Restorative Justice and the Contingent Exclusionary Rule

From my knowledge in taking this course thus far as well as with my knowledge of being certified as a police officer, my position for how Dripps model would work is that it would not work. From reviewing and researching his model, I believe his model is very anti-police and seems to take the stance that all police departments and judicial systems have some type of buddy system that embraces corruption in criminal justice. That is something that I completely disagree with. In his article it states that, “The judge is not offering to cancel the suppression order if the police department mows the judge's lawn or provides free security at rock concerts. The judge is offering to rescind one, purely deterrent, remedy if and only if the government submits to another remedy that deters equally and compensates better” (Dripps, 2001). This to me is incredibly offensive that one would believe that initially the system is that corrupt and two that increasing compensation from police departments is going to make anything better. In my opinion, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be expanded on as most officers, certainly not all, are out to help and are not doing things so malicious to warrant a mistake being so costly for the officer and his department. We should remember that “the purpose of the rule is to deter law enforcement officers from conducting searches or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment and to provide remedies to defendants whose rights have been infringed” (Jurkowski, 2017). This remedy is a deterrent and not a punishment as set forth by Dripps.
Heather
The main goal of the criminal justice system is to identify and control crime. There are two different approaches in the criminal justice system. The first being towards rehabilitation the centers around the Old Testament approach of "an eye for an eye". The other form is restorative justice which focuses on trying to build better relationships and to help victims ad offenders find a peace and move forward. Rehabilitation is the more modern approach in the system. The exclusionary rule prohibits unlawful searches and seizures which in turn can affect this process. "The exclusionary rule permits a criminal defendant to prevent the prosecution from introducing at trial otherwise admissible evidence that was obtained in violation of the Constitution" (Exlusionary Rule, 2018). Dripps suggested a contingent exclusionary rule where the exclusionary rule would still be enforced but most searches and seizures would be legal. In the criminal justice system, many people are let go because of the exclusionary rule even though they are guilty. If we allow searches and seizures that are not deliberate and intentional should be allowed because the truth is more important than assuring rights of criminals. I'm not saying criminals need to be treated unconstitutionally and not everyone IS a criminal. But we have to look at the bigger picture as far as the safety of the community verses someone's rights or privacy. Dribbs exclusionary rule could mesh with restorative justice because it involves rehabbing the right people and making sure they are moving in the right direction. This would also help probation and parole officers find out the true colors of people and could allow for searches that could help people achieve lasting rehabilitation. There has to be a balance between safety and our rights. Psalm 82:3 says, "Give justice to the weak and the fatherless; maintain the right of the afflicted and destitute".
Response:
On the one hand, Jordan is directly on point in the observation that the exclusionary rule should be expanded to take into account the unique circumstances in which law enforcement authorities operate. Indeed, assuming that the overwhelming majority of police officers act in good faith with the overarching objective of protecting and serving the public, it is just common sense to apply the good faith exception more broadly, particularly in situations where the serendipitous discovery of evidence could not have been obtained otherwise.
On the other hand, though, it should also be pointed out that the exclusionary rule’s good faith exception that allows the introduction of evidence “discovered by officers acting in good faith” is also qualified by the requirement that such discoveries are made “in reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they were authorized to take those actions” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., p. 564). This stipulation means that evaluating and interpreting the various actions that are taken by police officers in a given fact situation invariably require a highly subjective analysis by the courts to determine if (a) they were acting in good faith and (b) they were mistaken as to what actions they believed they were authorized to take.
Clearly, this type of subjective assessment is fraught with opportunities for admitting evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment if a particular judge holds that both conditions were satisfied. Moreover, the good faith exception also already provides for the admission of any resulting “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine” provided that the “knowledge of facts gained independently of the original and tainted search” (Black’s, 1990, p. 670). In sum, rather than being primarily “anti-police,” as Jordan suggests, I believe the Dripps’ model is more “pro-Fourth Amendment rights” and includes sufficient protections for both the prosecution and defense to provide the framework needed to adjudicate contingent exclusionary rule cases. This also means that legalizing the majority of searches and seizures in an effort to help those who are targeted as noted by Heather is contrary to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
Certainly, the American public is rightfully nervous in the post-9/11 world, and the interests of the United States are threatened at home and abroad. This looming threat, however, should not be used to degrade the civil liberty protections afforded by the Bill of Rights nor should it be used to expand the authority of police officers to use their own personal judgment as to when a search and seizure is warranted absent any other compelling reason besides their personal judgment.
This is not to say, of course, that most – if any – police officers would exploit any expansion of their newfound ability to search and seize evidence and act on any information they obtain thereby, but it is to say the potential exists for the abuse of any such expanded authority in ways that will inevitably be violative of the key provisions of the Fourth Amendment in police officers’ zeal to obtain restorative justice for crime victims. In fact, it is not the responsibility of law enforcement authorities to ensure that defendants are “moving in the right direction” -- after all, they are not social workers but officers of the court charged with enforcing the law according to the protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution, including most especially the Fourth Amendment’s protections concerning illegal searches and seizures. As the common law dictum emphasizes, “It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it, the storm may enter, the rain may enter; but the king of England cannot enter!”