Morality in the Magus Probably

Morality in the Magus

Probably the most interesting thing about ethics theories is that they are not only numerous, but also significantly divergent. This appears to suggest that human beings differ in terms of what they consider moral, good, and even true. The value of truth itself is indeed generally more subjective than many would like to admit or even consider. Particularly where political upheaval and violent disagreement are concerned, what is considered "true" by both sides is used as the basis for violence and conflict, whereas moral and ethical decisions use completely contrasting platforms to take effect. In John Fowles's novel, the Magus, while the ethical theories of utilitarianism and ethical subjectivism might be applied in varying degrees to the situations, decisions and actions described by Conchis, the specific outcomes suggest that the most relevant theory is subjectivism.

The basis of ethical subjectivism is the premise that perception, whether individual or collective, dictates moral decisions and actions, and particularly where such decisions and actions concern judgments about human conduct. In other words, these judgments are based upon a fundamentally arbitrary viewpoint that can vary among nations, individuals and time periods. The reason for this is that ethical statements are based upon feelings, beliefs, preferences, and attitudes. All these tend to be subjective to the individuals or collectives that hold these attitudes. It then follows that an ethical theory is constructed on the basis of personal experiences that are generalized to become judgments about the world and how the individual should respond to the world and other human beings. According to this view, an ethical belief is a personal opinion or perception regarding what is true that is expanded to a collective belief regarding generally held truths. These beliefs are not necessarily in fact true. However, they are an accurate representation of an individual's or number of individuals' perception of what the world is and how individuals should live in this world.

When applied to the extract from Fowles's work here, ethical subjectivism can be applied to both Conchis personally and the Nazis collectively.

Where Conchis is concerned, his personal values are temporarily overridden by the Nazi ideal, and specifically by Colonel Wimmel. Indeed, the collective Nazi ideal is so strong that he initially believes that he has no choice in terms of actions that, under normal circumstances, might be questionable. When the colonel, for example, orders Conchis to make a hostage provide information, he does this not out of a sense of personal duty, but rather out of a sense of being trapped within a certain moral paradigm. This is evident in his words: "…I begged the man to give all the information he could. & #8230;I felt passionately that it was my duty to stop any more of this atrocious degradation of human intelligence." (p. 391).

For Conchis, the moral decision-making process did not extend beyond his own horror at the torture he had witnessed. His ethical subjectivism was therefore based upon a reaction towards what had been done to other human beings, and secondly upon the desire to stop it from happening to anyone else. No consideration beyond this, such as saving human lives, was important. It was his very immediate and direct experience of and response to his own environment that drove his decision. This is the basic premise of ethical subjectivism.

As his narrative progresses, Conchis, however, becomes increasingly conscious of his own power of choice, which culminates in his final decision to resist the colonel's orders to bludgeon two hostages to death. Despite the radical change in his specific decision, the basic premise for his moral decision-making process, however does not change. It remains ethical subjectivism. Although he was no longer subject to the horror imposed by the German paradigm, Conchis nonetheless still adheres to a collective sense of ethics, this time in the form of the Greek paradigm (p. 395):

"I felt this immaleability, this refusal to cohere, was essentially Greek. That is, I finally assumed my Greekness… I saw that I was the only person left in that square who had the freedom left to choose…"

The very importance that Conchis attaches to this type of morality and freedom of choice, even to the detriment of his own life, is in itself subjective and reactionary. After being forced to witness the full horror of what the German morality was capable of, Conchis found himself driven to ultimately resist it, regardless of its consequences. It is a type of ethics that refuses to accept as true anything beyond its own reason and paradigms. This is also true of the decision-making process at the basis of Colonel Wimmel's moral actions, questionable though they may be.

Colonel Wimmel subscribes to the collective ethical subjectivism of the Nazi German paradigm. This is summed up in the Conchis's criticism (p. 393):

"One of the great fallacies of our time is that the Nazis rose to power because they imposed order on chaos. Precisely the opposite is true -- they were successful because they imposed chaos on order. They tore up the commandments, they denied the superego…"

The Nazi belief in their cause was based upon a collective belief in the reality of their order. Indeed, Wimmel himself claims the reasons for his atrocious actions as being based upon his nature as a "realist" (p. 388). Later he notes that nothing is more important to him than the order he perceives as the highest purpose of his existence and his actions. This, along with the clear fallacy of the belief, is a typically subjectivist belief system.

It is the extremity and strength of this belief that temporarily drove Conchis to the belief that he had not choice. When collective subjectivism imposes itself upon the individual, the individual morality can be influenced to such an extent that it changes the individual's own moral system, whether this is subjectivist or not. When Conchis reverts to his "Greekness," he simply exchanges one subjectivist morality for another.