Killer Angels the Union Army

Killer Angels

The Union army won the fierce, bloody battle at Gettysburg won due in large part because of the failure of the Confederate army to conduct adequate intelligence. That is, the Confederates did not know exactly what the Union Army's movements were at times when it was crucial to know those strategic events; General Jeb Stuart should have been reporting the massing of the Union army to General Lee, but he did not do that. The Union army also won because Confederate Generals Ewell and Early did not send their soldiers to the high ground. [The novel used for this report is Random House's "large print" so the pages will not necessarily coincide with pages from regular size print; this was the only book available for this report.]

What factors led to the Union victory at Gettysburg?

The way in which the strategy for the battle was developed for the great battle of Gettysburg, and the faulty way in which the intelligence was acquired by the Confederates had a great deal to do with the victory by the Union. Tactical mistakes are always costly in a battle zone, but especially when soldiers are fighting close quarters with small arms, and they don't have the advantage of modern weapons of warfare. One key factor that let to the win by the Union army was the error in reconnaissance by General J.E.B. Stuart, who was in command of the Confederate cavalry.

What were the positive steps and fatal errors, and why did they occur?

The positive steps involved both armies; on the Union side, the generals were able to get help before the main battle began; General Buford was successful in getting more brigades to come to Gettysburg. On the Confederate side, the scout / spy was able to alert General Lee that the Union army was approaching. On page 20, the rebel spy (Reynolds) arrived at the encampment of Longstreet after a long and dangerous ride from the north. Having just arrived through the driving rain and lightning storm the spy breathlessly told Longstreet that perhaps as many as a hundred thousand Union troops were coming. But if this were true, "…there would have been some word," Longstreet's aid Sorrel stated. "We've had no word of Union movement," said Longstreet; and Sorrel, who did not trust spies mentioned that General Stuart's cavalry "…went out a few days back" and he "hasn't reported any movement" (Shaara, 22). Therein lies one of the flaws of the Confederate strategy that helped lead to their defeat; while the Union army was massing for an attack, Stuart (according to Reynolds, the spy) was "Stirring up headlines and fuss" but not doing any "real damage" (Shaara, 22).

When Longstreet's aide Sorrel continued to doubt the spy, the spy emphatically asserted that Buford's cavalry was "thick as fleas"; at that point Longstreet's "temper boiled" because apparently General Jeb Stuart "was joyriding. God damn him," Longstreet was thinking. Longstreet knew that General Robert E. Lee was not a big fan of spies, and that Lee also trusted Stuart, knowing "…wasn't fool enough to let the whole damned Army of the Potomac get this close without word, not one damned lonesome word" (23).

While the spy and Longstreet are about to wake up General Lee, the spy assured Longstreet that the "bluebellies" (Union army) were a "desperate tired lot" and the war was close to being over (24). When told that maybe a hundred thousand Union soldiers might be massing for an attack, Lee immediately doubted the spy's veracity and Lee said "Stuart would not have left us blind" (31). Nevertheless, Lee agreed that his army needed to move, but it was too late to truly be ready or to launch a surprise attack. While on the way to Gettysburg, Lee was still unsure of the actual movement of Union soldiers; a general in charge of a huge army has to know what troop movements are ahead for the enemy. "I cannot imagine what's become of Stuart," Lee spoke "impulsively" (165). He was frustrated by not knowing what was in front of him. "It may be the entire Federal army," Lee remarked (165).

There were fatal strategic errors that led to the Confederate's losses at Gettysburg; for example, though General Ewell had been ordered by General Lee to take the high ground south of Gettysburg (Lee actually asked Ewell's II Corps to take Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill), Ewell had failed to follow those orders -- or was simply not able to take that high ground. Clearly General Lee is fed up with the lack of intelligence; "I know nothing," he is thinking; Lee believed he could depend on the troops but "…can you count on the generals?" (173). On July 1, when all this activity began Lee ordered General Ewell to "take" the Powell Hill. Lee did say in the novel that Ewell should take the hill if it is "practicable" to do so (181). Lee was committed to taking the two "rounded hills" above Gettysburg, but it was not to be.

Ewell's excuse to Lee (as to why he didn't take the hill) was that it wasn't "practical" to do so and that Ewell's forces were "…waiting, ah, for many reasons" (226). Ewell went on to admit that he was perhaps too cautious, too careful (236). And it turned out to be a big mistake that Ewell was too cautious, and failed to follow his orders. It should also be noted that General Lee, an aging, somewhat feeble but very intelligent leader, made a mistake in terms of engaging the Union army out in the open, hoping to overpower the north. The Civil War was a time when long-distance artillery and rifles that shot longer distances than previous weaponry were used; this advantage of the Union army helped defeat Lee's tactics.

The ill-timed strategy that General Pickett followed was another enormous reason that the Confederate army lost the battle of Gettysburg. Pickett had been ordered to advance and take Cemetery Ridge on July 3, 1863, although General Longstreet was uncertain that this was the best strategy. As Pickett raised his sword and hollered that his men should charge this hill for their wives, their girlfriends, and for Virginia, the disaster was about to unfold. It is worthy at this point to quote Shaara (532-33) in describing the vicious attack that Pickett's men were forced to face. "…Millions of metal balls whirring through the air like startled quail, murderous quail… eyes [were] sick with fear…" as a "long blue line of Union boys" were "firing from the right." There was no yell by the rebels during this battle and the rebels were "falling here and there like trees before an invisible ax" (536).

Does it matter that Shaara's novel was fiction based on fact?

It does matter indeed that the book is basically fiction drawn from factual accounts. On the one hand, the novel reads very well and the descriptions that Shaara employs are very effective at creating a tone, a mood, a setting that a reader can relate to. This is not considered a work of history because facts have been used to create a fictional narrative. For young readers especially, and for students of American history, this is an enjoyable novel and it portrays the Civil War in realistic ways. In fact this book of fiction could (and probably has) inspire a young student to delve deeper into the actual battles of the Civil War, and the generals who led those battles.