Why New Orleans Should Not Be Rebuilt

¶ … New Orleans Should Not Be Rebuilt

Throughout history, humans have learned the hard way that living in some parts of the world is risky because of any number of factors, such as living near an active volcano such as Pompeii or earthquake- or flood-prone regions such as along the Yangtze where millions of lives have been lost over the centuries. In some cases, the geographic attributes of such regions are so compelling that people have ignored these dangers and rebuilt their cities time and again, only to have them ravaged by the destructive forces of nature. In other cases, though, the decision was made to simply abandon the affected area in favor of more hospitable living areas where Mother Nature was more amenable to human occupation and the chances of yet another disaster were far less. Today, the City of New Orleans is faced with this same type of decision as local, regional, and federal officials seek to identify ways to avoid a recurrence of the high-profile Hurricane Katrina and its heart-wrenching aftermath, but this hurricane is only one of the latest in a long series of weather-related events that have destroyed New Orleans over and over. This paper reviews the relevant literature to show that the decision should be made to abandon the existing city environs in favor of a more suitable location further inland at the earliest opportunity. A summary of the research and important findings in support of this thesis are presented in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Founded in 1718 by Jean Baptiste le Mayne and named for a regent of France (New Orleans history 2011), New Orleans has a long history of battling the elements for its survival. Indeed, this history has been fraught with the same types of disastrous events, with only the extent of the devastation and the dates being different from the most recent events such as Hurricane Katrina. In this regard, Colton (2005) provides a useful description of the devastation caused by one such weather-related event on the citizens of New Orleans: "The high water destroyed several bridges, interrupted business throughout the city, contributed to health problems, disrupted the lives of thousands, and caused extensive property damage throughout the city" (Colten 2005, 28).

Although this quotation appears to accurately describe the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in eerie ways (and it does), in reality, it is actually a description of the Sauve Crevasse disaster that occurred in 1849 (Johnson 2006). In fact, following the onslaught of a hurricane just a year after the establishment of the city, the construction of a massive system of earthen levees began in 1723 and, judging them inadequate, they were further reinforced by engineers in 1724 to protect the city which was already noted for the frequency of hurricanes (Clark 1970, 4). Described by Johnson as "one of many environmental events in the history of New Orleans that have either blown away or waterlogged part of the city," the Sauve Crevasse was the handwriting on the wall for all to see, but the warning signs were ignored to the peril of the citizens of New Orleans. As Colten puts it, "On 3 May 1849, a weakened portion of the levee on the Sauve Plantation 17 miles above New Orleans was breached, creating a 30-foot-wide gap. Water poured southward into the city, approaching the French Quarter by 17 May. The devastation was massive" (2005, 26-27).

If this was an isolated event, the Sauve Crevasse disaster could be written off as an anomalous event, but the historical record shows that this disaster was just the beginning of a long list of similar events that would destroy or cause massive destruction to the City of New Orleans over the years. In fact, hurricanes have ravaged the New Orleans area time and again over the years (Ludlum 1963, 55). In this regard, McCarragher (2011) reports that, "Louisiana was hit by 49 of the 273 hurricanes that made landfall on the American Atlantic Coast between 1851 and 2004. On average, one major storm crosses within 100 nautical miles of New Orleans every decade" (1).

The devastation that is caused by these weather-related events is due in large part to the siting of the city in the first place. For example, according to Dunlap, Johnson and Morse, "Starting in the 19th century, but especially in the 20th century, most neighborhoods of New Orleans were built below sea level in what were marshes (or bayous)" (981). The inevitable outcome of these misguided building patterns should have been apparent, but the historical record shows that the people of New Orleans are either unwilling or unable to admit defeat to the elements. For example, Johnson (2006b) emphasizes that the above-described Sauve Crevasse "incident is one of many that have periodically left water in streets and homes. For people living in New Orleans these events serve as historical benchmarks: 'Where were you during Hurricane Betsy? The flood of April 1983? The flood of May 1995?'" (139). Likewise, McCarragher suggests that, "New Orleans history offers its own perspective, including the four most destructive storms of the twentieth century: the Hurricane of 1947, Betsy, Camille, and Georges" (3). In fact, these hurricanes also exacted an enormous toll on New Orleans and its people, but they did not receive the same high-profile media coverage as Hurricane Katrina and have therefore been largely forgotten by the rest of Americans despite their severe impact (McCarragher 3). In this regard, McCarragher concludes that, "The people affected never forgot Camille, but the nation as a whole allowed the memory of the destruction, the importance of efficient preparation, and the cohesive recovery methods fade into the background" (4).

Admittedly, many places around the world experience harsh weather-related events that cause enormous human suffering, and it is reasonable to suggest that virtually every human habitat has experienced its fair share of such highly destructive events over the millennia. There are some spectacular success stories as well such as the large amounts of land reclaimed from the Zuiderzee in The Netherlands. Nevertheless, in some cases it just makes good business sense to cut the losses and move on rather than continuing to rebuild an increasingly expensive infrastructure that is doomed from the outset for a number of reasons, including the region's propensity to flooding because of its low elevation that is actually below sea level in many parts of the city. According to Johnson (2006b), "In the early days, New Orleans was principally concerned with flooding from the Mississippi River. Levees were constructed to hold back the water, but they could not be built strongly and extensively enough to contain all of the water all of the time, with the result that the city continued to experience periodic flood events" (140). Unlike the diligent Dutch, though, many of the citizens of New Orleans have earned a reputation for a devil-may-care attitude concerning the environmental threats that are arrayed against them that may at least be partially deserved and which may account for history repeating itself time and again. In this regard, Johnson emphasizes that, "New Orleanians historically have worried about their environmental circumstances, but not too much. In the city that 'care forgot' and in which 'let the good times roll' is an unofficial motto, it is easy to slip into a state of complacency about environmental hazards" (2006b, 140).

Such complacency, though, is clearly unwarranted even in a city where jazz, good food and good times are watchwords. After all, much of New Orleans remains highly vulnerable to devastation simply because of its lack of elevation. Notwithstanding the city's colorful history and the important part it has played in American history, the City of New Orleans is a veritable sitting duck waiting to be shot in the head once again by Mother Nature. For instance, Johnson (2006a) reports that, "New Orleans has every reason to fear the Big One. Much of the city lies below sea level and is surrounded by hurricane-protection levees" (326). In fact, with the highest points in the city being around just 15 feet above sea level, cemeteries in New Orleans are replete with above-ground mausoleums because of the low terrain, and the only terrain within the city itself that is actually above sea level are the levees alongside the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain that have been used to reclaim land and keep the ocean at bay over the years (Johnson 2006b, 326). The combination of factors creates an untenable situation for the City of New Orleans today. As Colten and Welch point out, "Very few places face the risk of experiencing the chaos and damage of a hurricane as much as New Orleans" (2003, 1).

Although hurricanes are a perennial threat for several months of the year, New Orleans is also confronted with constant weather-related threats. For example, Johnson notes that the city receives as much as 60 inches of rainfall a year and an elaborate -- and expensive -- system of pumps and canals are used to control water flow but these systems, at 30 billion gallons a day, are already near capacity levels and devastating events such as hurricanes can quickly overcome the ability of these flood-control systems (Johnson 2006b). Indeed, Johnson goes so far as to point out that, "The list of nature's insults to New Orleans is long enough to call into question why the city was ever built to begin with. The problem is terrain -- specifically, low elevation -- which gives nature an edge in any contest for control" (326).

The question of why New Orleans was built in such a hazard-prone site in the first place, though, is also apparent. Judging other local cities at the time as being inappropriate for a port city (Clark 4), the city was situated in a strategic location that created a complicated cost-benefit analysis that has historically weighted the benefits of its geographic location over the hazards involved. In this regard, Johnson concludes that, "Situation trumped site, that location at the mouth of one of the world's great rivers produced commercial advantages that outweighed the hardships of the environmentally precarious setting" (2006a, 326).

Irrespective of the environmental forces arrayed against it, some authorities suggest that the other problems confronting the City of New Orleans are equally threatening to the city's long-term survival. For example, Dunlap and his colleagues emphasize that, "While the New Orleans tourist industry, centered around the French Quarter, Superdome, and the Mardi Gras Festival, were well-known and appreciated by many Americans, outside this area and other middle class neighborhoods much of New Orleans verged on being a social disaster before Hurricane Katrina" (981). In support of this assertion, Dunlap et al. point out that even prior to the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans suffered from racial segregation and extreme levels of poverty, the majority of governmental agencies were operating marginally, the criminal justice system was completely overburdened and the city's school system had been placed in receivership. In fact, Waldman (2007) characterizes the pre-Katrina school system in New Orleans as being among the worst in the nation and notes, "Three months after Katrina, the state legislature deemed 107 of the 128 city-run public schools 'failing' and seized control of them for five years" (89). Likewise, Dolfman and his associates report that, "Job and population losses in New Orleans, identified during the 1990s, continued into the 21st century. By 2004, the New Orleans economy had lost more than 16,000 jobs (6.2%) since 2000. The city's population declined by an additional 23,000 residents, or 4.7%, during the same period (4).

Unfortunately, the immediate and long-term impacts of Hurricane Katrina would further exacerbate these downward trends. In this regard, Clayton and Spetzer (2006) report that following Hurricane Katrina, the closely-knit social fabric of the city was completely disrupted: "Statistics from the Census Bureau show that the population in Orleans Parish dropped from 437,186 on July 1, 2005 to 158,305 on January 1, 2006, and the population of the seven parishes that make up the New Orleans metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dropped by 29%, from 1,292,774 to 914,745, over the same timeframe" (12). With more than half of the remaining half million residents of New Orleans living in flood-prone areas of the city and with many of these residents lacking the resources to relocate following Hurricane Katrina, the city's infrastructure was further overwhelmed (Dunlap et al. 982).

Although funds had been sought from the U.S. Congress time and again to reinforce the levees that were protecting New Orleans, no such assistance was forthcoming and New Orleans was left to face the full impact of Hurricane Katrina on its own -- and the impact was profound (Dunlap et al. 982). For instance, according to Frazier-Anderson (2008), "Hurricane Katrina accounted for approximately 1,100 [later estimates place the number at around 1,200] fatalities in New Orleans and temporarily displaced the overwhelming majority of its residents to numerous cities across the United States. Flooding completely obliterated lower level areas, making certain neighborhoods uninhabitable due to the large amounts of debris and dangerous environmental and public health hazards" (410).

With more than 80% of the city flooded as a result of Hurricane Katrina, the City of New Orleans continues to rebuild in the same flood-prone areas that have historically been most affected by these storm waters, with much of the cost being borne by American taxpayers. In this regard, Dolfman, Wasser and Bergman (2007) report that the damages from Hurricane Katrina were estimated at more than $200 billion, which places Hurricane Katrina among the most expensive hurricanes to ever to strike the United States. In response to the high-profile events that followed, the U.S. Congress authorized emergency response and recovery assistance amounting to $62.3 billion. To paraphrase Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, "A billion here and a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking real money." How long will the city leaders and people of the United States continue to ignore the harsh realities that confront New Orleans today and in the future? How many more lives will need to be lost and how many more families will need to be displaced? As Behar (2006) points out, "New Orleans needs more protection than levees alone can offer. But in Louisiana, a comprehensive flood-control program had been repeatedly rebuffed -- by environmentalists who fretted over the effects on ecosystems, by fishermen who feared for their livelihood, by engineers dead-locked over competing proposals, and by administrators who dismissed the plans as too expensive" (56). While the threat from new hurricanes and other weather-related remains constant, there are other forces at work that are placing New Orleans at even greater risk of such events in the future. In this regard, Behar adds that, "Vast swamps protect New Orleans from the open ocean, but they are shrinking at the rate of an acre every 30 minutes. Since 1930, more than 1,500 square miles have vanished. By 2050, a third of the inland shorelines currently sheltered by wetlands will be exposed to open ocean" (57).

Some of the alternative solutions that have been advanced to protect New Orleans in the future from such weather-related events include the following:

1. Eliminate the canals and replace them with underground concrete sluiceways, called boxed culverts, to form a giant plumbing system that would carry floodwaters out of the city. Buried under a few feet of ground cover, the culverts would be at least 10 feet tall and 20 feet wide.