National Fire Protection Agency Codes

Lessons Learned for Nightclub Fires In some ways the historical events that accompanied "The Station" fire were precedent setting. In other ways, however, these historical events were sadly a little too familiar. A perfect example of this sort of dichotomy is found in the trigger to this fire. According to a report compiled by Robert Duvall (2006) regarding this particular fire and nightclub fires in general, the conflagration at The Station "resulted from a form of ignition not often seen when comparing other fires in assembly occupancies: pyrotechnics" (p. 22).

In this regard, the fire at The Station was unique when compared to the other fires detailed for their historical events in Duvall's document. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has very specific standards and requirements for the utilization of pyrotechnics in "Existing Assembly Occupancies" (Duval, 2006, p. 22). Interestingly enough, even a cursory examination of those standards introduces the aspect of The Station's historical events that was preceded by some of the other major fires discussed in this document.

Specifically, some of those conflagrations were suspected to have initiated due to the usage of open flame. The propinquity of open flame devices and their manifestations, and those pertaining to pyrotechnics, is underscored by NFPA's descriptions of regulation about both of these potential fire starters in that they are discussed under the same heading and chapter number as "Open Flame Devices and Pyrotechnics" in NFPA's document entitled Life Safety Code (Duvall, 2006, p. 22). The Cocoanut Grove fire was believed to have originated due to the presence of open flame.

Additionally, there were a plethora of combustible materials present in the interior of The Station fire which definitely pertains to historical events related to this fire. The presence of such materials was a point of commonality between the fire at The Station, and those at The Rhythm Club, Cocoanut Grove, and the Beverly Hills Supper Club (Duvall, date, p. 18).

What was different about the fire at The Station (and at each of the other previously mentioned historic fires" was the type of combustible materials in the interior that contributed to its magnitude. Those materials involved soundproof foam insulating materials, which directly attributed to the rapid spread of this particular fire. Another historic aspect of the conflagration at The Station is the fact that it revealed difficulty in egress.

Unfortunately, such a difficulty of patrons to exit in a timely, safe manner is another point of commonality that the fire at The Station shares with the other fires mentioned in this paper. It is worth noting that with an entire nightclub destroyed, and approximately 100 deaths and 200 people injured, The Station and its burning is ranked by NFPA as "the fourth deadliest nightclub fire in U.S.

history." The events that took place at The Station would go on to play a profound role in contemporary fire culture and public community cultures, simply because they resulted in situations in which the standards for minimizing the damage of a fire became stricter (especially in public venues such as nightclubs). In the wake of the fire at The Station NFPA made a number of changes to its requirements for such venues.

These included the fact that the main entrance of such a location must now be able to accommodate at least two thirds of its capacity. Prior to the travesty at The Station, such exits were supposed to only account for half of the total occupancy. Additional changes pertaining to egress include the fact that now, "Other exits must accommodate not less than one-half the total occupant load…the total egress capacity must accommodate 117% of the total occupant load" (Duvall, 2006, p. 1).

Other restrictions pertain to the mandatory inclusion of sprinklers in venues hosting more than 100 people, exit inspections prior to night clubs getting approved to open for business, and circumscriptions on seating in festivals. NFPA implemented many changes in the wake of this particular fire, which made fire code safety much more strict and prevalent in the operation of night clubs.

The impact that this particular fire -- as well as another incident that is discussed in Duvall's document, an overcrowding situation that took place in Chicago 4 days prior to The Station fire (Duvall, 2006, p. 16) -- had on public community cultures was considerable. In fact, one could even argue that the events that Duvall details in this document helped to significantly contribute to society's perception of risk.

All of these statements are corroborated by the myriad changes that took place to the operation of public facilities and their relation to damage from fire. Perhaps the most tangible indication of this fact is found in the response of the state of Rhode Island, which is no surprise because the station conflagration occurred in this state. That response was multifaceted, and is linked to the response of another North Eastern neighbor state, Massachusetts.

Perhaps the main thing that the state did which indicated that fires were important issues for those in the public service and for society as a whole was to grant an interim adoption of new codes implemented by NFSA. Typically the changing and ratifying of such codes is exceedingly time consuming and can even involve a good deal of bureaucracy.

The effects of The Station fire, however, were able to expedite this process largely because of a meeting that took place between public officials of the state, representatives from NFSA (which were on hand to review various aspects of the fire) and some damaged survivors from the fire itself (Duvall, 2006, p. 25). It is interesting to note the efficacy of this meeting and its effect on both the public and society at large.

Whereas the unfortunate circumstances of The Station fire took place in March, the aforementioned meeting was held relatively early that summer. Midway through the summer, the interim codes for the NFSA -- which would become permanent later on in 2006 -- were put in place.

It was quite clear that public officials in Rhode Island, fueled by the sentiment of the general society at large in the wake of one of the most deadly fires the state had suffered in recent times, were sincere about making an effort to ensure that such circumstances would not happen again.

Perhaps even more significant is the fact that of the numerous NFPA recommendations that emerged in the collaborative efforts between these representatives and those of the city, the vast majority of them were signed into state law early in July. The result was that, "NFPA 1, Uniform Fire Code, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (2003 editions) became the basis for the Rhode Island Fire Code… Now all buildings, new and existing, have to meet the provisions of the current state fire code" (Duvall, 2006, p. 31).

Society's perception of the risk of fires, then was made quite clear simply due to the changes that were made. Firstly, there was a significant amount of changes to the state's fire code that was created in the aftermath of The Station fire. Secondly, they took place at a very expedient rate that revealed the earnestness of public official who were attempting to mitigate the possibility of similar conflagrations ever happening again. It is clear that public officials and contemporary society are viewing fires in night clubs or large.