North Korea Nuclear Related Case Study

NUCLEAR-RELATED CASE STUDY 5

Nuclear-Related Case Study: North Korea

Background

Korea’s nuclear development and the subsequent nuclear weapons possession could be traced back to the mid-50s (Pardo, 2019). A few years later, as Pardo (2019) further indicates, “at the 4th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea held in September 1961, Kim Il Sung urged the government to pursue research and development for the peaceful use of nuclear power” (187). The utilization of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was restated and pursued, i.e. via the establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Institute, and nuclear research and development efforts scaled up over the next two decades. It was not until the mid-90s that the development of nuclear weapons became fully embraced as a defense approach under the guidance of Kim Jong-II (Pardo, 2019). This, as the author further points out, was followed by enhanced nuclear weapon development efforts – with the establishment of the Military Industrial Department (which was formerly the Workers’ Party of Korea machinery division).

Over time, the U.S. and its partners have attempted to negotiate with North Korea so as to convince the country to halt its missile and nuclear development program. It is important to note that although there have been indications of progress in denuclearization efforts at various moments, no tangible results have been realized on this front. According to Gray and Lee (2021), some of the strategies that have been pursued towards this end are inclusive of, but they are not limited to; “military cooperation with U.S. allies in the region, wide-ranging sanctions, and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls... diplomatic initiatives to have North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons efforts in return for aid” (197). The country continues to wave the nuclear weapons card in what could be translated as not only efforts to advance its interests on the regional and international fronts, but also maintain its leader’s grip on power on the domestic front. It should also be noted that a law recently adopted by Korea People’s Assembly further expands the scenarios under which the country would deploy its nuclear weapons (Congressional Research Service – CRS, 2023). More specifically, the said law permits a ‘first use’ course of action if in its estimate, the survival of the regime is threatened (CSR, 2023). At present, it is estimated – by various experts - that the isolated country’s nuclear arsenal stands at approximately 40-50 warheads (Herskovitz, 2022).

Cognitive Biases

a) Locking on One Alternative

There are a number of cognitive biases that impact (or have in the past had an impact) on the relationship between the various stakeholders in this case – with the key actors being the North Korean regime and the United States. To begin with, North Korea has for a long time claimed that its actions are essentially a defense strategy, i.e. in response to the joint US-South Korean military exercises. Thus, in line with this narrative, North Korea considers the nuclear weapons development program a deterrent of sorts to an imminent invasion. The bias in decision-making exhibited in this case is ‘locking on one alternative.’ North Korea appears to be convinced that denuclearization would diminish its defense capabilities and expose it to an invasion – possibly from South Korea and its allies. Thus, the only way to deter an invasion would be to be nuclear-armed.

b) Relying on the Past

The other cognitive bias relates to the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). President Biden, in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, stated that “any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime” (Congressional Research Service – CRS, 2023). Metcalfe (2022) defines MAD as the doctrine whereby it is assumed that two players with nuclear capabilities are prevented from utilizing the said weapons against each other by the mere fact that both would be annihilated by such a move. More specifically, according to the author, from a theoretical perspective underpinning the MAD concept, “a nuclear attack by one superpower will be met with an overwhelming nuclear counterattack by their target — using early warning systems, automated missiles, airborne nuclear bombs, and missile-armed hidden submarines” (Metcalfe, 2022). The outcome would, thus, be the total annihilation of both the aggressor and the target. This appears to be the position pushed by Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, as stated above. This is a hardline position that does not help deescalate the situation. To a large extent, the US appears keen on ensuring that North Korea does not use its nuclear weapons against South Korea. The cognitive bias evident in this case is ‘relying on the past.’ Haller and Pry (2021) note that the concept of MAD – which they refer to as a Cold-war relic - has been effective in the past because of the capabilities of the US (or any other nuclear power for that matter) to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes if it is attacked first. However, as the authors further point out, the fact that various individual nations (such as China and Russia) have upped their nuclear capabilities means that an aggressor could possess capabilities for a disarming first strike that makes it difficult (or impossible) for the target to launch a retaliatory counterattack.

Overcoming the Biases

To overcome the first bias, i.e. ‘locking on one alternative, North Korea should consider, explore, and pursue other alternatives and channels to protect itself from external military aggression. One such alternative happens to be the establishment of strategic alliances with other states or nations, with the key goal in this case being to safeguard the security as well as freedom of each other. An example of such an alliance happens to be NATO.

When it comes to the second bias, i.e. ‘relying on the past’, the United States could overcome the said bias by coming to terms with the fact that the world is a dynamic place and factors or circumstances that may have governed events in the past could have shifted. More specifically, the US should embrace a proactive as opposed to a reactive approach to the problem.

Recommendation to Policy Makers

As a policy advisor, my number one recommendation to the policy maker(s) in this case would be for the United States (and its international partners and allies) to guarantee North Korea of its safety and offer enhanced incentives for the said country to abandon its nuclear weapons plan. Safety guarantees could in this case be offered by way of halting US-South Korea joint military drills – or any other engagement that could be translated by North Korea as being a threat to its national security. Further, efforts should be made to demonstrate to North Korea what it stands to gain if it abandons its nuclear program and becoming a member of the international community. There may be need to ensure that these efforts are mediated or spearheaded by a country seen by North Korea as being friendly. China fits the bill.