Natural Right and History Leo Strauss

Strauss and Nature

Strauss is contending that the "self-evident" natural rights of man are no more apparent because of a creeping relativism in thought and an increasing dependence on legalism. Thus, "the legislators and the courts" decide what is "right" and what is not. In a sense, the lament of Strauss for the loss of common sense, especially regarding what is naturally good and lawful is appreciable. It is just. On the other hand, it could be argued that the "natural right" that Jefferson believed in was not as "self-evident" as imagined but rather more imaginary than "self-evident." Strauss asserts that this line of argumentation is the result of the subjectivist attitude and perspective of modern philosophy. While subjectivism is a deadly form of philosophy and kills all sense of truth, as Plato shows in Euthyphro, it is the natural consequence of what Strauss identifies in his last sentence of this passage: "If there is no standard higher than the ideal of our society, we are utterly unable to take a critical distance from that ideal." In other words, if there is no objective standard by which we can judge (i.e., an objective truth), we are doomed.

Strauss is arguing here for that objective standard, for the fact that truth can be self-evident, that something which is natural and right can be comprehended and can be unchanging from one generation to the next, for, as the ancients taught, truth is unchanging. It may be said that he is arguing for universalism or for the one, the good, the true, and the beautiful -- the transcendentals identified by Plato. What he is arguing against is the subjectivist viewpoint that morality and principles are simply that which a society agrees upon as being good. This viewpoint is inherently false and dangerous, because it suggests that if a society agreed that cannibalism was good, then cannibalism would be good. Rather, Strauss suggests, that individuals may choose to think cannibalism good and many in a society may act as though it were a good -- but they would be wrong, every last one of them, because in reality there is a higher standard to which men must submit their hearts and minds and wills. This is the essence of religion and philosophy, but modern philosophy is rooted more in an obfuscation of truth or in a reshaping of truth according to one's own perspective rather than in a desire to know or to understand the truth, as Socrates possessed. In this sense, Strauss is less a modern and more a classicalist.

The subject he addresses also raises the question of innate ideas. If something that is "self-evident" such as a natural right is unchanging and manifest to all who use their reason in order to discern an objective law in nature concerning mankind and society, the question becomes, how is it self-evident? Are we born with this information written on our souls, or is it something that we grow to understand? If the former, then there are likely ramifications regarding theology and philosophy. If the latter, then the subjectivists may have a point.

The limits of human perception and cognition are those of human reason. This question was posed by medieval scholastics like Aquinas, who asserted that human reason alone could not comprehend all the mysteries of the world but could only approach them and deepen the understanding of them. In a way, they are like the skeptics of today, except skeptics question the extent to which we can know anything at all. Ultimately the medievalists argued that certain things would remain mysteries, but they did not deny the value and/or use of human reason.

It could also be argued that the medievalists had the correct valuation of human reason. The intellect is capable of discerning reality, but there are some things that cannot be discerned. The five senses can work in conjunction with the intellect to perceive reality and truth, but they are not able to discern all things. This then raises the issue of revelation and reason and the relationship. If some things can be known, that is are self-evident, and other things that man knows (but only by way of divine revelation), the issue becomes more complex. What if something that is revealed is not self-evident and in fact contradicts the "natural rights" that Jefferson speaks of? Jefferson was by no means an orthodox Jew or Christian, but rather was shaped by enlightenment philosophy. What then should be made of his perception of self-evident notions? Oughtn't his outlook be considered before one accepts his own assertions as self-evident and true? What does all of this say of consciousness?

Where is consciousness headed depends upon what answers are provided to these two discussions. If consciousness as a part of human life is part of an evolutionary process, it might be argued that consciousness is headed towards some kind of final evolutionary change. If consciousness is part of human life as created by a deity then it might be argued that consciousness is inevitably religious and therefore headed back towards God. This latter viewpoint appears to be the viewpoint of Socrates in Plato's Dialogues. It is shared by the great philosophers of the medieval world. It is only in the modern world that the concept of God becomes dubious. Moderns tend to be skeptical of anything that reason cannot fully comprehend, which is perhaps a holdover from the age of Rationalism, or Enlightenment.

In one sense the question of Innatism is a question of objective vs. subjective reality. It proposes an examination of the connection between men's minds and the outside world that informs them. Implicit in the discussion is the question of the existence of God -- for if mankind is born with the ability to intuit truth, or to confirm the identity between his intellect and reality, then he could perhaps arrive at conclusions concerning the moral law, the moral order, and his spiritual nature. If, on the other, no innate ideas actually existed, and man was compelled to learn everything a posteriori -- after the fact -- as though he were a blank slate at birth, and could experience the world only through his own subjective perceptions -- then his confirmations about truth were only indicative of his own subjective experience. Subjectivity thus battled with objectivity, and a priori arguments battled with a posteriori arguments.

Freud discusses innate ideas in this context when suggesting that severe upbringing will have an unconscious affect on a child: "What it amounts to is that in the formation of the superego and the emergence of a conscience innate constitutional factor and influences from the real environment act in combination" (131). Freud asserts that our minds are shaped by what goes on around us and though we may not be born with certain innateness, it can develop over time or be planted in us by parents, etc. Thus, how we know things or what we think we know can be molded by lived experience. But is this not a subjective rendering of epistemology? And are we not concerned with objective truth rather than with the subjective experience of it? It is important to distinguish between the two, and that is what Strauss appears to suggest at the beginning of Natural Right and History.

Strauss stresses this idea again later when he states that "the idea of natural right must be unknown as long as the idea of nature is unknown," (81) and this claim certainly appears logical. If rights come from nature, then a comprehension of the order of nature must be had before any objective claim regarding rights can be made. Jefferson likely had such comprehension, but in the technological age, the Age of Industrialization, generations have been divorced from nature, and nature's order has been lost on those same generations. It is a separation from what is naturally ordered that has had a lot to do with the subjectivization that Strauss laments. Strauss pits knowing nature inside the arena of knowing philosophy, arguing that the Old Testament does not know nature. This claim could be disputed, because it appears that often in the Old Testament, an understanding of human and earthly nature is inherent, implicit. Because the Book is billed as Revelation, however, it is easy to claim that it has no philosophy, but this is not the case and any Old Testament scholar would argue this point.

Nonetheless, Strauss does appear to have a logical reason for appealing to philosophy in order to understand what is nature. Hannah Arendt does the same in The Human Condition, though she does so in her own subjectivist way, defining man and what it is to live according to her own terms rather than submitting to the terms used by the ancients and applying them to today. Arendt describes the three fundamental human activities of vita active as labor, work, and action, giving a definition of each and showing how it applies to the human condition (6). It is an attempt at classification, a novel one, but one that does not afford the reader any deeper understanding of his own being. Arendt attempts to see difference and discord where there is none; for example, in her description of the differences in the ways that Jesus and Paul approach the teaching on men and women she seems to suggest that the two taught different, contradictory doctrines -- but what it shows is a lack of critical thinking on her part, and a lack of objective understanding. She is too willing to push her own subjective perspective rather than accept as objective the teachings and then see how they are actually reconciled with one another. She approaches it without acceptance and therefore misses the opportunity to understand. This same approach is what impairs individuals from understanding their natural rights. They either do not accept that such a term has significance or they accept a different doctrine prior, one that is alien to natural rights and proceeds from their own teachers in school.

Michael Foucault also appeals to nature for an understanding of humanity. He cites several authors who show how nature informs the human consciousness and shapes one's art and politics and sociality. For example, he quotes Marat, saying that "penalties no longer proceed from the will of the legislator, but from the nature of things," (105) and Guibert when he states that "if we studied the intention of nature and the construction of the human body, we would find the position and the bearing that nature clearly prescribes for the soldier," (155) and again still Beccaria when he states that "it is not only in the fine arts that one must follow nature faithfully; political institutions, at least those that display wisdom and permanence, are founded on nature" (106). What Foucault illustrates by citing all of these authors and thinkers is that nature is of fundamental importance in the erection and stabilization of society. Just as Strauss indicates, what is right and just cannot be known unless one first understands nature -- and not in a subjective way, because it is subjectivity that focuses on differences and self, but rather in an objective way because it is objectivity that focuses on the other and the actual. When concerning "rights," the question is not simply of self but of society and so consideration of the other is necessarily implied -- and therefore one must take an objective consideration of nature and set aside the subjective experiences that appear to inform the perspectives of Arendt and Freud. As Foucault and Strauss imply, it is subjectivity that limits one's growth, because it dwells too much on what one has been shaped by rather than on what one must conform to in order to climb. It is much like the tomato plant, which needs a stake to wrap itself around so as to reach the sun. A mind with only itself is lost -- but if it clings to something outside itself that leads it upward, it can arrive at the truths intended for it. This is what Strauss and Foucault mean by nature.

To explain it in another way, subjectivity is passive while objectivity is active. Subjectivity is emphasis on self, while objectivity is emphasis on other. The former is encountered by being acted up while the latter is encountered through action. Or, to use a classical classification, objectivity is masculine, and subjectivity feminine. These terms are not meant to denigrate but merely to illustrate a difference of species and role. Subjectivity has its place, which can be discussed at more considerable length at another time, but essentially its place is related to the concept of the other in the sense that it supplies a helpful hand of appreciation, of understanding, sympathizing, empathizing, etc. It acts as a handmaid to objectivity, by reminding it to not be so harsh, so severe. It tempers and calms, in a sense. The two are related, indeed, in the same way that Paul speaks of men and women being related, the one being for the other, and yet both being for each other. This way of looking at it is important in structuring one's approach to natural rights and sensing the importance of nature and truth. It is also the one that is implicit in Reinhold Niebuhr's assessment of human nature.

Niebuhr asserts that "human nature is not wanting in certain endowments for the solution of the problem of human society" (2). In other words, humans have the capacity, due to their own nature as rational beings (read objective) to understand themselves, their needs, their weaknesses, and what they need to do in order to establish harmony in society. Niebuhr proceeds by explaining that "man is endowed by nature with organic relations to his fellow-men," (2) meaning that man is indeed a social creature. He is made for the other, Niebuhr argues, by nature. Where nature comes from is another question with theological or biological ramifications, depending on which philosopher you choose to follow -- but as far as nature indicating man's essence, Niebuhr is speaking logically and objectively. He states that "natural impulse prompts him to consider the needs of others even when they compete with his own" (2). This line is essential because it suggests that man is capable of actually being selfless. The fact that one can be selfless suggests that one can be wholly objective, which indicates that one can know nature, law, and truth by using one's reason. It also suggests that one can gauge adequately of revelation, of theology and religion to see where reason is used and where reason is abused.

Yet, as Niebuhr acknowledges later, the assertion of Self exists alongside the desire to act selflessly, and so he appeals to Aristotle for the "first authoritative word" on that matter (260). He states of Aristotle's theory, that reason "establishes control over all the impulses, egoistic and altruistic, and justifies them both if excesses are avoided, and the golden mean is observed" (260). The appeal to moderation and the golden mean is unavoidable but also relevant: it is a higher standard -- the standard that Strauss yearns for at the beginning of Natural Right and History. It is this standard that allows man to temper his two competing selves, subjective and objective, or selfless and selfish. It is this standard that allows him to climb upward to the truth about himself and about nature which he needs to organize society and become better in and of himself. Niebuhr's assessment of the role of nature in man's maturation process, so to speak, is helpful in understanding Strauss' own position regarding natural right. It allows one to seek the answer to one's self outside of one's self, rather than becoming lost in one's own subjective experience of self, as Arendt and Freud sometimes do. There is a need to base self on other and to find meaning in other, for it is other, and a higher other (or standard or golden mean) that gives man the truth about himself.