Mobile Security Research Paper

Excerpt from Research Paper :

Mobile Device Security

Analysis of Routing Optimization Security for Mobile IPv6 Networks

Defining and Implementing Mobility Security Architectures

Approaches to defining, implementing and auditing security for mobility devices have become diverse in approach, spanning from protocol definition and development including IPv6 through the creation of secure mobile grid systems. The wide variation in approaches to defining security for mobility devices has also shown the critical need for algorithms and constraint-based technologies that can use constraint-based logic to isolate and thwart threats to the device and the network it is part of. The intent of this analysis is to evaluate the recent developments in constraint-based modeling and network logic as represented by mobile IPv6 protocols and the role trust management networks (Lin, Varadharajan, 2010). These networks are predicated on algorithms that are used authenticating the identity of specific account holders, in addition to defining a taxonomy of the factors that most closely resemble their continued use of resources on a network

(Wang, Pang, 2003).

In addition to the latest development on the mobile IPv6 protocols there are also developments in the area of security management and trust management integration to the account and resource level, where algorithms are used for defining access and priority rights by each area. Trust-enhanced security models are created by integrating the security management and trust management models together, as will be shown from the recent research completed in this area (Rosado, Fernandez-Medina, Lopez, 2011). A MobileTrust system architecture has been created specifically from the combining of these tow system components, and it is explained in this analysis. The differentiating features of the MobileTrust system architecture are its Trust Management and Trust Enhancement Security Protocols. These two core aspects of the MobileTrust system are used for authentication and interdomain trust of mobility devices, regardless of the operating system they are running. In previous generations of mobility-based security algorithms and especially security platforms there was a high dependency on the specific operating system and constraints of the device at the Application Programmer Interface (API) level (Goode, 2010). Today these limitations have been removed as the common platforms are based at the network and communications layer of the devices, which bypasses the constraints of specific operating systems, in effect residing at the area of the lowest common integration and connectivity points across the vast spectrum of smartphones, tablets and hybrid mobility-based devices (Rosado, Fernandez-Medina, Lopez, 2011). Routing optimization and the creating of trust layers throughout a network hierarchy are becoming increasingly relied on for ensuring device independence and high performance, while also ensuring security of mobile devices across all possible scenarios they could be used. This analysis begins at the protocol level and then progresses to system architectures in use today for ensuring the security and stability of the entire spectrum of mobility devices in use.

Analysis of Routing Optimization Security for Mobile IPv6 Networks

The foundation of routing and optimization security for mobile IPv6 networks is predicated on a series o algorithms specifically designed to identify and re-route security threats back at the attacking IP address in addition to cataloging them in a database for further analysis and tracking. The use of the Mobile IPv6 protocol and algorithms are specifically designed to complete threat classifications while at the same time completing Routing Optimization of traffic between nodes in a mobile-based network, including smartphones, tablets and wireless-enabled hybrid devices. The attacks that the MIPv6 protocol is specifically designed to thwart are those based on spoofed IP addresses and the use of replicated Binding Updates that are typically shared across a network (Ren, Lou, Zeng, Bao, 2006). The second type of threat this protocol is designed to thwart are those that attempt to impersonate a Binding Update, creating a resource drain on an entire mobile network. This approach to hacking through a networkforces servers to force a soft start which provides an opportunity for code to be inserted on UNIX-based servers during start-up or re-initialization (Wang, Pang, 2003).

To overcome the threats inherent in a protocol-based attack on a mobility device and entire network, researchers have created a Hierarchical Certificate based

Binding Update protocol (HCBU) (Rosado, Fernandez-Medina, Lopez, 2011). This is used for defining and integrating the three layers of a trust management framework. Figure 1 shows an example of how researchers completing the MIPv6 protocol have envisioned its used through a series of Internet Service Provider (ISP) integration points across the Home Links on the 3rd Layer to the mobile devices

(Ren, Lou, Zeng, Bao, 2006). Note these layers are all operating system agnostic.

Figure 1:

Three Layer Trust Model for Ensuring Mobility Security Across Device Platforms Source: (Ren, Lou, Zeng, Bao, 2006)

Defining and Implementing Mobility Security Architectures

Contrasting the approaches of MIPv6 protocol development and the corresponding algorithms aimed at thwarting attacks while also creating more effective approaches to managing mobility networks (Allen, 2006), there are also over a dozen approaches to creating layered security designs using architectures that are heavily dependent on trust-based and authentication-based technologies (Komninos, Vergados, Douligeris, 2006). The use of mobility architectures transcends from relative low-end use of Bluetooth (Barber, 2000) to the more sophisticated approaches of using EV-DO-based technology capable of ensuring long-range wireless connections (Goode, 2010). What unites all of these approaches however is the complete integration of trust-based authentication and validation throughout an entire architecture aimed at securing mobility services. Like the protocol-based approaches to defining security, these are also operating-system independent or agnostic, seeking to define abstract, establishment and integration of system of record and taxonomies across mobile operating platforms in both short-range and global deployments through a complex of servers and infrastructure support (Ren, Lou, Zeng, Bao, 2006).

In evaluating these architectures three dominant components or elements of their frameworks emerge. The first is the Trust Abstraction role of components and management modules of the code that governs integration across mobile agents. This layer is also used for modeling the structure of trust relationships across the entire network of mobility devices (Ren, Lou, Zeng, Bao, 2006). This first requirement is also essential for ensuring a scalable, easily customizable mobile network that is operating system, therefore capable of supporting a wide variety of devices, from phones to large-scale tablets. The layered approach to the design of this first layer of architectural models is predicated on having a trust constraint engine that arbitrates across the many inbound requests for access to systems, data stores and files (Komninos, Vergados, Douligeris, 2006). The trust constraint engine also optimized inbound traffic from a registration and taxonomy identification standpoint, ensuring each component or element is easily identified and assigned to each user's role-based access privileges. This greatly streamlines the overall development of the learning aspects of the architectural approach to mobility and security.

The second is Trust Establishment. This level of mobility security architectures is the most complex and intricate, as it seeks to align resources, roles and system interconnections across an entire complex of systems supporting mobile users. This layer of the architecture also ensure trust policy decisions are consistent across all devices and account types, in addition to ensuring optimization of recommendation engine results (Rosado, Fernandez-Medina, Lopez, 2011). Please see Figure 2 for an a graphical representation of how this layer and its functions perform vital trust-based authentication across mobility networks.

The third layer and requirement is the integration of security and trust and security models as shown in Figure 2 via the integration of Trust Management Protocols and Trust Enhancement Security Protocols. This approach to defining trust representation, recommendation and optimization ensures the security and stability fo mobility-based networks regardless of the actual operating system of the device. It also creates a unified platform for Mobile Agent Platforms that integrate directly to Integrity and Auditing,. Security Decision Optimization (via a Constraint Engines) and the integration back to Trust Management. Figure 2…

Sources Used in Document:


Allen, M. (2006). An IT manager's insight into mobile security. The British Journal of Administrative Management,, 22-23.

Barber, R. (2000). Security in a mobile world - is Bluetooth the answer? Computers & Security, 19(4), 321-325.

Goode, A. (2010). Managing mobile security: How are we doing? Network Security, 2010(2), 12-15.

Komninos, N., Vergados, D., & Douligeris, C. (2006). Layered security design for mobile ad hoc networks. Computers & Security, 25(2), 121-130.

Cite This Research Paper:

"Mobile Security" (2012, October 02) Retrieved April 24, 2019, from

"Mobile Security" 02 October 2012. Web.24 April. 2019. <>

"Mobile Security", 02 October 2012, Accessed.24 April. 2019,