Iran is a Terrorist Regime

Terrorism in Iran: Fighting or Helping?

Today, the 90 million people of Iran are confronted with a critically important juncture in their nation’s lengthy history which will have implications well into the future. The adverse impacts of longstanding crippling economic sanctions by the United States combined with the perception by many members of the international community that Iranian leaders have militaristic ambitions in the region have created a situation wherein foreign investors are reluctant to actively engage with Iran at present (Iran economy, 2021). Against this backdrop, the Iranian people are also confronted with the harsh reality that their country, the birthplace of human civilization, is also home to several international terrorist organizations that threaten the stability of the region and may even precipitate another world war. The purpose of this paper is to provide a description of the current state of terrorism in Iran and an analysis of the Iranian government’s response to these extremist organizations. Finally, an assessment concerning the success of the Iranian government’s response is followed by a summary of the research and key findings concerning these issues and their implications for the future in the conclusion.

The current state of terrorism

For far too many Americans, the name “Iran” immediately conjures up visions of turbaned, wild-eyed terrorists who are bent on destroying the United States and its interests at home and abroad, but this is certainly not the case with the vast majority of the freedom-loving Iranian people. There are some violent extremist actors in Iran, however, that have contributed to this misguided image in the United States and much of the international community. At present, the primary terrorist organizations that are operating in Iran include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force, the Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party; al-Qa’ida (Iran terrorism, 2021) as well as providing safe having for actors from Hezbollah and Hamas (Malakoutikhah, 2020). In addition, the U.S. State Department charges that Iran has sponsored terrorist cells in Syria, Iraq and parts of Gaza (Country reports on terrorism, 2019). In this regard, the most recent State Department report on terrorism in Iran emphasizes that, “Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region” (Country reports on terrorism, 2019, p. 2).

These actors operate in different parts of Iran but they are typically located near border regions with neighboring countries to facilitate their regional terrorist activities (Country reports on terrorism, 2019). Moreover, these terrorist organizations claim different motivations for their activities that defy easy analysis and explanation, with some claiming religious reasons while others maintain they are actually national liberation movements (Malakoutikhah, 2020). It should be noted, though, that some authorities believe that humiliation in one form or another represents the true motivation for all forms of terrorism (Lindner, 2001).

Further, some terrorist organizations appear to be seeking territorial gains in neighboring countries or political leverage over their perceived enemies using terrorist attacks as a tool to achieve these nefarious goals (Malakoutikhah, 2020). Because these organizations are allowed to operate within the borders of Iran with veritable impunity and outright protection from the Iranian government, it is not surprising that intelligence agencies around the world are eager to learn as much about what to expect from the unpredictable but increasingly dangerous Iranian regimen as possible.

What is known for certain at present is that Iran has a long history of harboring and sponsoring terrorist organizations, especially following the 1979 Islamic Revolution which ousted the hated shah and replaced him with a strict theocracy that subscribes to Sharia law. This legacy means that terrorist organizations in Iran routinely recruit marginalized individuals who lack viable economic alternatives and employment opportunities and that have been radicalized as a result (Malakoutikhah, 2020). While Iran has experienced some degree of domestic terrorism in recent years, Iranian security forces have succeeded in keeping these attacks to a minimum, especially when compared to the country’s neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Malakoutikhah, 2020).

At present, there are some outside actors that may also be fueling terrorism activities in Iran for illicit economic gain, presumably to help finance their domestic and international efforts For example, according to U.S. intelligence authorities:

· Iran is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor;

· Organized groups sex traffic Iranian women and children in Iran and to the United Arab Emirates and Europe;

· The transport of girls from and through Iran enroute to the Gulf for sexual exploitation or forced marriages is on the rise;

· Iranian children are also forced to work as beggars, street vendors, and in domestic workshops;

· Afghan boys forced to work in construction or agriculture are vulnerable to sexual abuse by their employers; and,

· Pakistani and Afghan migrants being smuggled to Europe often are subjected to forced labor, including debt bondage (Iran terrorism, 2021, para. 3).

Taken together, the stakes are high economically, but the human toll that is being exacted on the people of Iran is unquantifiable (Lotto, 2017). Although the general structure of terrorism in Iran remains secretive and cellular in order to protect the actors and their plans for the future, the purported national liberation movements that receive financial and moral support from the Iranian government are widely regarded as criminal organizations by other countries (Malakoutikhah, 2020). Taken together, it is clear that the Iranian government is faced with a viper’s nest of terrorists within and without its borders, some of which are by design and others by opportunity that will require more forceful interventions on the part of the Iranian government as discussed further below.

Discussion concerning the Iranian government response

In truth, the Iranian government response to terrorism has been one of encouragement rather than any type of meaingful attempt to counter these criminal organizations. For instance, according to analysts with the U.S. Department of State:

Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members residing in the country and refused to publicly identify members in its custody. Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria. (Country reports on terrorism, 2019, p. 2)

In addition, the Iranian government has also provided ongoing financial support for various terrorist attacks on Iranian dissidents living in continental Europe for the past several years, including Belgium, Albania, Denmark and the Netherlands (Country reports on terrorism, 2019). More troubling still, the Iranian government has not only refused to cease its support of these terrorist organizations, it has failed to enact any laws or official policies that are intended to stop the violence. In this regard, Malakoutikhah (2020) emphasizes that, “Regardless of claims relating to Iran as a victim or sponsor of terrorism, no official policy or document has been published by the government by way of a counterterrorism policy because any stated policy would be subject to accountability, human rights, and the rule of law” (p. 914).

While the Iranian government has not enacted any legislation to counter the terrorist threats within and without its national borders, it has implemented some social programs that are intended to promote its credibility with average Iranian citizens; however, these efforts have been sorely hampered by U.S.-sponsored economic sanctions (Rabiei, 2019). Indeed, in many cases, these efforts have backfired and have only resulted in a growing number of former middle-class Iranians being pushed below the poverty line (Rabiei, 2019).

The diversion of scare taxpayer resources to the nation’s uranium enrichment program and its adamant refusal to negotiate with the United States to lift economic sanctions has clearly exacerbated the situation for average Iranians, and it is likely just a matter of time until popular will exerts a mitigating force on these governmental efforts. In the interim, however, the international community in general and IGOs and NGOs in particular must help the Iranian people during this challenging period in their country’s history. For example, the United Nations has provided significant support to help the Iranian government respond to the ongoing Covid-19 global pandemic (Shabini, 2021) which has already claimed more than 60,000 lives with nearly 1.7 million people infected, representing one of the highest per capita infection rates in the world today (Covid-19 dashboard, 2021).

Your informed opinion on the success of the government’s response

To date, the Iranian government’s response to terrorism has been akin to providing an army of serial arsonists with all the kerosene and matches they want as well as a list of soft locations they can target. If the actual intentions of the Iranian government are to promote terrorism as a tool for achieving regional hegemony and profit from criminal enterprises, this response must be judged an outstanding success by any measure. Indeed, although Israel has kept its nuclear powder dry while the Iranian regime continues to prosecute terrorist activities around the world, it is reasonable to posit that the international community, most especially the United States and the European Union, remain a nervous wreck when it comes to Iran and its support of terrorism within its own borders but especially in neighboring countries.

Conversely, even if any significant decisionmaker within the Iranian government currently has legitimate aims to reduce these criminal activities within its borders, the government’s response is a miserable failure. Consequently, any improvement in the Iranian government’s response to terrorist activities within its own borders and is sponsorship of terrorism abroad must involve a fundamental sea change in leadership, one that embraces the rule of law and conformance with international standards of conduct in order to effect any real meaningful change.