Naval Operations in the Twentieth Century

Admiral's Advantage -- U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War The Admirals Advantage The Admirals Advantage is a book that is based on an Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) 'Lessons Learnt' symposium that was held in 1998 at the National Maritime Intelligence Centre. It also borrows from studies conducted by the reserve units of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) that were conducted in the period between 1994 and 2004. The book is written by Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, who received assistance from Randy Balano.

Christopher Ford served as the Republican Chief Counsel to the U.S. committee on appropriations and among other previous roles; he had served as U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's general counsel[footnoteRef:1]. He is also a graduate from Yale and Harvard. At the time the book was being written, David Rosenberg worked in the Institute for Defense Analyses as a professional staff member in the Intelligence Analyses Division, and he also graduated from the University of Chicago with an a PHD in History[footnoteRef:2].

Rosen received immense recognition for receiving a five-year MacArthur fellowship for his Cold War nuclear strategy studies, as no other military historian had received such an award before[footnoteRef:3]. [1: Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, The Admirals Advantage: U.S.

Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014),811] [2: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 813] [3: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 813] Being naval intelligence officers, reservists, and academics, the authors were well suited to provide insight to naval operations as they provided an insider's point-of-view and they were also objective as outsiders, which enabled them to narrate the events that took place clearly and in a way that outsiders could understand[footnoteRef:4].

This book is more of a report than a narrative as it presents the structures of the organization and the naval operations in chronological order. However, due to the classified nature of the material used in the book, and the involvement of top ranking directors of the naval intelligence, which warranted a certain level of seriousness, readers with no background on this field may not get entertained easily and they may have to rely heavily on the acronym and the abbreviation section of the book.

[4: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 13] The authors begin by defining OPINTEL as "the art of providing near real time information concerning the location, activity, and likely intentions of potential adversaries"[footnoteRef:5]. The overall theme then centers on the major role played by the right kind of analyst or consumer relations in the successful use of intelligence, as it highlights the nexus between the operations of the naval team, intelligence, and technology.

The book explores the important element of naval OPINTEL in relation to the Soviet Union and touches on the relationship between U.S. naval commanders and naval intelligence officers whose roles and responsibilities conflicted[footnoteRef:6]. This leads into the book's main argument that the infiltration of naval intelligence professionals in the workings of the U.S. navy and its community was responsible for improving the relationship between the intelligence analysts and the naval commanders. It also reinforces John Boyd's, a U.S.

Air Force Colonel, idea of the "observe-orient-decide and act (OODA) cycle of command as it capitalizes on both accuracy and the use of timely information[footnoteRef:7]. The authors argue that the efficient use of the OODA cycle gives any team an advantage over the opponent since they are able to assess their environment faster and take the required action.

[5: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 52] [6: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 88] [7: Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, 584] The key ideas of the book include: OPINTEL as an important aspect of John Boyd's OODA cycle, the importance of knowledge of the whereabouts, intentions, and capabilities of friends and foes by intelligence analysts, relationships between the commanders intelligence analysts, the incorporation of dynamic information and intelligence in decision making, and the level of trust between operational institutions and individuals.

One of the most memorable quotes on which the foundation of the book is based is that of Sun Tzu who stated that "one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements"[footnoteRef:8]. This emphasizes the importance of intelligence analysts and naval commanders getting to know all the people they get involved with, which will make it easier for them to anticipate what they plan to do next.

In summary, the authors clearly articulate the evolution of operational intelligence, which provides valuable information for readers who are interested in Cold War conflict and the organization of navy operational intelligence. [8: Ford and Rosenberg,.