Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)

FACTS:

The injured passenger was standing on a platform waiting for the train to stop.

Another passenger attempted to jump on the slowing train and in the process dropped an unmarked package containing fireworks, which exploded and indirectly injured the waiting passenger standing several feet away.

The injured passenger (respondent) sued the Long Island Railroad Company (appellant) for negligence and the jury found in favor of the respondent.

The railroad company appealed the verdict and lost.

The railroad company then appealed to the New York Supreme Court.

The lower court found Long Island Railroad to be negligent for the injuries caused to the respondent. An appellate court affirmed. The issue brought before New York Supreme Court was whether the railroad was proximately negligent for unforeseen injuries caused to a passenger by another passenger?

LAW: Negligence must invade a legally protected right (Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170), must be reasonably foreseeable, and proximately result in a wrong to the person making the claim of negligence (McSherry, C.J., in W. Va. Central R. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666; cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Wood, 99 Va. 156, 158, 159; Hughes v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 71 N.H. 279, 284; U.S. Express Co. v. Everest, 72 Kan. 517; Emry v. Roanoke Nav. Co., 111 N.C. 94, 95; Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79; Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494; DiCaprio v N.Y.C.R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 94).

RATIONALE: The man who dropped the package was another passenger and not an employee of the railroad company. In addition, the package containing the fireworks was unmarked, therefore the railroad could not have reasonably foreseen the danger and is not proximately negligent. Since the act of negligence was committed by the person who dropped the package the respondent could have made a derivative claim of invasion of the right to bodily security, but this claim was not made and is therefore not a question addressed by the Court. The appellant could not have reasonably foreseen the danger that the dropped package posed to the respondent, therefore the claim of negligence is unsupported by the facts.

HOLDING: Judgment reversed.

Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954)

FACTS:

While both parties had been drinking, Lucy offered $50,000 to Zehmer for a farm.

In an effort to force Lucy to reveal that he did not have $50,000, Zehmer wrote up a contract for sale of the property and had his wife sign it.

When Lucy attempted to pay Zehmer the asking price, Zehmer refused despite admitting the price was more than fair.

Lucy sued Zehmer for specific performance and the lower court found in favor of Zehmer.

Lucy appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Intentions hidden from other parties to a contract are irrelevant to whether a contract is valid (17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 133 b., p. 483; Taliaferro v. Emery, 124 Va. 674, 98 S.E. 627; First Nat. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 VA. 99, 114, 192 S.E. 764, 770). In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, sharp dealing, or other forms of inequity, specific performance is typically awarded through the court's discretion (Bond v. Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 444, 69 S.E.(2d) 470, 475). Enforcement of court-ordered specific performance is indirect, through mechanisms such as contempt of court.