Philosophy concepts and foundations

¶ … Philosophy of Descartes and its rational transition through the stages of senses, self (Cogito) and God (Innate Idea). Find two criticisms on Descartes approach to philosophy.

While considering the argument over dreams, Descartes was guided to his position by a set of personal experiences. His test sample of one individual yielded the case that his mind was the producer of the images in his dream. He supposed from this resolution that he had no reason to believe that his mind was not similarly the producer of the images occupying his living experiences. However, the primary justification for obstructing such a transitive notion is that the commonality of interpretation from one individual to the next would suggest a certain universality in the perception of objects. This universality negates Descartes' self-directed view that the objects and devices he perceives are the invention of the mind. Instead, this speaks to the aforementioned notion that the objects present in the dreams are the mind's reflection of its own experiences while awake.

This lends to other refutations of Descartes' experience due to its being one solely inclined by his personal disposition. In particular, it seems an argument of individual convenience to contend that the similarities between the dream world and the corporeal illustrate a firm doubt that that which we perceive to be real is actually part of some sustained dream state. Such is a conditional statement which, under the auspices of Descartes' sensory argument, is given credence. However, it is through the very defined sensory distinctions between dreaming and living that Descartes' argument surrenders its merit. That is, while the objects and devices appearing in our dreams may be representations of these objects as they appear in the waking state, these objects are incapable of having the same impact. "The experience of, for example, thinking your bed is on fire, and being sound asleep and thinking in your dream that you bed is on fire, are "experiences" in different senses of the word" (Pastor, 1) The latter of these is, common to many distressful scenarios which may occupy our dreams, capable of accelerating the heartbeat, inspiring fear and causing perspiration. It is, however, incapable of actually levying any physical harm against an individual. While one may dream to be experiencing the repercussions of laying in a burning bed, the body will not suffer the consequences. Contrarily, if one perceives his bed to be on fire while in a waking state, it is certain to be accompanied by a feeling of intense physical pain which could leave no doubt as to the individual's level of consciousness.

This points to the primary detraction from Descartes' argument.

2. Lockean search for reality can be summarized as a "Journey from simple ideas to complex ideas." Yes/No. Explain. Atheism of Locke can be disproved from various view points. Can you come up with a few?

Locke, in seeking to characterize "qualities," as facts which serve to define objects or, as an extension of that, which serves to define people, assesses those ideas taken simply and for granted as actually being quite complex. Indeed, he notes that in our comprehension of reality, the primary and secondary qualities which we intuit to be associated to seemingly simple objects and ideas will actually reveal rather complex ideas. To the point, Locke describes primary qualities as those which establish the constant and unalterable nature of objects such as their bulk, solidity, extension and motion/rest. Secondary qualities are somewhat more abstract in nature, described as those sensations elicited from us upon interaction with an object in question. More directly, these secondary qualities are those sensations that are derived in us as a result of the primary qualities.

Locke's prime impulse in exploring the qualities of an object in this way seems to be designed of a need to distinguish between what can be considered absolute and what cannot. Indeed, it can be deduced from Locke's explanation that while there are universal constants, subjects to the laws of nature, absolutes lose value of application in human interpretation, which becomes the source for secondary qualities. While the former category is immutable, the latter is relative. Naturally, this idea of absolutes as those ideas and conditions with cannot apply to the secondary qualities of an object denotes that such characteristics would be difficult to apply to an unseen divine figure.

Concerning a topic as perilously subject to the laws of prejudice as defining reality of observation vs. perception responsive behavior, drawing distinctions in the simple and esoteric device of weight and body differences in a grain of wheat as Locke does in one example actually glosses over a barbed wire field of larger questions about personal experiences, cultural differences, intellectual capabilities and a host of other factors that may create a perception of the divine. This is particularly driven by the argument that Locke's atheism relies too heavily on the nature of man's perception, which as we can see in Descartes' consideration for one, is a deeply individualistic experience even in the face of something allegedly simple as a grain of wheat. This individualism discounts Locke's insistence that the absence of so-called absolutes as a way to comprehend God will fail the beholder, instead suggesting this to be a consideration due for subjective observation.

3.

Bishop Berkeley could not take the Atheistic scientism of Locke. And so he made a "Spiritual world" of finite and infinite kinds. Do you agree with this statement? Yes/No. Why?

For Berkeley, a devout Irish protestant with a heavy involvement in the Church right up to his appointment as a Bishop, the philosophy of immaterialism rejected such absolutism as that which seemed to limit Locke's conception of things. This is ironic because at the outset, it appears that Berkeley may also prove himself driven by terms of concrete observation. An ideology that was largely rejected and critically abused at the time of its inception into the academic discourse, Berkeley would argue that the world is fully constructed of that which our minds manifest.

At the root of this argument though, by a strict and defined contrast from that which Lock offered on the subject, is the fundamental requirement of God in the actualization of this theory. As Berkeley denotes in one work, 'Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,' that "the spirit that moves, the Intellect that guides / Th' eternal One that o'er the Whole presides. / Go learn'd mechanic, stare with stupid eyes, / Attribute to all figure, weight and size." (Berkeley, 1)

This seems a fairly aggressive and direct attack on the Locke ideology, which presumes far too much of the world based on the primary qualities of physical body discussed here. Berkeley balks at the implications of the grain analogy, instead here promoting the idea that all those things which we perceive in the finite spiritual world are projected by an infinite spiritual world. In other words, the finite nature of man and objects is underscored by the infinite proposition in which God's mind has manifested images, objects and ideas which we therefore perceive on this plane.

4.

Hume's "Matter of Facts and Relations of Ideas" contribute a lot to philosophy. While making his arguments where he needs more accuracy? And why? Could he successfully defend atheism?

In our investigation here Scottish empiricist David Hume provides a framework for understanding knowledge that is pragmatic, individualistic and, therefore, driven by experience. The result is an account which is almost inherently atheistic in its assertion of individuality as an important force in comprehension.

In the primary work by Hume, it is contended "that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it." (Hume, 6) To Hume's perception, and the perspective of this account, the human perspective is an individual filter of details which promotes distinctly differing conceptions of rationality. This is an approach which tends to define knowledge in inherently flexible terms, contingent distinctly upon experiences which differ from one person to the next. Thus, the idea that God is manifested in our perceptions depends on a constancy of perception amongst individuals. The impossibility of such a condition underscores Hume's successful defense of atheism.

Still, there are regards in which this position could benefit from greater accuracy. Namely, in contrast to the empirical perspective espoused by Hume, there is a more absolutist belief system which engages knowledge quite oppositely. To those in this school of thought, there is a belief that rationality is the formulating constant allowing for the assumption of absolute cognitive and moral principles. A fundamental belief in a moral and rational order defined by a divine power, as a prominent example, will tend to refute the concept that knowledge could somehow be mutable according to perspective. Instead, it is considered rational for all sound and reasoning individuals to achieve certain degrees of consensus on those 'certainties' which may be considered as knowledge.

5. Kant's "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy is in his genius use of the positive aspects of Rationalism (Descartes and so on) and Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley and Hume). How can you argue this out with the help of the "Critique of Pure Reason"?

The human experience of negotiating the universe as it seems to be presented to us is one governed by a great many assumptions. Our education of this process, and in particular our capacity to become adept or even talented in various faculties thereto, is created by experience. In experience, we gain the evolving abilities to relate to objects which we can perceive in our world. However, in order to accomplish this, there are any number of beliefs which must be possessed in us that will create a framework wherein such relating can occur. These beliefs -- and the practical, ideological and physiological experiences which are dependent upon them -- are somehow instinctually incorporated into human thought as knowledge. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is concerned both with the process by which we have assumed such 'knowledge' and with the implications that such assumptions have on our approach to the mortal realm. In his discourse, he approaches space and time as two principles which occupy such a disposition in our shared consciousness and herein offers insight into the transcendental notion of human perception as a reflection of the self rather than of 'reality.'

Immanuel Kant may perhaps be regarded as our most important metaphysical philosopher for the assimilation of a great breadth of scientific knowledge with an unparalleled insight into questions over existence, man's relationship to the universe and the inherent nature of man to strive for answers to questions beyond his pale of understanding. Key works composed by and about Kant's explorations of all of the above disciplines indicate that the thinker viewed scientific ingenuity as a natural extension man's senses and as a manifestation of human impulse to challenge, create and comprehend. It was thus that he worked to elevate empiricism as a key element of his rationalist ideology.

Kant's metaphysical perspective within the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' with its emphasis on human perception as an end to the means of scientific progress, espoused the idea that the tangible result of empirical science represented a high act of moral responsibility by its creator to the betterment of collective human living standards.

In his discussion on reason, Kant would find rationalizations for the continual probing of our capacity to understand and even harness the great forces of the universe, suggesting that for Kant, the relationship between spiritual and mortal concerns was in many ways based in this plane of scientific innovation. .

6. The self in world experiences "fear and trembling" in front of faith or God. This paradox of religious ideality and models is clearly seen in the figure of "Abraham." Describe it out with Kierkegaard.

The existentialist considerations of Kierkegaard are particularly intriguing to our discussion as they reveal a mold for the consideration of God which pays due respect to the role which human emotion, perception and even social systems play into religiosity. Accordingly, he makes the challenging argument that as we develop our individual relationships with the physical and the spiritual, we come to achieve a relationship with God less based on rational presumption or empirical observation. Instead, he attributes this relationship to something more fundamentally psychological or emotional in the beholder.

To this point, he denotes that "religion is made meaningful and relevant by our passionate commitment to what we believe and what we want out of life, regardless of whether it can be rationally and mathematically described. For the religious person to say that such-and-such is 'true,' they are saying that it is 'true for me' because it is a truth that this person lives in an immediate and existential way rather than simply observes at a distance." (Cline, 1)

Kierkegaard defends this position as having a basis in the scriptures, recounting Abraham's horrible dilemma when God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac. Here, the biblical allegory is invoked for its demonstration of pure faith, separate from the empirical or rational considerations of human morality that might have prevented Abraham from agreeing to the act. Though the act is not carried out -- a reward for Abraham's faith to say the least -- Kierkegaard views this as the type of impassioned commitment that one assumes with God based on personalized and individualized experiences. The nature of Abraham's faith, to this point, would take him to the peak of a mountain with his son in a stark demonstration of the sense of this commitment.

7. Marcel's contribution to "Inter-subjectivity" is unique and important. How and why?

The importance of Marcel's contributions to the field of philosophy revolves on that which he offers us on the subject of human relationships. The notion of inter-subjectivity is a crucial element of what Marcel describes in the capacity of one individual to relate properly to another. The concept is important for helping to define the civility, conscientiousness and compassion which are derived from this experience of understanding the world and its encounters as they are likely to be understood through the eyes of another individual. The concept of intersubjectivity serves an important function here, denoting that as part of the social experience of being human, the way that we relate to others is underscored by our ability to define morality and rightness within the practical confines of the relationship.

This points to what Marcel refers to as spiritual availability. He defines this as "entering into one another's lives through different disposabilities. Disposability is the condition for the possibility of an openness to the other. Not only can we permeate one another but also there is a sympathetic resonance that moves beyond those involved." (Kidd, 1) This is to say that Marcel's ideas are of particular importance for their simultaneous nuance and universality. Namely, Marcel changes a discourse of morality almost always driven by behavioral codes or theological prescriptions. Here, instead, he leaves these moral decisions where other individuals are concerned to the 'intersubjectivity' which might allow us not just to do right by those whom we know but to use these interactions and experiences as a way to project a proper template for behavior and moral orientation in all of one's dealings. Particularly for its emphasis on human systems as a way to define moral behavior, Marcel draws the nature of this discourse somewhat closer to our pedestrian experiences, making it valuable and easily applicable.

8. Jean Paul Sartre and his atheistic philosophy

The school of thought supporting existentialism is distinguished in the attention which it devotes to questioning the rift between the individual's instinctual experience of the universe and the frequently obscuring impingement of the collective. With the ideology emerging from an essentially negativist understanding of this rift, Sartre's would speak on this point with a distinctive bent toward rejection of collectively driven theological impulses. An article from the New York Times, speaking on the subject of Sartre's dramatic rejection of the Nobel Laureate honorin 1964, reinforces the appropriateness of the author's decision, describing the existential movement according to an atheistic precept distinguishing it from institutionalization of any kind. As the article explains, "for the existentialist God does not exist and the world is just a phenomenon without any meaning other than what man may attach to it." (Special, 1). Thus, fundamental to this ideology is the belief that institutions designed by man to convey their own distinct and self-motivated conceptions of truth are diametrically opposed to the liberty of the existentialist. This is a notion that applies to academic institutions, governments and, indeed, to award committees. It is quickly detectable that, in spite of what we might perceive as an extremely reputable organization, the Nobel group is ideology distinct from the existentialist thinker whom it sought to honor in 1964. In response to Sartre's refusal, in fact, the academy's secretary, Karl Ragnar Gierow is reported to have contended that thought it had been forewarned of his intended refusal, the organization chose Sartre because of his work's "vast influence on our times, mainly through its spirit of liberty and quest for truth." (1) The explanation here points to a contradiction likely suffered by Sartre, whose very philosophy rejects the merit of institutional recognition of universal truths or collectively pertinent values.

According to existentialist ideology, the cause for rejection of such universal truths is the frequency with which these tend to force a conflation between individual desire and the pressures imposed by larger systems such as societies and governments. This conflation will tend to eliminate free-will in the individual who is unaware that such a phenomenon has taken place. It is understandable, therefore, that Sartre approached the notion of accepting the award as the dangerous prospect of endorsing a single vision of truth as defined according to an elite academic organization's determination or to an organized religious institution. Beyond the hypocrisy implied by an endorsement of the Nobel organization, Sartre might well have been forced to thereafter recognize his own complicity in the subversion of the free will of men. Naturally, anything resembling this concession could be taken as an outright contradiction to that articulation of atheism which had earned Sartre his high accolades.

9. Nietzsche still lives in our hearts and minds in different forms. The quest for selfhood takes its extreme forms in many life situations. Substantiate.

One of the central preoccupations which must extend from the atheism at focus throughout this series of discussions is that of the self. In relationships with god and others, it is frequently the case that individual perception enters into our midst. This serves to suggest that the manner in which we tend to define these areas of life will be a reflection of ourselves and vice versa. And to the point, this is a deeply complex relationship that Friedrich Nietszche argued that the ability to know, define or even recognize the self is quite frequently obstructed by a willful institutional disdain for independent though.

This idea is offered by Nietzsche in his The Gay Science, where he remarks that "for an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys, and rights -- that may well have been considered hitherto as the most outrageous human aberration and as idolatry itself." (Nietzsche, 143) This is to make the claim that we are far too committed to achieving that which we anticipate by regard of others will be a prompt to positive life experience. As is noted in Nietzsche's remark, there are unnumbered powerful forces at work obstructing this independent equation toward personal balance.