eroded sovereignty the behaviors of states are more exposed to global and more specifically American scrutiny (Ikenberry 2005).

In addition, in the wake of 9/11 America's beliefs concerning contingent sovereignty makes outside influences even more pervasive. The author further explains that the growth of American unipolar dominance and the concurrent diminishing of state sovereignty are a historical development as it relates to international order (Ikenberry 2005). As it relates to history the aforementioned phenomenon, is a drastically new distribution and expression of the power of a single nation. As a result it is not unrealistic for the world to question and consider the new-fangled rules and institutions of international order (Ikenberry 2005).

Ikenberry (2005) asserts that the current and emerging international order is being shaped primarily by the United States in addition to countries in Europe and East Asia (Ikenberry 2005). The author asserts that because the United States of America possesses so much power as it relates to technology, military economic and political factors it has a great deal of influence throughout the world (Ikenberry 2005). Much of this power emerged after the cold war when America had more significant growth than Japan or Europe (Ikenberry 2005). In addition this power exists because America has military bases throughout the world while countries such as China and Russia are confined to their specific regions (Ikenberry 2005). Indeed, America has a great deal of authority and there is very little competition from other countries.

As a result of the aforementioned factors it is at the forefront of creating an international order (Ikenberry 2005). The author explains that this international order is centered on security alliances, open markets, democracy and multilateral collaboration (Ikenberry 2005). If countries are to be successful in this increasingly global world, they will be compelled to operate in the aforementioned realms (Ikenberry 2005).

The author explains that although this is the order that emerged in the wake of the cold war there are now concerns about the sustainability of this type of international order (Ikenberry 2005). The article asserts that the international order that has been perpetuated by the United States since the cold war is now at a crossroads in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (Ikenberry 2005). The Bush administration's willingness to aggressively expand military budgets and infringe upon the constitutional rights of American citizens has caused some to question the ultimate goals of the administration and America in general (Ikenberry 2005). The author explains that the prestige that America once held in the international community has been compromised (Ikenberry 2005). The author further explains that for most of the postwar era, America's pursuit of its national interest and the construction of a progressive and mutually agreeable global order went hand in hand. But today, America and the world seem increasingly estranged. Anti-Americanism is a prominent feature of politics in many regions of the world. The most fundamental questions about the nature of global politics - who commands and who benefits - are now the subject of conversation among long-time allies and adversaries alike (Ikenberry 2005)."

Indeed the controversies that have arisen in the wake of terrorism and war have been substantial. The author explains that many are now questioning the unipolar order that now exist as it relates to international order (Ikenberry 2005). The primary concern is that the United States will no longer honor postwar commitments including multilateral partnerships (Ikenberry 2005). This concern developed when the United States invaded Iraq in spite call from the United Nations and individual countries to abandon or at least delay the invasion (Ikenberry 2005).

The author explains that the American post Cold War order has engaged the center of world politics for fifty years (Ikenberry 2005). The 'American system' is structured around a various institutions, rules, and partnerships along the lines of international and regional security in addition to political and economic realms (Ikenberry 2005). This post cold war order is based on a foundation of 'liberal hegemonic' bargains, provision for public goods, diffuse reciprocity, and an unparalleled assortment of intergovernmental agencies and collaborative relationships (Ikenberry 2005). In addition the author explains that the advanced democracies of the world live in a 'security community' in which use or threat of force is improbable (Ikenberry 2005). As a result, this post cold war order cannot be considered an empire but instead it is an American-led democratic political structure (Ikenberry 2005).

The author also insists that the changes in the international system are impeding upon the ability of this structure to maintain many of its liberal characteristics (Ikenberry 2005). As such both the integrity and that stability of this system has been compromised (Ikenberry 2005). The author asserts that there are two sources that have caused this breakdown (Ikenberry 2005). The first being the "long-term 'flipping' of the Westphalian state system (Ikenberry 2005)."

This flipping has to do with the fact that the power of the United States has increased while nations' norms of sovereignty have diminished (Ikenberry 2005).

As a result of this the power that America possesses has become a concern for people in the rest of the world which also diminishes the stability of the balance of power logic of the previous geopolitical periods (Ikenberry 2005).

In addition there are emerging threats to security that are not necessarily shared by all nations that are members of the old alliance (Ikenberry 2005). These threats weaken the strength of the security that is the foundation of the American system. In addition the strategic partnerships that once existed amongst old allies is now eroding. As a result the United States has more leverage to make choices that are independent from the concerns of other nations (Ikenberry 2005). It is also the case that European and East Asian nations have the economic and military prowess to operate in a manner that is independent from the United States (Ikenberry 2005). Consequently, the postwar alliance system that was so important to the stability of American political and economic relations with Europe and East Asia - is now more delicate and questionable (Ikenberry 2005).

It is also true that the changing global conditions cultivate philosophies that are both liberal and neo-imperial. Each of these philosophies are a part of American political culture and as such they are both apparent as it relates to American diplomacy (Ikenberry 2005). For example, a liberal philosophy has been made apparent as it relates to the Atlantic community, along with its institutional language including NATO and multilateral economic regimes (Ikenberry 2005). The author further asserts that the neo-imperial philosophy if international order would be in the form of a global 'hub and spoke' system (Ikenberry 2005). The author further explains that the formation of such an order would be formed around bilateralism, client states, and patronage-oriented foreign policy (Ikenberry 2005). In addition America's postwar 'hub and spoke' security tie with East Asia demonstrates that such an approach may be likely (Ikenberry 2005). Certainly the liberal and neo-imperial philosophies continue to provide an assortment of benefits and costs associated with the American governance of unipolarity (Ikenberry 2005).

Lastly, the author explains that it does not seem probable that America will discard rule-based order (Ikenberry 2005). The author explains that is the case because it would lead to complete chaos (Ikenberry 2005). In addition a neo-imperial system of American rule is too expensive and burdened with inconsistencies, and based on an exaggerated accounting of American power (Ikenberry 2005). The asserts that Likewise, there are an array of incentives and impulses that will persuade the United States to try to organize unipolarity around multilateral rules and institutions. The United States may want to renegotiate rules and institutions in some global areas, but it ultimately will want to wield its power legitimately in a world of rules and institutions. It will also have incentives to build and strengthen regional and global institutions in preparation for a future 'after unipolarity'. The rising power of China, India, and other non-Western states presents a challenge to the old American-led order that will require new, expanded, and shared international governance arrangements (Ikenberry 2005)."

One may question why there is so much emphasis placed on America as it relates to international order and international relations in general. While it is true that much of this emphasis is due to the fact that America is a superpower, this emphasis is also present because America's approach to international relations is amongst the most studied and practiced form of international relations. In fact according to Assem and Volten (2006) the discipline of international relations was born and raised in the United States and if quantitative yardsticks were utilized the American approach to, International relations had accomplished a great deal especially when compared to the European approach to International relations to (Assem and Volten 2006).

In addition, the American approach to this discipline was thriving in many American institutions of higher learning and libraries were full of publications of American scholars concerning the discipline of international relations (Assem and Volten 2006). However in Europe, the amount of studying concerning to subject of IR was limited and the research output was also less significant than in America (Assem and Volten 2006). The development of the discipline of international relations has placed America in a position of authority as it relates to carrying out certain initiatives on an international level.

Overall, the research seems to indicate that from a traditional stand point -- certainly after the cold war -- the protocol for the international use of force has been to address international conflicts of problems multilaterally. However, in the wake of 9/11 the United States has acted unilaterally as it relates to the war in Iraq. By some standards this approach has been viewed as an attempt at imperialism and has been condemned. It has also propagated anti-American sentiment throughout the world. Indeed, America in many respects in now viewed as a super power with imperialistic intentions. Over the next few paragraphs we will explain the manner in which the role of becoming an imperial threat is connected to the belief that international order is becoming more liberal.

The next few paragraphs will discuss the liberalization of international order as it relates to a perceived imperial threat.

The role of an Imperial Threat

According to Litwak (2002) the global dominance of the United States is often compared to a modern day Roman Empire. Surpassing the Cold War rubric "superpower -- the term "hyper power" has entered our political language to communicate the scale of the United States' dominant international status (Litwak 2002). The author further asserts that also though American power has never been so significant it also has never been surrounded by so much uncertainty and confusion (Litwak 2002).

The author explains that the debate over current American policy usually encompasses a substantial range if issues. The most evident being the debate over unilateralism and multilateralism, which was evaluated previously in this discussion. However this author contends that the aforementioned debate isn't the cause of the confusion (Litwak 2002). Instead it is noted that the confusion can actually be found in the ever-present tension between what the author describes as America's twin identities (Litwak 2002). This is a duality that was first described by the political theorist Raymond Aron in his book the Imperial Republic (Litwak 2002). Aron describes America as an "imperial power dominating and maintaining an international order whose key institutions and governing norms bear an indelibly American stamp. At the same time, it's a "republic" -- that is to say, a sovereign state existing within a system of sovereign states equal under international law (Aron 1973; Litwak 2002)."

In addition the author explains that the conflict that comes about as a result of this duality has real-life consequences as it relates to international order (Litwak 2002). For instance should America respond to genocide or other forms of internal instability if there is no American interest in the region (Litwak 2002)? Or should the county act unilaterally as it relates to confronting rogue state militarily (Litwak 2002). The author asserts that liberal thinkers including Kant believed that the primary way to determine these answers would depend upon the internal organization of states (Litwak 2002). The author asserts that such a belief system would substantiate the claim that international peace can be tenable through the global propagation of democratic political systems. Indeed former President Bill Clinton has stated that "Democracies don't attack each other (Litwak 2002)."

On the other hand, realist thinkers seem to believe that peace does not come as a result of the domestic structures of states but rather from a consistent and fair distribution of power among the states (Litwak 2002). The author further explains that the contrasting views of liberalism and realism are apparent in the foreign policy initiatives that have been developed in the United States (Litwak 2002). For instance, during the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon and national security adviser Harry Kissinger could not maintain domestic support in American for a realpolitik foreign policy that was separate and apart from foundational American values that support democracy and human rights (Litwak 2002).

In addition, President Jimmy Carter was faced with the opposite problem, when liberal idealism ran up against the power realities of an increasingly assertive Soviet Union (Litwak 2002). Also the international institutional structure developed following World War II was reflective of both liberal and realist philosophy. The economic agreements that emerged as a result of Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan the United States imagined an extended geographic zone of democratic, free-market states whose nucleus would be Western

Europe, North America, and Japan (Litwak 2002).

Also the new institutions in the system, which were resolutely grounded in a liberal notion of international order, became the keystone of the current approach to international order (Litwak 2002). These institutions were accompanied by an equally significant security alliance system that commenced with the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Litwak 2002). In addition the institutions that were a part of the security alliance were shaped by the realist tradition to concentrate on the overriding test of the postwar era which was the containing of an expansionist Soviet Union (Litwak 2002). The author further asserts that Writing under the pseudonym X, American diplomat George Kennan elaborated the containment doctrine in a classic article in Foreign Affairs in 1947. He viewed the West's efforts to balance Soviet power as essentially a long-term holding operation until the internal contradictions of the communist society led to its "break-up" or "mellowing." As the Cold War unfolded, successive American administrations defined U.S. interests beyond Europe and Japan (and most significantly in the Third World) in terms of a global competition with the Soviet Union (Litwak 2002)."

As it relates more specifically to a more liberal international order emerging in the world, it is apparent that factors such as free trade and democracy are inherently liberal (Ikenberry 2005).

As such, as the world begins to embrace free trade and democracy, the international order will more likely than not become increasingly more liberal (Ikenberry 2005). Many scholars believe that the increased liberalism will emerge as a result of America becoming an imperial ruler. In fact Ferguson (2002) asserted that America already has an informal empire that is similar to the British empire. The writer also asserts that this American liberalism should be embraced as it relates to international order. Ferguson (2002) asserts that because the United States provides public goods, security, and order, and because these elements are missing in some areas of the world, a liberal international order perpetuate by the United States may be beneficial to the world (Ikenberry 2005).

On the other hand, many scholars also assert that an American Empire could be destructive, exploitive and lead to international instability (Ikenberry 2005). The article points out that over that last ten years America's military has become more consolidated because America desires international imperial rule (Ikenberry 2005). In fact the author refers to America as a military juggernaut that only desires to dominate the world (Ikenberry 2005). Still others assert that the United States military power is unorganized and as a result it will fail to dominate (Ikenberry 2005). It is also believed that these endeavors will fail because America will lack the capacity to be an imperial ruler and the end result will be international instability (Ikenberry 2005).

Furthermore in 1968 Robert Tucker wrote that "an imperial state must have as its purpose the creation and maintenance of order (Litwak 2002)." If one considers this definition America via its distinctive institution-building role following World War II, could be labeled an imperial power (Litwak 2002). However such an American "empire" was unlike any that had been in existence before (Litwak 2002). Depending upon the America for protection and economic assistance, the recovering European nations with the exception of the Soviet Union were eager to join the multilateral institutions wrought through American leadership (Litwak 2002).

The author further asserts that the consensual foundation of these states' relationship gave the postwar international order its distinctive character (Litwak 2002). As such it also caused Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad to distinguish the U.S.-led Western system as an "empire by invitation" (Litwak 2002). On the other hand, only the coercive existence of the Red Army maintained the Soviet bloc or that "evil empire," referred to by President Ronald Reagan.

Assem & Volten (2006) assert that liberalism is bound to become part of the international order since international relations is largely an American grown discipline. The authors explain that because a liberal attitude is so pervasive in American politics and because America is so dominant an international figure, it will continue to influence international order (Assem & Volten 2006). The author points out that individualism plays a significant role in American liberalism because individuals are the foundation of any society (Assem & Volten 2006). This can be seen in the provisions set forth by the constitution in addition to the partiality towards micro analytical approaches in social sciences (Assem & Volten 2006).