The Manhattan Project and nuclear weapons development

Manhattan Project

The development of the first atomic bomb represents a reference point in recent American history. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have given rise to numerous controversies as to the development and use of this kind of weapons. Scientists and common citizens alike have wondered about the creation, usage and effect of these bombs on the world at large.

Scientific experiments undertaken in the 1930s generated the conclusion that fission (the procedure resulting in the splitting of the atom) was possible. With this great scientific discovery came the speculation that a bomb could be created as a result of a chain reaction under a particular set of circumstances. In order to understand in what way the Manhattan Project was proof of American exceptionalism, it is important to look at the historical development of this endeavor, especially at the political and diplomatic relations which it entailed.

Frightened at the thought of Nazi Germany developing the first atomic bomb, a group of Jewish scientists who were refugees in the U.S. (led by Albert Einstein) sent a letter to President Roosevelt (1938) asking for support in developing the bomb before Germany. This fear was based on the fact that the Germans had eminent nuclear physicists, control of uranium resources in the former Czechoslovakia as well as of a heavy water plant in Norway.

American research in the field of nuclear physics had been progressing in a rather unsystematic manner. The British were interested in finding out about the American work. To this aim, they did not hesitate in what including atomic information in the exchanges of technical information and scientific missions that were going on in the beginning of the 1940s. This interchange of scientific information was very important; proof of its importance is that face that one of the documents forwarded to the United States was the Thomson Committee Report. This document stated the feasibility of an atomic bomb and led to the British decision to become involved in such a project; also, it represented an important factor that influenced the U.S. follow the same path and become involved. This was followed by an offer issued in October, 1941 by President Roosevelt to Winston Churchill for cooperation in relation to the project. After the agreement, the next step in the evolution of the project was a division of labor.

The U.S. contribution encompassed scientific and engineering assistance, and financial support; the British contributed with high-level scientific aid; and the Canada offered the needed raw materials. Thanks to the division of labor, in June, 1942 Churchill and Roosevelt convened upon moving the project forward to the next step. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. started questioning increasingly the British contribution in the sense that the U.S. suspected that the United Kingdom's interest was of ensuring post-war commercial perks. When the U.S. War Department was presented with the project, it decided to sever the flow of information to their collaborators. This decision was based on the American belief that the British did not need to know about the project since it was not part of their campaign in WWII. A crisis situation quickly sparked because in the British view, the cooperation between the two states was relying on this very exchange of information which had been severed. This dispute was short-lived; it was ended in May 1943 when American President Roosevelt gave Winston Churchill the assurances that this flow would continue between the two sides.

This consensus allowed for the project to continue its development. The next stage was to make Canada a formal partner, which pushed the project into a stage of production. The settlement of any post-war industrial or commercial advantages resulting from the nuclear project was to be handled by the President according to his will, without any exterior intervention. One year later, the Quebec Agreement suffered a very important modification. On September 18, 1944, at Hyde Park, Roosevelt and Churchill initialed an aide-memoir providing for interchange of any postwar industrial or commercial advantages and stating that "Full collaboration... For military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement" (Hewlett and Anderson, 327). When the President's advisers were informed of his intentions, they expressed their disapproval and thought it prejudiced the issue of international control of atomic energy; also that it presented a double risk: the U.S.S.R. could have been antagonized by its implementation and the United Kingdom in case it was not implemented.

Any discussion on the scientific and political aspects of the relation between the U.S. And the United Kingdom in the case of their atomic bomb cooperation during or after the war always revolves around the supply of uranium, one of the major problems both scientists and politicians encountered on this occasion. Canada and Belgium were important actors because they were the main wartime suppliers. Canada's government was closely connecter with the United Kingdom; moreover, the British owned large shareholdings in the uranium mines of Union Minitre. Similarly to the French, both the United Kingdom and the United States had tried to establish contacts with the Union Minitre but their attempts had been unsuccessful. This is why, in June 1942, three years after the U.S./UK joined attempts, the British managed to pass this endeavor on to the Canadian government, which would actually purchase all the uranium mines in Belgium, ensuring the needed supplies of uranium. In February 1944 the U.S. And the United Kingdom contacted Union Minitre without the knowledge of Belgium. Eventually the latter was included and on September 24, 1944, an agreement was signed between the Anglo-American and the Belgian sides.

As far as the actual development of the project, the period 1943-1944 was dedicated to a gun-type fission weapon with plutonium entitled "Thin Man." Once this stage would be achieved, it was thought that the uranium version "Little Boy" would only entail an adaptation of the previous method. Complications arose, and in July 1944 the project had been redirected towards solving the implosion problem. Later it was discovered that it could be fixed with the use of shaped charges with explosive lenses that would produce the "spherical wave needed to compress the plutonium sphere" (Wikipedia). The first nuclear test, named Trinity, took place in New Mexico on July 16, 1945 and was the first explosion of an atomic bomb (Wikipedia).

To a great extent the core of the Anglo-American relation in regard to the Manhattan Project was the question of security. This issue provides a good example of the difficulties that may arise if in the case of a particular policy, the policy-maker does not ensure that explicit instructions are given to the entire executive body. The policy of compartmentalization consisted of telling the members of a compartment only what they need to know to perform their specific task, and represented an old and standard military doctrine. General Groves, among others, was a strong opponent of the unrestricted flow of information to the British, and it was precisely his opposition that decisively contributed to this policy of compartmentalization.

Upon the death of Roosevelt, three months before the Trinity test, Truman followed as President and assumed FDR's responsibilities. Although his knowledge with regard to the bomb were limited, Truman announced his decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan instead of Germany as it had been initially intended, in an attempt to end the war. The bomb of Hiroshima was launched on the morning of August 6, 1945 destroying about 90% of Hiroshima. It was the first atomic bomb ever launched (it was followed by another in Nagasaki, three days later) and a huge success on the part of the United States both in WWII (the bomb actually ended the war) and in the nuclear war they had waged on Germany 6 years earlier.